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ABSTRACT 
Three Essays on Bank Efficiency 
Yi-Kai Chen 
Eric James Higgins 
 
Since commercial banks play important roles in the financial markets, it is 
important to evaluate whether banks operate efficiently.  Moreover, given increased 
competition from non-bank financial institutions, commercial banks should operate 
more efficiently than they did previously.  Commercial banks might operate more 
efficiently if they have superior information.  If this is true, bank size should not 
matter to the operation of the bank.  Thus, as long as the bank has superior 
information, it will operate more efficiently.  Therefore, is it necessary that banks 
should be big to be efficient?  Will the numbers of small commercial banks decrease?  
This dissertation will investigate the survival value of small commercial banks. 
There are three essays related to X-efficiencies in U.S. commercial banks in 
this dissertation.  First, the relation between commercial banks' X-efficiency and 
agricultural factors is examined.  Two hypotheses are examined in this essay.  First, 
pairwise comparison tests and regression analyses are used to test relations between 
X-efficiency and bank size, location, and specialization.  Second, the relation between 
bank X-efficiency and agricultural factors at the county level is examined.  Like 
previous studies, economies of scale are shown to exist in the banking industry.  
However, the degree of scale efficiency is found to be related to loan specialization.  
ix 
 
 
Larger is not always better for banks with loan specialties in agriculture.  Furthermore, 
agricultural factors, regarded as a proxy for local economic activity, have a significant 
impact on small agricultural banks.  The second essay examines the degree to which 
commercial bank X-efficiencies are affected through time by monetary policy and 
macro economic factors.  We are able to document that X-efficiency does change 
through time in a predictable manner.  Finally, in the third essay, an improvement in 
the methodology for calculating bank X-efficiency is examined.  The improvement is 
designed to solve the problems associated with using cross-sectional and time-series 
panel data.  The improved methodology is used to re-examine the empirical results 
found in the first two essays. 
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CHAPTER 1 
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
1.1 Background 
Because banks still play certain important roles in the financial market, it is 
important to evaluate whether banks operate efficiently.  Recently, the financial market 
has become more competitive.  In order to compete with non-bank, financial institutions, 
banks should be increasing their levels of efficiency.  The size of banks has also become 
an important issue.  Because of the deregulation in the banking industry, there is a trend 
for banks to merge with others and become larger in size.  These trends leave survival 
questions that must be answered.  Is it necessary that banks should be big to achieve scale 
economies?  If economies of scale do exist, is there any survival value of small banks?  
Do banks with a variety of financial service products operate more efficiency than the 
banks with specialties?  This dissertation attempts to answer these questions by 
examining the efficiency of agricultural lending, in comparison to the banking industry as 
a whole.  The dissertation also examines the time series pattern of bank efficiency to 
determine what factors have influenced efficiency changes.  Finally, the dissertation 
proposes a new estimation technique for bank efficiency.  
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Information asymmetry is the advantage that banks have over other financial 
institutions.  From this perspective, bank size does not matter to the operation of the 
bank.  As long as banks have superior information, they will operate more efficiently.  
Recently, the increased competition between banks and non-bank financial institutions 
has increased, especially in the metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs).1  Larger banks 
might have advantages of scale economies. However, scale and scope economies may not 
apply in the non-metropolitan statistical areas (non-MSAs).  Given that non-MSAs are 
generally associated with rural areas, it is likely that agricultural products are the major 
outputs in this area.2  Logically, agricultural loans should be one of the important 
financial services provided by local banks.  Thus, agricultural lending should play an 
important role in the rural market. What kinds of banks should specialize in the 
agricultural lending?  Does bank size matter to the efficiency of agricultural lending in 
the non-MSA financial market?  Are there any local economic factors that might affect 
the efficiency of the rural bank?  One of the major purposes of this dissertation is to 
examine rural agricultural bank efficiency and determine the factors that influence 
efficiency at these agricultural banks. 
                                                                                                                                                 
1 The general concept of a metropolitan area (MA) is one of a large population nucleus, together with 
adjacent communities that have a high degree of economic and social integration with that nucleus.  
Metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) are relatively freestanding MAs and are not closely associated with 
other MAs.  These areas are typically surrounded by non-metropolitan counties.  The source of the 
definition is from http://www.calmis.cahwnet.gov/htmlfile/msadef.htm 
2 Jayaratne and Wolken (1999) assume that the MSA is the relevant geographic area for urban banking 
markets and the non-MSA county for rural markets. Usually, the antitrust regulators also routinely make 
this assumption. 
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Another recent trend in the banking industry is consolidation.  Figure 1 shows that 
in the first quarter of 1988 there were 14765 banks, 13537 of which were classified as 
traditional commercial banks.  By the last quarter of 1997, there were 10466 total banks.  
9147 of which were commercial banks.  Given this degree of decline, can small banks 
survive?  To answer this question, it is necessary to consider solving the problem of 
information asymmetry between the bank and the investor.  Superior information 
obtained from their customers is one of the advantages that banks have in the financial 
market.  The relationship between banks and customers also is also essential in obtaining 
reliable information.  Maintaining relationships with their customers is an important issue 
to banks.  On the other hand, in order to maintain or extend credit from the bank, bank 
customers might need to have a relationship with a specific bank.  Under this 
circumstance, relationship lending will be important to ensure bank efficiency.  In 
general, smaller banks might have more flexibility to deal with their customers because 
they have better relationships with their customers. In other words, larger banks might 
not be as flexible as smaller banks to satisfy various customers’ needs.  Hence, smaller 
banks might do a better job in relationship lending than larger banks.  However, moral 
hazard might occur in the process of relationship lending.  Loan officers at small banks 
might abuse the flexibility they have and adversely affect the cost and quality of the 
loans.  This dissertation examines whether the relationship with local customers of 
smaller banks will increase or decrease the efficiency of bank operation.  Thus, the 
dissertation will provide more information regarding the survival value of the smaller 
banks.  
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Bank efficiency might also be related to macroeconomic movements, such as 
monetary policy, interest rates changes, and bull and bear market conditions.  Logically, 
such macroeconomic events will influence the economy as a whole.  This economic 
impact may then affect banks and the efficiency of their operations.  On a local level, 
banks will be influenced by regional economic conditions.  The small rural banks are 
likely to be impacted by shocks to agricultural production.  Hence, the efficiency of 
smaller rural banks is likely to be influenced by agricultural conditions in the area.  
Larger banks that do not specialize in agricultural lending will not be affected by these 
local economic conditions.  Thus, the dissertation examines the impact of 
macroeconomic factors and agricultural factors on bank efficiency.  
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1.2 Objectives 
First, this dissertation investigates whether small banks in rural markets can 
survive under the pressure of bank mergers and consolidations.  Six categories of banks 
are examined in the dissertation.  The categories are commercial banks in MSAs, 
commercial banks in non-MSAs, agr icultural banks in non-MSAs, agricultural banks in 
MSAs, non-agricultural banks in non-MSAs, and non-agricultural banks in MSAs.3  This 
study hypothesizes that smaller banks might have some advantages, such as superior 
inside information because of better relationships with customers, flexible and favorable 
interest rates, and specialization in the specific rural area.  If the impact of these factors is 
positive on bank efficiency, those factors might be an advantage to small bank operation.  
If those factors have a negative impact on cost efficiency, they might imply that the 
problem of moral hazard might be a bigger issue in this study.  One of the objectives of 
the study is to differentiate the size of the bank and test whether there is a survival value 
to the small bank in the rural market.  Additionally, this dissertation examines the extent 
to which banks are influenced by local economic conditions through agricultural outputs.  
We examine Census of Agriculture data to determine what relationship, if any, 
agricultural outputs have on bank efficiency.  It is hypothesized that banks specializating 
in agriculture will be greatly impacted by agricultural outputs.  
                                                                                                                                                 
3 Ellinger (1994) defines agricultural banks as banks with more than 25% agricultural loans to total loans. 
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Therefore, the objective of the first essay is to find the linkage between the cost 
efficiency of the bank operation and agricultural factors.  Traditional X-efficiency 
methodology and a new estimation approach, developed in the third essay, are both 
employed to evaluate the efficiency of all commercial banks in the United States.  Two 
hypotheses are tested in this essay.  The first hypothesis examines bank efficiency in 
different categories, based on the bank size, specialties, and charter location.  We expect 
that if there is a benefit to being smaller, it will occur because of a bank’s specialization.  
Thus, we expect that smaller banks that choose to specialize in agricultural lending may 
be more efficient related to those banks that don’t.  This could suggest that a bank’s 
survival value is not based on its size but on its degree of specialization.  The second 
hypothesis investigates the relationship between bank efficiency and agricultural factors.  
Several agricultural factors and change in agricultural prices at both county and state 
level will be tested in the regression models.  Again, we expect agricultural banks to be 
much more sensitive to agricultural factors.  Thus, wile specialization may benefit the 
bank in terms of efficiency it may also increase the risk level of the bank. 
The second essay examines time-series patterns in X-efficiency estimates for 
banks.  The efficiency of the commercial banking industry in the United States might 
follow the business cycle or the cycle of bull and bear markets.  Lead and lag 
relationships will be tested in this dissertation.  However, because of the variety of 
definitions of business cycles and bull-bear markets, different models will be tested to 
determine the one that best explains the variance of X-inefficiency in banks.  Monetary 
policy and macroeconomic factors may also play an important role in affecting bank 
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operations.  Most literature on bank failures tends to deal with incidents of financial 
crisis, panic, or contagion.  Some attribute these episodes primarily to speculative attacks 
on the numeraire (Wigmore 1987; Donaldson 1992) or illiquidity shocks (Diamond and 
Dybvig 1983; Donaldson 1993), whereas others attribute these episodes to increased 
asymmetric information regarding the incidence of financial distress (Calomiris and Kahn 
1991; Bhattacharya and Thakor 1993; Kaufman 1994; Calomiris and Mason 1997).  
Recent corporate bankruptcy literature further distinguishes between failure arising from 
systemic events like crisis, panic, or contagion, and unrelated financial pressures (Denis 
and Denis 1995).  Though effective safety and soundness regulations should mitigate the 
risk of bank failures attributable to individual bank effects like fraud and 
mismanagement, the industry could still be susceptible to financial weakness arising from 
a general deterioration in economic conditions.  Such an occurrence could presumably 
lead to conditions of increased bank weakness that would cause a systemic crisis, panic, 
or contagion.  Thus, overall macroeconomic conditions should affect bank efficiency.  
Jensen, Mercer,and Johnson (1996), Kleim and Stambaugh (1986), Campbell (1987), 
Fama and French (1988, 1989), Schwert (1990), and Howton and Peterson (1998) all 
provide evidence that business condition proxies like dividend yields, default spreads, 
and term spreads explain significant variation in stock and bond spreads.  This study 
hypothesizes that similar indicators reflect the diversification and flexibility of bank loan 
portfolios.  Changes in portfolio condition will ultimately affect bank earnings and 
expenses, like interest revenue and loan chargeoffs.  Thus, business condition factors are 
also examined in this essay.  
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Finally, in the third essay, an improvement to the measurement of X-efficiency is 
examined.  X-efficiency is traditionally estimated using the translog function by 
employing input and output variables to form a cost efficient frontier of all banks.  The 
measurement of X-inefficiency is the distance between costs of banks deviating from the 
frontier.  In general, the input and output variables of the bank are accounting variables 
that estimate the total costs of the bank.  Panel data is used in estimating the X-efficiency 
of banks.  The estimation of the translog function is a second-order Taylor series 
expansion in output quantities and input prices.  Cross-sectional regression analysis is 
used to estimate the deviation of the bank’s cost from the efficiency frontier.  However, 
panel data also has time-series characteristics.  The error term of the translog function 
might not accurately represent the estimation of the distance if there is predictable time-
series variation.  Thus, the variance of the error term without considering the time series 
might be higher than that considering both the cross-section and time series. We propose 
an alternative approach that takes cross sectional and time series panel data into account 
to improve the estimation accuracy of the error term in the translog function. After the 
development of the alternative approach, the new approach is applied to the previous two 
empirical studies and makes comparisons between the original and alternative 
approaches. 
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1.3 Literature Review 
Bank efficiency has been discussed for years.  Recently, because of the rapid 
growth of financial markets and financial innovations, it has become more important to 
measure the efficiency of financial institutions.  If those financial institutions operate 
more efficiently, they might expect improved profitability and a greater amount of 
intermediated funds.  Consequently, the consumer might expect better prices and service 
quality and greater security and soundness of financial systems [Berger, Hunter, and 
Timme (1993)].  The academic research on the performance of financial institutions has 
increasingly concentrated on X-efficiency (or Frontier efficiency), that measures 
deviations in performance from that of best-practice firms on the efficient frontier, 
holding constant a number of exogenous market factors like the prices faced in local 
market.  The efficient frontier measures how well the financial institution performs 
relative to the predicted performance of the best firms facing the same market conditions 
in the industry.  X-efficiency often measures cost efficiency of institutions more 
accurately than does standard financial ratios [DeYoung (1997)].  Comparing the 
financial ratios of different banks is not appropriate unless the banks are nearly identical 
in term of product mix, bank size, market conditions, and other characteristics that can 
affect the costs of the banks.  Thus, statistical based “efficient cost frontier” approaches 
would measure efficiency more accurately.  There were 116 out of 130 studies related to 
financial institution frontier efficiency across 21 countries written or published during 
1992-1997 [Berger and Humphrey (1997)].  
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1.3.1 Liberation of Intra- and Inter- State Branching 
There are several factors that might affect the efficiency of the bank.  First, 
geographic deregulation has an impact on the bank operation.  The banking industry is 
highly regulated.  Theoretically, those regulations increase banks’ operating costs and 
decrease competition and efficiency within the industry.  Kalish and Gilbert (1973) tested 
whether regulations affect the operating efficiency of banks by using a bank efficiency 
index. 4  They assumed that bank operational efficiency has a positive relationship with 
the degrees of current competition and a negative relationship with the degrees of 
potential competition in the banking industry.  The statistical results show no significant 
effect on the banking industry for current and potential competition.  This means that 
regulations, causing banks to produce services and products at excessive costs, have no 
significant influence on bank operational efficiency.  
In the 1980s, deregulation in financial markets resulted in dramatic changes in the 
banking indus try.  Because of deregulation, the barriers to geographic expansion and 
interest rate ceilings were eliminated.  Thus, in the financial market, commercial banks 
experienced substantial competition from in-state banks, out-of-state banks, and non-
11 
 
bank rivals.  Kaufman (1995) suggests the existing regulatory framework is costly and 
imposes inefficiency. 5  This means that the regulation causes banks to make less profit 
and be at a greater disadvantage to their non- or less-regulated competitors.  Intuitively, 
the removal of the regulation would increase the efficiency level of the banking industry. 
However, Humphrey (1991) finds that deregulation leading to bank mergers 
might have expensive “one-time” expenditures to integrate back office operations and 
standardize banking products instead of reducing costs in the short run.  Moreover, 
acquiring banks, rather than removing excess branch office capacity, have tended to 
perpetuate the overcapacity conditions that might lead to higher costs.  Thus, deregulation 
might result in more costs to the banking industry and make the whole industry less 
efficient.  
In 1994, the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act was 
passed.6  Because of this geographic deregulation, there was more and more industry 
consolidation during 1980s.  Certainly, it decreased the share of assets held by small 
banks.  However, Calem (1994) showed that the decreased asset share of small banks was 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 The efficiency index is an estimate of the excessive cost of the bank per unit of output over the average 
cost the bank would incur if operated at maximum efficiency. 
5 On page 305, Kaufman referred to a study that reported the range of the regulatory cost in the banking 
industry in 1991 was between $7.5 billion and $17 billion, or between 6% to 17% of the banks’ total non-
interest expenses. 
6 The act was passed on September 13, 1994.  One year after enactment, a bank holding company (BHC) 
will be able to acquire banks in any state as long as certain conditions are met.  See Calem (1994), page 21. 
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caused by relaxation of in-state branching restrictions instead of relaxation of interstate 
restrictions.  He argued that the removal of in-state branching restrictions severely 
influenced small banks because such restrictions excluded many of these banks from 
achieving an efficient size.  After removal of the in-state restrictions, many small banks 
may seek potential merger partners or acquirers to reach economies of scale.  Thus, most 
banks would be close to an efficient size before the removal of interstate restrictions.  
Allowing banks to branch interstate would not have a major adverse impact on small 
bank efficiency.  Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (1996) also reviewed the impact of 
the Interstate Banking Efficiency Act of 1994 on risk diversification by using a structural 
model of production.  Their results suggested that increasing geographic and/or depositor 
diversification improved expected return.  Increases in branches also enhanced efficiency 
by making inefficient institutions closer to the efficient frontier in both the return and risk 
dimensions.  Evanoff (1998) also supported that allocative inefficiency was a factor 
before deregulation.  However, after deregulation, allocative inefficiency is nearly non-
existent.  Banks fully exploit scale economies by altering the production process to 
improve the efficiency of the bank after deregulation. 
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1.3.2 Interest Rate Ceiling Deregulation 
Interest rates play an important role in bank operations.  The major business of 
commercial banks is taking deposits and making loans.  When the interest rate increases, 
the cost of a bank’s liabilities also increases.  However, the interest rate of the bank’s 
loans will also increase.  In the past, interest rate ceilings kept deposit costs low creating 
less volatility in the spread between a bank’s deposits and liabilities.  Interest rate 
deregulation caused higher bank funding costs and lower bank profits in the early 1980s, 
because the cost of raising funds for commercial banks was closely related to interest 
rates in the money and capital market.7  This increased the volatility of raising funds for 
banks.  Lam and Chen (1985) expected that banks of different sizes (small and big banks) 
might react differently to changes in capital regulation because of the phase out of the 
interest rate ceiling.  Brown (1983) found the deregulation of interest rates gave more 
freedom to the small community bank.  However, community-oriented small banks might 
also be at risk to interest deregulation because of the their traditionally high concentration 
of low-cost deposits.  Brown shows that high-performance banks maintain the 
profitability by controlling non- interest expenses to compensate for decreased margins 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 The 1980 Depository Institution Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) phased out interest 
rate ceilings (Regulation Q) by 1986.  
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and when comparing the non- interest expenses, Brown shows that smaller banks are 
more efficient than the larger banks.8 
Humphrey and Pulley (1997) showed that large banks bore the brunt of interest 
rate deregulation between 1977-1981 and 1981-1984.9  Large banks tend minimize the 
negative impact on profits from the deregulation- induced rise in funding costs by 
adjusting their use of labor and capital inputs and deposit and loan output prices.  
However, between 1981-1984 and 1985-1988, the situation was reversed for the large 
banks.  According to the evidence of Humphrey and Pulley, smaller banks with assets 
between $100 and $500 million had done less adjustment to the deregulation.  Thus, 
those smaller banks less relied on the improved business environment in order to stabilize 
profitability and larger banks relied more on the business environment to improve their 
profitability.  The results also imply that the volatility of larger banks’ profits is higher 
than that of smaller banks after the deregulation of the interest rate ceiling.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
8 Brown (1993) suggests that productivity, low employment turnover, and reductions in staff are the major 
measures used to control costs.  
9 Large banks are those with assets over $500 million. 
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1.3.3 Legislation in the Agricultural Banking Industry 
In this dissertation, agricultural banks are examined.  The quality of agricultural 
loans will affect the cost of bank operations.  Thus, agricultural loans have a direct 
impact on operational efficiency for agricultural banks.  Therefore, regulation in the 
agricultural loan sector will play role in the efficiency of agricultural banks.  The history 
of federal legislation on farm credit shows a federal mandate to channel credit to the farm 
sector.  The Federal Land Bank system was formed in 1917.  In 1930s, the system was 
expanded to the Farm Credit System under the aegis of the New Deal.  The agency was 
re-capitalized to Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation (Farmer Mac), which allows 
financial institutions to sell certain agricultural and rural housing loans in a secondary 
market [Gilbert and Kliesen (1995)].  Gilbert and Kliesen indicated that agricultural 
banks as a group were more profitable than other banks from 1970 through 1983.10  
However, due to the low capital ratio of agricultural banks, many agricultural banks 
failed during the period from 1984 to 1987.  
Belongia and Gilbert (1990) indicated that two major adverse shocks in 1920s and 
1980s caused problems in the performance of agricultural banks because of the 
undiversified loan portfolios held by the agricultural banks.  Gilbert and Kliesen (1995) 
                                                                                                                                                 
10 The Competitive Equity Banking Act of 1987 (CEBA) created a special program for banks with total 
assets less than $100 million and agricultural loans more than 25% of their total loans.  Qualifying banks 
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also suggested that regulators could require banks with higher ratios of agricultural loans 
to total assets to maintain their higher capital ratios.11  Their results proved that there are 
no significant rewards to society from relaxing the safety and soundness regulations that 
apply to banks that specialize in agricultural lending.  
 
 
1.3.4 Relationship Banking 
The relationship between the customers of agricultural loans and banks is a major 
issue that this dissertation focuses on.  Relationship lending should play a key role in 
small business and agricultural loans.  Although the entry of mutual funds and non-bank 
financial institutions increases the competition for banks, they still play a major role in 
this market because they decrease the level of asymmetry information by producing and 
analyzing information.  Berger and Udell (1995) found that the relationship between 
banks and their small- firm borrowers are valuable.  Small- firm borrowers with longer 
banking relationships pay lower interest rates and are less likely to pledge collateral.  
                                                                                                                                                 
were allowed to write off their loan losses over several years.  However, CEBA does not reflect special 
regulation for agricultural banks.  
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Petersen and Rajan (1994) suggested that the availability of finance from banks increases 
as the small firm spends more time in a relationship, as it increases ties to a bank by 
expanding the number of financial services it buys from the bank, and as it concentrates 
its borrowing with the bank.  Thus, Petersen and Rajan (1994) suggest that a firm with 
close ties to a specific financial institutions should have lower cost of capital and greater 
availability of funds than that without such ties if scale economies exist in information 
production and information is durable and not transferred easily.  
However, young firms who get loans from banks are more indebted in 
concentrated markets than in competitive markets.  Yet, the pattern reverses for older 
firms.  It seems that banks try to smooth interest rates over the life cycle of the firm in a 
concentrated market.  In other words, banks charge lower than competitive rates when the 
firm is young and higher than competitive rate when the firm becomes old.  Cole (1998) 
shows that pre-existing relationships between the firm and the bank, like pre-existing 
saving accounts and financial management services at the lender, are important.  These 
relationships are important factors in determining the likelihood of the extension of credit 
to the firm.  It means that such relationships generate valuable private information about 
                                                                                                                                                 
11 Gilbert and Kliesen (1995) indicated that banks with higher proportions of agricultural loans to total 
assets did not tend to have higher capital ratios in 1993.  Thus, higher capital ratio requirements can reduce 
the credit risk of agricultural banks.  
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the firm’s financial situation. 12  Elsas and Krahnen (1998) also find information- intensive 
lender-borrower relations in Germany.  Boot and Thakor (2000) suggest that there is 
more transaction lending at lower levels of interbank competition than higher levels.13  
Competition in the banking industry will increase relationship lending.  However, each 
loan will have less value added for the borrower. Relationship loans will have higher 
added value for borrowers if capital market competition is higher. 
Ferri and Messori (2000) examine relationship banking in three macro-areas in 
Italy.  They show that relationship banking is characterized by both the fast-growing area 
and the marginal area of dependent development.  They conclude that relationship-
banking patterns would become efficient only if they encourage efficient banks to 
promote autonomous local development to supply credit flows and more sophisticated 
financial services.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
12 Cole (1998) demonstrates that the length of the relationship is unimportant.  However, the bank is less 
likely to extend credit to firms with multiple sources of financial services.  
13 Berlin and Mester (1998) suggest that credit scoring models and securitization remake the small business 
lending market in the image of the consumer loan market.  Transaction lending is usually the way that 
larger banks make small-business loans.  Relationship lending is characterized by close monitoring, re-
negotiability, and implicit long-term contractual agreements.  Commercial banks, especially small banks, 
dominate in the small-business loan market by using traditional relationship lending. 
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1.3.5 Bank’s Roles in the Rural Financial Market 
Urban and rural markets can be regarded as two major markets of commercial 
banks.  In the urban areas or metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), larger banks might 
reach economic scale and take advantage of their branching opportunities.  Thus, because 
of the competition, larger banks might perform better and become more efficient than 
smaller banks in these areas.  However, in the rural market, the competition level of 
banks might vary.  Since the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency 
Act, larger banks could enter the rural market that they previously may have ignored.  
Weber and Devaney (1998) investigated the relationship between the bank efficiency and 
community lending in the Lower Mississippi Delta Region (LMDR).14  They found that 
rural banks were less technically efficient because they might be constrained from 
loaning outside of their local market, compared with the multi-state bank holding 
companies that can underwrite loans to broader geographic regions.  Thus, a lack of 
credit worthy borrowers might lead to less efficiency in rural banks.  Gilbert (1997) and 
Gilbert (2000) asserted, however, that the entry of larger banks in the rural market after 
the deregulation of the interstate branching would enhance competition in rural financial 
markets. 
                                                                                                                                                 
14 The LMDR in Weber and Devaney (1998) study, included Arkansas (38 counties), Illinois (11 counties), 
Kentucky (11 counties), Louisiana (30 counties), Mississippi (38 counties), Missouri (29 counties), and 
Tennessee (19 counties). 176 out of 219 counties are rural counties.  
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The evidence of Gilbert and Belongia (1988) shows that the percentage of lending 
to farmers has had an inverse relationship to the size of their parent organization among 
those banks in rural areas.  This means that the gap in agricultural loan ratio is positively 
related to the asset size of the bank holding companies.  Gilbert and Belongia suggest that 
their results show that larger banks might be able to diversify their loans in other markets.  
Thus, banking consolidation may restrict the access of farmers to credit from banks.  In 
other words, rural banks that are not subsidiaries of large banks or bank holding 
companies have less opportunity to diversify risk in their loan portfolios.  Thus, smaller 
rural banks without any affiliation with large banks or bank holding companies might 
invest a relatively higher percentage of their assets in agricultural loans because they 
have a limited choice for lending opportunities.  This implies that when rural banks 
became larger and were acquired by the out-of-state larger banks or bank holding 
companies, local borrowers, especial farmers, might have less available credit from the 
banks.  However, Featherstone (1996) finds the opposite to be true.  On average, he 
observed that rural banks did not tend to reduce the percentage of agricultural loans to the 
total loans three-year after a bank consolidation.  He found a positive relationship 
between the agricultural loan ratios of the acquired banks and the acquiring banks.  He 
found that relatively larger banks specializing in agricultural loans acquired smaller 
banks also specializing in the same industry.  Keeton (1996) also finds similar results.  
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He did not find a significant reduction of rural business and agricultural lending during 
the first three years after a bank merger.15  Yet, out-of-state acquisition of rural banks 
owned by urban organizations reduced business lending by 34 percent over three years.  
Jayartne and Strahan (1996) found that the growth of income at the state level is 
influenced by the relaxation of branching restriction.  They show that liberalizing 
branching restriction stimulated state economic growth.  Yet, the results only indicated 
gains at the state level not the county level.  Thus, whether deregulation in the rural 
financial markets would stimulate local economic growth is still an ambiguous picture. 
Gilbert (1997) suggests that large banking organizations would dominate in most 
rural counties.  However, he mentioned that the recent changes in bank regulation were 
favorable to reduce the regulatory burden of relatively small banks.  Because of the 
regulatory relief to the smaller bank, those smaller banks would become an important 
source of credit for rural business and residents that were not served by the large banking 
organizations.  In order to survive in the rural market dominated by larger banking 
organizations, smaller banks in the rural market would provide more service and operate 
more efficiently in their communities.  The results from Neff and Ellinger (1996) are also 
interesting.  They examined the participants in rural bank consolidations.  They showed 
that rural banks with considerable agricultural lending had not been the primary targets of 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 Keeton (1996) used commercial and industrial loans as the measure of business loans, and the sum of 
farm operating and farm real estate loans was used as the measure of farm loans. 
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acquisitions involving interstate combinations.  This implies that consolidation in rural 
banking industry would not significantly affect the accessible farm loan credit.  Thus, if 
the rural agricultural banks are profitable, they should survive and perhaps be more 
efficient than their non-agricultural competitors.16  
We assume that the accessibility and availability of agricultural loans has positive 
relationship to the expansion of agricultural production.  Thus, does lack of access to 
agricultural loans constrain agricultural production?  Kochar (1997) examined whether 
the access to formal credit affected the agricultural production in rural India.  The results 
show that the relationship between the availability of agricultural loans and agricultural 
production is positively significant in the rural India.  Drabenstott (1999) also indicated 
that rural businesses were forced to rely more on loans rather than equity capital to 
finance their operations.  This situation might also be applied in the agricultural industry.   
Local farmers may have limited sources to raise the funds.  Agricultural loans may be 
their major source of funds.  On the other word, agricultural loans may also be the major 
business of banks in the rural market.  Thus, bank efficiencies are correlated to one of 
their outputs, loans.  The availability of agricultural loans may affect agricultural 
                                                                                                                                                 
16 Belongia and Gilbert (1990) indicated that agricultural banking is profitable in general.  They found that 
agricultural banks performed efficiently in agricultural lending, except during agricultural shocks.  
Agricultural shocks might cause some problems for those agricultural banks that were not well diversified 
in their loan portfolios  
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production.  Thus, a relationship between agricultural production and bank efficiencies 
may exist.  
 
 
1.3.6 Business Cycles, Monetary Policy, Agricultural Outputs, and 
Macroeconomic Effects on Bank Efficiency 
The banking industry is very sensitive to macroeconomic conditions.  Thus, the 
operation of the bank should be closely related to economic movements.  Therefore, 
business cycles and monetary policy might affect the efficiency of a bank.  Loans are one 
of the bank’s major outputs.  There is a linkage between loan and business cycles and 
monetary policy movements.  Problem loans might occur more frequently in worse 
economic conditions.  Berger and DeYoung (1997) interpreted several reasons that cost 
inefficient banks might tend to have problem loans.  One potential reason that they cite is 
local economic downturns.  
Since loans are one of the bank major outputs, problems loans might lead to bank 
X-efficiency reduction.  Berger and DeYoung (1997) employed Granger causality 
techniques to test the relation between loan quality and a bank’s cost efficiency.  They 
found intertemporal relationships between loan quality and cost efficiency in both 
directions.  They indicated that high levels of problem loans caused banks to increase 
costs in monitoring, working out, and/or selling off those problem loans.  Thus, those 
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non-performing loans tended to decrease the cost efficiency of banks.  DeYoung (1998) 
also found similar results.  He found that cost efficiency is positively related to 
examiners’ ratings of the management quality.  His results also showed that banks’ 
management ratings were strongly related to their asset quality rating.  Berger, Bonime, 
Covitz, and Hancock (2000) also indicated that bank performance was sensitive to 
regional/macroeconomic shocks.  They show that even the greater geographic 
diversification and the greater use of financial engineering techniques employed to 
manage risk in recent years still could not reduce the banking industry’s sensitivity to 
regional/macroeconomic shocks.  They also explained that bank profitability would 
increase during economic boom periods because all regions likely had the unexpected 
favorable economic conditions.  During favorable macroeconomic conditions a shifting 
toward higher-return investments with higher-risk taking might occur (Berger and Mester 
(1999), Berger, Bonime, Covitz, and Hancock (2000)).  Thus, if this was the case, the 
profitability of banks should increase.  However, this does not mean that banks can 
reduce the cost efficiently.  The cost efficiency in the banking industry may reduce 
during the boom economy.  However, during downturns in the economy, the banking 
industry might need to operate more efficiently in order to survive.  Thus, the effect of 
economic conditions on efficiency is still a question mark. 
On the other hand, bank lending might also affect the local or macro economy. 
Schumpeter (1911) asserted that the financial system could promote economic growth. 
He argued that the services provided by financial intermediaries, such as mobilizing 
savings, evaluating projects, managing risk, were necessary for economic development 
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and technological innovation. King and Levine (1993) find the results that were 
consistent with the Schumpeter’s view by using cross-country data of 80 countries over 
the 1960-1989 periods.  
 
 
1.4 Organization 
In Chapter 2, the estimation of X-efficiencies is discussed.  Several different 
estimation techniques will be reviewed.  Chapter 3 contains the first essay of the 
dissertation.  In this essay, bank efficiency comparisons based on the bank’s size, charter 
location, and loan specialties are examined.  The relationship between bank efficiency 
and agricultural factors at the county level is also examined.  In chapter 4, essay 2 
investigates the time series pattern of bank efficiency.  The essay examines whether 
efficiency is associated with business cycles, monetary policy, and economic growth.  In 
Charter 5, essay 3 develops an alternative approach to estimate X-efficiency employing 
both cross sectional and time series panel data.  The alternative approach is also applied 
to the empirical studies in essays 1 and 2.  Finally, chapter 6 will present the results of 
this study and discuss the contributions of this study.  
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CHAPTER 2 
MEASUREMENTS ON BANK EFFICIENCY 
 
The overall bank efficiency can be decomposed into scale efficiency, scope 
efficiency, pure technical efficiency, and allocative efficiency.  The bank has scale 
efficiency when it operates in the range of constant returns to scale.  Scope efficiency 
occurs when the bank operates in different diversified locations.  When the bank 
maximizes the output from the given level of input, pure technical efficiency occur.  
Technical efficiency is the major method that this study employs to measure bank 
efficiency.  Allocative efficiency happens when the bank chooses the revenue 
maximizing mix of outputs.  Theoretically, a bank is fully efficient if it produces the 
output level and mix tha t maximize profits and minimize possible costs.  However, in 
reality, most banks are not fully efficient.  There are a number of sources of inefficiency 
in the banking industry.  
A professional note from Berger asserts that the most important origin of cost 
problems in the banking industry is X-efficiency or differences in managerial ability to 
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control costs for any given scale or scope of production. 17  They also mentioned that on 
average, banks’ costs were about 20% above the efficient frontier.  This means that a 
bank, on average, has costs around more than 20 % more than a “best-practice” bank 
producing the same products.  Most of the sources of the inefficiencies are caused by 
inappropriate operation, like excessive use of labor in branch offices, and financial 
inefficiency, such as excessive interest paid for funds.  
 
 
2.1 Scale Efficiency 
In banking, the average cost curve has a relatively flat U-shape, with medium-
sized firms being slightly more scale efficient than either very large or very small 
banks.18  The primary uncertainty expressed in Humphrey (1990) is the location of the 
bottom of the average cost U – the scale efficient point.  McAllister and McManus (1993) 
suggested that the commonly used translog cost function specification gives a poor 
approximation when applied to banks of all sizes.  The translog does not hold up as a 
reasonable global approximation because it forces large and small banks to lie on a 
                                                                                                                                                 
17 The professional note is shown on Saunders’ (1997) book.  
18 See the survey by Humphrey (1990). 
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symmetric U-shaped ray average cost curve and disallows other possibilities, such as an 
average cost curve that falls up to some output point and remains constant thereafter.  
Thus, it may be the case that the diseconomies found for larger banks are simply the 
imposed reflection of the economies found for the small banks.  In addition, the translog 
approximation may behave poorly away from the mean product mix, which can create 
problems in measuring scale efficiencies because large banks tend to have very different 
product mixes from the average.   
McAllister and McManus’s (1993) solution to this problem is to replace the 
translog with one of several nonparametric estimation procedures.  Their other innovation 
is to add a missing factor to the calculus of scale efficiency – risk.  They show that as 
bank loan portfolios increase in size up to about $1 billion, the standard deviation of the 
rate of return falls precipitously, presumably because of diversification benefits.  The 
reduction in risk lowers the amount of financial capital that must be held by the bank to 
keep the risk exposure of the bank’s creditors (including the deposit insurer) at a given 
level.  Because capital is the most expensive marginal source of funding, this creates a 
financial scale economy by which banks can lower their average costs of funds as scale 
increases by holding a sma ller proportion of capital.  This represents an improvement 
over two previous attempts to incorporate risk into the cost function for financial 
institutions, one of which specified risk but did not include its cost, and one which 
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measured risk by provisions for loan loss reserves, which reflect expected losses rather 
than the risk or variance of losses.19  McAllister and McManus find substantial scale 
inefficiency for small banks, full-scale efficiency reached by about $500 million in assets, 
and approximately constant average costs thereafter up to $10 billion in assets, the upper 
limit of their sample.  Another potential difficulty in the scale economy literature is that 
most studies do not use a frontier estimation method.  Scale economies theoretically 
apply only to the efficient frontier, and the use of data from banks off the frontier could 
confound scale efficiencies with differences in X-efficiency.  Fortunately, Berger and 
Humphrey (1991), Berger et al. (1992), McAllister and McManus (1993), and Mester 
(1993) have compared scale efficiencies on and off the efficient frontier and have found 
only small differences. 
 
 
2.2 Scope Efficiency 
Prior studies on scope efficiency for financial institutions are even more 
problematic than the scale studies.  The degree of scope economies measures the 
percentage change in production costs if specialized firms, as opposed to a single firm 
                                                                                                                                                 
19 See Hughes and Mester (1992) 
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produced a bank’s products.  If the measure is positive, scope economies exist and the 
bank producing multiple products is more efficient than several specialized banks.  If the 
measure is negative, there are scope diseconomies and specialized banks operate more 
efficiently.  
Three major problems have been recognized.  First, there is a problem in applying 
the translog specification to evaluate or test for scope economies.  The second recognized 
problem in estimating scope economies is that there is often little or no data on firms that 
specialize.  In banking, virtually all firms produce the entire array of products specified in 
the cost function.  In fact, the dense part of the data set is usually away from zero outputs, 
creating potentially significant problems of extrapolation.  The effects of extrapolation, 
often combined with the problems of the translog specification, can be quite dramatic – 
measured scope economies and diseconomies are often erratic and far exceed credible 
levels, at times over 1,000 percent in absolute value.20  The third recognized problem in 
evaluating scope economies is that of using data that are not on the efficient frontier.  As 
in the case of scale economies, scope economies are defined only on the efficient frontier, 
so that evaluation, using data off the frontier, could confound scope economies with X-
efficiencies.  The empirical evidence shows there does not seem to be much in the way of 
scope economies or diseconomies.  The studies suggest that the cost efficiency of banks 
offering a variety of financial services and those of offering just a few services should be 
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identical.  A professional note from Mester in Saunders (1997) addressed that although 
the empirical work seemed to imply that consolidation could improve the efficiency, cost 
savings from mergers of large banks should not be expected.  She suggested that there 
appeared to be room in the industry for both large and small, and supermarket and 
boutique banks.  Berger and Humphrey (1991) found scope diseconomies of about 10-
20% on the frontier and economies in the 1,000s of percent when the entire data set was 
used.  Mester (1993) also finds huge differences between scope economies on and off the 
frontier.  
 
 
2.3 X-Efficiency  
X-efficiency is defined as the ratio of the minimum costs that could have been 
expended to produce a given output bundle to the actual costs expended.21  X-efficiency 
varies between 0 and 100 percent.  X-efficiency includes both technical inefficiency, or 
errors that result in general overuses of inputs, and allocative inefficiency, or errors in 
choosing an input mix that is consistent with relative prices.  Berger and Humphrey 
                                                                                                                                                 
20 See Berger and Humphrey (1991), Pully and Humphrey (1993), and Mester (1993). 
21 The assumptions are from Berger (1993) and Berger, Hunter, and Timme (1993). 
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(1997) show that 116 out of 130 studies related to financial institution frontier efficiency 
across 21 countries were written or published during 1992-1997. 
There are four types of X-efficiency estimation based on different assumptions.  
They are the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), the Stochastic Frontier Approach 
(SFA), the Thick Frontier Approach (TFA), and the Distribution-Free Approach (DFA).  
They differ from one another on the basis of the arbitrary assumptions used to disentangle 
efficiency differences from random error using a single observation for each firm.  We 
separate those approaches into categories based on the parametric and non-parametric 
approaches.  
§ Nonparametric linear programming approach – Data Envelopment 
Analysis  
§ Parametric Econometric Approaches – Stochastic Frontier Approach, 
Thick Frontier Approach, and Distribution-Free Approach 
 
 
2.3.1 Stochastic Frontier Approach  
The SFA assumes that inefficiency follows an asymmetric half-normal 
distribution, while random fluctuations follow a symmetric normal distribution. The 
efficiency results depend critically on the skewness of the data – any inefficiency 
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components that are more or less symmetrically distributed will tend to be measured as 
random error and any random error components that are more or less asymmetrically 
distributed will tend to be measured as inefficiency.  The SFA results also depend on the 
arbitrary assumption that the X-efficiencies are orthogonal to the cost function exogenous 
variables, including those used to compute scale efficiency.  According to the 
conventional scale economies literature, if X-efficient firms tend to compete well and 
become large, the SFA may falsely attribute X-efficiency to scale efficiency.  The major 
reason for this is that the coefficients on the output regressors pick up the correlation with 
the X-efficiency factors, which are in the composite error term.  The SFA cost function 
coefficients may be biased, leading to misestimates of X and scale efficiencies, if some of 
the input prices are correlated with X-efficiency.  For example, this may occur if banks 
facing relatively high wages tend to innovate and become more X-efficient. 
 
 
2.3.2 Thick Frontier Approach   
The TFA assumes that deviations from predicted costs within the lowest average-
cost quartile of banks represent random error, while deviations in predicted costs between 
the highest and lowest quartiles represent inefficiency.  The TFA estimates separate cost 
functions for the lowest and highest average-cost quartiles.  The residuals for both 
functions are assumed to represent only random error, while the predicted difference 
between the two functions is assumed to represent X-efficiency differences.  The 
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measured efficiency under the TFA is obviously sensitive to the assumptions about which 
fluctuations are random and which represent efficiency differences.  For example, the 
TFA may mistake one for the other if random errors follow a thick-tailed distribution and 
tend to be large in absolute value while inefficiencies follow a thin- tailed distribution and 
tend to be small. 
 
 
2.3.3 Data Envelopment Analysis Approach  
The DEA assumes that there are no random fluctuations, so that all deviations 
from the estimated frontier represent inefficiency.  If there is any luck or measurement 
error in an observation not on the estimated frontier, it will be mistakenly included in that 
firm’s measured efficiency.  If there is a random error in an observation on the frontier, it 
will be mistakenly reflected in the measured efficiency of all firms that are measured 
relative to that part of the frontier.  Because DEA uses only the data on inputs and outputs 
and does not take direct account of input prices, it does not incorporate allocative 
inefficiency. 22 
                                                                                                                                                 
22 EFA, TFA, and DFA take account of all cost deviations from the minimum, including those owing to 
errors in responding to input prices.  
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2.3.4 Distribution-Free Approach 
In the stochastic frontier approaches, making exp licit distributional assumptions 
disentangles the inefficiency and random error components of the composite error term.  
The random error term is assumed to be two sided, which usually is normally distributed, 
and the inefficiency term is assumed to be one-sided, which is usually half-normally 
distributed.  Both parameters of the distributions are estimated and can be used to obtain 
estimates of bank-specific inefficiency.  Bauer and Hancock (1993) and Berger (1993) 
found that when the inefficiencies were unrestricted, the efficiencies were much more 
like systematic normal distributions than half-normals, indicating the identification of the 
inefficiencies.  If panel data are available, some of the maintained distributional 
assumptions in the stochastic frontier approach can be relaxed, and the distribution-free 
approach (DFA) may be used.  The DFA assumes the efficiency differences are stable 
over time while random error average out over time.  A cost or profit function is 
estimated for each period of a pane l data set.  The residual in each separate regression is 
composed of the inefficiency and random error.  Since the random error component is 
assumed to average out over time, the average of a bank’s residuals from all of the 
regressions is an estimate of the inefficiency of the bank.  
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2.4 Estimation of X-Efficiency 
X-efficiency is the primary approach that we employ to measure the efficiency of 
U.S. banks.  We use the translog flexible function form to estimate the cost structure of 
banks and derive a measure of bank efficiency. 23  The translog function has been used 
widely to analyze the cost characteristics of depository institutions.24  The standard 
tranlog function is given by the following: 
 
where xt i represents the X-efficiency factor and ut i is the random error.  The current 
specification assumes six standard bank outputs and four input prices.  The inputs and 
outputs are the following: 
TCt i = total costs of bank i at time t 
                                                                                                                                                 
23 The translog function is also used as the cost equation in Mester (1987) and  English et al. (1993) 
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yk = bank outputs (1: real estate loans, 2: agricultural loans, 3: commercial and industrial 
loans, 4: personal loans, 5: deposit liability for transaction accounts, and 6: deposit 
liability for non-transaction accounts ). 
pl = price inputs (1: total interest expenses 2: price of capital, 3: labor, and 4: federal 
funds rate).  
 
Cost-share equations are derived from Shephard’s Lemma as follow: 
 
A share equation is omitted in order to prevent singularity. We estimate the equation 
formed by equation (1) and (2) subject to homogeneity and symmetry restrictions by the 
method of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR).  
If a firm systematically incurs relatively higher costs than the other firms in a 
competitive environment, it is considered X-inefficient.  In this study, we assume the 
                                                                                                                                                 
24 See the survey of Berger, Hunter, and Timme (1993) for a discussion of the translog cost function. 
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efficiency differences are stable over time, while random error averages out over time.  
Thus, we employ the distribution-free approach proposed by Berger (1993) to estimate 
the efficiency of the banks.25  From equation (1), we can define et i = ln(xt i) + ut i. 
Peristiani (1997) indicates that residual can be transfo rmed so that the minimum is zero.  
Thus, we can get equation (3): 
By taking the exponential of equation (3), we can obtain the X-efficiency as 
 
Thus, XEFFti is normalized to fall between zero and one. However, XEFFt i is not 
robust to outliers. Berger modifies the observations that fall below the p-th percentile so 
that they are set to the p-th percentile value ( )(ˆ ptie ), and observations that exceed the (1-
p)-th percentile are valued at ( )1(ˆ pti
-e ). Thus, the modified X-efficiency can be defined as: 
                                                                                                                                                 
25 See also the discussion in DeYoung (1997) for a diagnostic test for the distribution-free X-efficiency 
estimator. 
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CHAPTER 3 
ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN THE BANKING INDUSTRY: THE 
EFFECTS OF LOAN SPECIALIZATION 
 
3.1 Abstract 
Popular belief holds that banking consolidation will result in a small number of 
large monopoly banks that can achieve substantial economies of scale and outperform 
small competitors.  But research suggests that small banks are sometimes more efficient 
than their large counterparts.  One competitive strategy undertaken by numerous small 
banks is agricultural lending.  Agricultural lending is thought to benefit from micro- level 
monitoring to gauge whether borrowers implement scientific farming practices and exert 
requisite care to maximize yield and repay bank loans.  This essay uses county- level data 
from 1992 Census of Agriculture to classify agricultural banks and evaluate their lending 
activities in terms of cost efficiency.  Agricultural production, product-mix, crop yields 
and product prices are key factors affecting the performance of agricultural lending.  
They are used to exp lain disparities in bank efficiency. Agricultural lending is found to 
be positively correlated to bank efficiency.  The results also show that it is not necessary 
to be large to be efficient for the banks with loan specialization.  Nevertheless, both rural 
and urban banks tend to be susceptible to price volatility in the agricultural sector. 
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3.2 Introduction 
Before interstate banking deregulation, there were numerous small unit banks in 
the United States.  After deregulation, the number of banks decreased dramatically (See 
Figure 2).  From 1988 to 1997, the total number of banks decreased 29%, while the 
number of commercial banks decreased 32.6% (Figure 2 and Table 1).  Acceleration of 
mergers and acquisitions seems to be the main culprit for the decline.  In terms of size, 
large and medium size banks actually grew in number, while the number of small-sized 
banks declined by 46%.  Nevertheless, there are still 5818 small banks left, much more 
than the number of large and medium banks.  Looking at the data in Table 5, it appears 
that large banks are concentrated in metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), accounting for 
9.71% of the number of banks, while small banks congregate in rural areas, accounting 
for 42.89% of the number of banks.  Do rural small banks have an inherent advantage 
associated with their specialty and location over large metropolitan banks?   
As financial intermediaries, banks mitigate the problem of information asymmetry 
between lenders and borrowers.  Timely and reliable customer information is essential for 
successful banks.  Good information in turn requires close relations with customers.  It is 
alleged that small local banks dealing with small customers are in a better position to 
develop and maintain close customer contacts than large banks.  Small customers, 
without established credit, also tend to be more loyal to small banks than big banks.  If 
small banks indeed have a comparative advantage in relationship banking to large banks, 
this may be key to their continued existence.  Relationship banking, however, may 
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sometimes lead to moral hazards.  Large banks tend to adhere rigidly to rules and criteria 
in loan review while loan officers in small banks may have some discretion that they may 
misuse and thereby compromise loan quality. 
This study tries to find whether small banks have a comparative advantage in 
relationship banking by comparing their efficiency with that of larger banks.  In 
agriculture, great uncertainty and gyrations in yields and prices require a more in-depth 
understanding of customer situations, local environments, government policy, and 
fluctuations in agricultural exports in order for sound lending to occur. Examining the 
efficiency of agricultural banks could shed light on the future viability of small banks in 
coping with increasing competition from consolidated super banks.  Also, examining 
agricultural banks gives us some insight on the effect of specia lization on a bank’s 
efficiency and, hence, its ability to survive.  
In contrast to earlier studies, the efficiency of small, rural, agricultural banks is 
studied by simultaneously examining the effect of size, location and lending specialty.  In 
addition, the effect of the local agricultural environment on bank efficiency is studied in 
detail to see if the degree of specialization required in rural agricultural areas affects 
banking efficiency. 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the number of specialty banks and managed assets of 
specialty banks in the United States in 1996.  Most commercial banks are classified as 
general commercial banks.  There are no specific target customers for those banks.  
However, there are still significant numbers of banks with loan specialties in the banking 
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industry.  Figure 3 shows that 14.31% of U.S. commercial banks are classified as 
agricultural banks.  Although the number of mortgage banks, with residential, non-
residential, and redevelopment loans specialties, is the second largest in terms of the 
number of banks in the commercial banking industry in 1996, the information asymmetry 
in the mortgage market is low. Banks with specialties in agricultural lending are specialty 
banks with high information asymmetry.  Although Figure 4 shows agricultural lending is 
only 1.08% of all lending in the specialties banks, the number of agricultural banks is still 
high in the banking industry.  Therefore, agricultural banks, which have high information 
asymmetry, are the target banks examined in this study.   
Because of the high information asymmetry in agricultural banks, relationship 
banking might be one of the important issues of bank operating efficiency.  Generally, 
economies of scale do exist in the banking industry.  However, in banks with loan 
specialization, this might not be the case.  In term of operating cost efficiency, specialty 
banks with superior inside information might not need to be large in order to be cost 
efficient.  Thus, one of the objectives of this study is to examine whether economies of 
scale exist in the banking industry with loan specialization.  Due to the high information 
asymmetry in the agricultural lending sector and the relatively high percentage of the 
agricultural banks in the U.S. banking industry (Figure 3), agricultural banks are 
examined in this study.  Whether the smaller banks with agricultural loan specialization 
have survival value under the trend of bank consolidation is an important issue that we 
examine in this study.  
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Banks specializing in agricultural lending might be influenced by local 
agricultural production.  Thus, the fluctuation of agricultural production and price might 
impact bank operating efficiency.  In order to capture the impact of local economic 
activities on bank efficiency, agricultural factors at the county level are used to proxy for 
local economic conditions and are examined to determine whether there is a scale of 
economy effect in banks with loan specializations in agriculture. 
 
 
3.3 Literature Review 
Bank performance is found to vary with size, time, location, loan portfolio-mix 
and location.  Small banks appear best at lending to small local business. Small banks are 
better at relationship banking than large banks due to superior information and greater 
discretion in applying information.  Nakamura (1994) and Udell (1989) concluded that 
loan officers at large banks tend to follow bank rules and criteria more rigidly in loan 
review than their counterparts at small banks.26  Furthermore, Brickley, Linck, and Smith 
(2000) found that small local owned banks have a comparative advantage over branch 
                                                                                                                                                 
26 Nakamura (1994) indicates that small businesses are defined as businesses that have less than $10 million 
in annual receipts and borrow less than $3 million from all sources. 
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banks of large banks in some environments.27  Thus, banks with smaller sizes might 
survive under the trend of bank consolidation. 
Neely and Wheelock (1997) and Zimmerman (1996) showed that time plays an 
important role in bank efficiency.  As the business environment varies from region to 
region, Neely and Wheelock and Zimmerman indicate that local economic factors affect 
the performance of local banks significantly.  Bank location is a strong factor in 
determining loan portfolio-mix.  For example, farm loans are likely to be made by rural 
banks due to their proximity to farmers.  Levonian (1996) showed that banks 
headquartered in metropolitan areas, even through they have branches in agricultural 
areas, are less likely to engage in agricultural lending.  The study of the effect on bank 
efficiency of structural and environmental factors by Neff, Dixon, and Zhu (1994) found 
that a higher agricultural loan ratio reduces cost inefficiency but increases profit 
inefficiency.  
Large banks in metropolitan areas, through their many local branches, can reap 
economies of scale. The existence of other large rival banks in an urban area fosters 
competition and drives banks to operate more efficiently. Weber and Devaney (1998) 
indicated that local banks in rural areas usually make only local loans and tend to be less 
                                                                                                                                                 
27 This conclusion is based on a county-by-county comparison of two sets of banks operating in Texas.  
One set comprises small locally chartered banks.  The second set comprises branches of large banks that 
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technically efficient due to small-scale operations.  After the deregulation of interstate 
branching in 1997, Gilbert (1997, 2000) asserts that large banks with more resources are 
likely to expand into rural areas leading to greater competition and efficiency.  However, 
there is another view by Gilbert and Belongia (1988) that argues that large banks, being 
able to diversify, may be less inclined to invest in agricultural loans.  The entry of large 
banks into rural areas, therefore, may actually lower credit availability in rural areas.    
Jayartne and Strahan (1996) found the liberalization of branch restrictions 
stimulates the rural economy by increasing competition.  Featherstone (1996) observed 
that small rural banks are likely to be acquired by large banks specializing in agricultural 
loans. As a result, mergers and acquisitions do not affect the rural economy.  
Although large banks in the future are likely to dominate rural areas, recent 
changes in banking regulation are favorable to small banks in reducing their regulatory 
burden. They are now allowed to expand into new businesses.  Gilbert (1997) showed 
evidence that competition from new entrants of large banks would also compel small 
banks in the rural areas to operate more efficiently. As small rural banks specializing in 
agricultural loans had not been the primary targets of interstate mergers and acquisitions, 
                                                                                                                                                 
hold out-of-state charters.  
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Neff and Ellinger (1996) argued that those small rural agricultural banks can continue to 
retain the old agricultural business as well as expanding into consumer loans.28 
The above-cited studies suggest that small banks might have comparative 
advantages, especially in the rural financial markets.  Because of the profitability of small 
banks in the local financial markets, large banks are also attracted to enter those markets.  
The competitiveness of the local financial market will increase.  Under these 
circumstances, operating efficiency will be an important issue for the survival of small 
banks.  If small banks take advantage of their superior information in the local market 
and their increased flexibility, small banks may operate more efficiently than large banks.  
However, small banks are tied more closely to local economy.  Thus, small banks 
operating in rural environments may be sensitive to agricultural production and prices 
within their local area.  Figure 3 shows the managed assets of specialty loans of specialty 
banks.  Loan specialization and local economic conditions are examined in this study.  
Therefore, this study investigates whether size matters to bank operating efficiency and 
survival value.  The results will provide evidence on whether small banks will be victims 
of recent bank consolidation.  The study will also examine the effect that specialization 
                                                                                                                                                 
28 Belongia and Gilbert (1990) indicated that agricultural banking is profitable in general. They find that 
agricultural banks performed efficiently in agricultural lending, except during agricultural shocks. 
Agricultural shocks might cause some problems for those agricultural banks that are not well diversified in 
their loan portfolios. 
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has on bank efficiency by examining agricultural banks.  This examination of the impact 
of specialization has not been done before.  
 
 
3.4 Methodologies, Data, and Results 
This essay examines the survival values of small banks by looking at their 
operating efficiency.  Operational efficiency is examined for different types of bank 
structure, such as bank size, agricultural loan specialization, and charter location.  We 
employ the X-efficiency methodology to measurement of the operating efficiency.  
Previous studies show that there are several ways to differentiate banks by size.  We 
examine bank size using a new sorting criteria, which will be discussed in the following 
sections.  The specification of the bank specialty and charter location will also be 
discussed in the following sections. 
 
 
3.4.1 Estimation of Bank Efficiency 
Berger, Hunter, and Timme (1993) surveyed different approaches to estimating 
bank efficiency.  This study uses the measure of X-efficiency of Berger (1993) that 
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measures a bank's operating efficiency relative to the most efficient bank.29  To derive X-
efficiency, a total cost function is first estimated for the average bank in a given year. 
Total cost is expressed as a function of output, and input prices.  A standard translog 
function is used to estimate to total costs and derive the X-efficiency measure. 
 
 
 
where xt i = X-efficiency factor 
ut i = random error  
TCt i = total costs of bank i at time t  
yk = bank outputs (1: real estate loans, 2: agricultural loans, 3: commercial and 
industrial loans, 4: personal loans, 5: deposit liability for transaction accounts, and 6: 
deposit liability for non-transaction accounts ).  
                                                                                                                                                 
29 Berger, Hunter, and Timme (1993), and Mester (1997) also apply the same methodology. 
)6(,)ln()ln()ln()ln()ln(5.0
)ln()ln(5.0)ln()ln(ln
6
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
6
1
4
1
6
1
6
1
0
titilti
k l
ktilkhti
l h
ltilh
jti
k l k j
ktikjltilktikti
uxpypp
yypyTC
++++
+++=
å åå å
å å å å
= == =
= - = =
da
baba
50 
 
pl = price inputs (1: total interest expenses 2: price of capital, 3: labor, and 4: 
federal funds rate). 
Note that the joint effect of any two independent variables is captured with the 
product terms.  The efficiency factor is captured in the residual term xt i when individual 
bank data are applied to the regression results.  Data used in equation (6) are taken from 
the Reports of Condition and Income Report Guide (Call Report).  Commercial banks of 
charter number 200, 210, 250, or 340 and having issuer code and total assets greater than 
zero are included in the sample.  This definition ensures that only commercial banks are 
included in the sample.  
Cost-share equations of each input price can then be derived as follows:  
 
Equations (6) and (7) are estimated subject to homogeneity and symmetry 
restrictions using the method of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR).  If a firm 
systematically incurs relatively higher costs than the other firms in a competitive 
environment, it is considered X-inefficient.  In the survey conducted by Berger, Hunter, 
and Timme (1993), several econometric and linear programming techniques have been 
proposed for estimating X-efficiency, including the econometric frontier approach (EFA), 
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the thick frontier approach (TFA), data envelopment analysis (DEA), and the 
distribution-free approach (DFA).  In this study, assuming efficiency differences are 
stable, and the random error averages out over time, the distribution-free approach of 
Berger (1993) and DeYoung (1997) is used to estimate the efficiency of the banks.  
Peristiani (1997) shows that when we let et i = ln(xt i) + ut i and transform et i such that the 
minimum becomes 0; we arrive at the following: 
)8(.ˆ}ˆmin{ˆ tititi ee -=e  
By taking the exponential of equation (8), X-efficiency is obtained. 
)9().ˆexp( titiXEFF e=  
The X-efficiency of bank i at time t (XEFFt i) is now normalized to fall between 
zero and one. Since XEFFt i is not robust to outliers, Berger (1993) modified the X-
efficiency measure such that observations falling below the p-th percentile are set to the 
p-th percentile value ( )(ˆ ptie ), and observations exceeding the (1-p)-th percentile are set to 
( )1(ˆ pti
-e ).  The modified X-efficiency can be defined as: 
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3.4.2 Bank Size Specification 
Banks are classified according to size, specialty and location based on the Federal 
Financial Institution Examination Council (FFIEC) form 031, 032, 033, and 034.30  
Banks with assets over $300 million are classified as large banks, $100 million to $300 
million as medium banks and less than $100 million as small banks.  However, according 
to the sample statistics in Panels A and B of Table 1 and Table 2, the sample is not 
normal distributed during the examination period.  Because of the unique distribution of 
all U.S. commercial banks samples, it is hard to categorize banks by size.  More than 2/3 
of banks in the U.S. are below $150 million in total assets in the first quarter of 1988 and 
1997.31  On average, over the sample period, around 70% of the banks are small banks, 
20% are medium banks, and 10% are large banks.  In the largest size category, we also 
notice a large discrepancy.  There are a cluster of extremely large banks with total assets 
in excess of $3 billion.   
                                                                                                                                                 
30 The call report forms is split into four forms, 031 – 034, representing banks with domestic and foreign 
offices, banks with domestic offices only and total assets of $300 million or more, banks with domestic 
offices only and total assets of $100 million or more but less than $300 million, and banks with domestic 
offices only and total assets less than $100 million. Thus, in this study, the boundary of large, medium, and 
small banks are total assets of $300 million and $100 million. The cutoff of the larger banks, $300 million, 
is also consistent with the one that Jayaratne and Wolken (1999) employ. 
31 There are 86.95% and 76.95% of commercial banks are below $150 million in total assets  in the first 
quarter of 1988 and 1997 respectively. 
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Several recent studies employed different approaches to classify different banks 
by size.  Alam(2000) and Akhigbe and McNulty(2000) categorized large and small banks 
by using a cutoff of $500 million in total assets.  Stiroh(2000) classified banks using 
more detailed categories.32  In this study, two different approaches are used to 
differentiate different banks by size.  The first uses FFIEC categorization and the second 
uses a modified version of the scale employed in Stiroh(2000).  
If only few particular cutoffs of bank size are applied, bank growth might result in 
problems.  For example, if steady growth of the banking industry is assumed, there will 
be an upward trend in bank size.  Inflation issue might also be another issue that will 
affect bank size.  However, Table 3, Panels A and B show, using two major indicators of 
inflation, that the inflation rate is not very high during our examination period.  Thus, 
inflation might not be an important issue in discussing the bank size during our 
examination periods.  Additionally, an upward bias of bank size might not exist because 
of the information exposure in the call report.  Banks in different size categories have 
different reporting requirements from the FFIEC on the call report.  For example, in the 
schedule RI-B of the call report, large banks, which have more than $300 million, have to 
release the details and itemize the charge-offs and recoveries on loans and leases and 
                                                                                                                                                 
32 Stiroh(2000) classified bank size in different categories as follows: 200 million, 300 million, 500 million, 
1 billion, and 5 billion. 
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changes in allowance for credit losses.33  Small banks with less than $100 million in total 
assets only have to disclose the total amount of each item.  Thus, banks in the small and 
medium size categories might have incentives to stay in the same categories in order to 
maintain the same level of information exposure.  Thus, from this perspective, fix cutoffs 
of bank size through time might be appropriate. 
To prevent a possible upward bias of the cutoffs of FFIEC, quartiles are also used 
to differentiate the bank size.  Table 4 shows the cutoffs using the quartile criteria.  
Although using quartile criteria can solve the upward trend of the bank size, Figure 5 
shows that the distribution of the first and second quartile may still be biased.34  For 
example, in the first quartile, some banks are extremely large with size more than 10 
billion dollars in total assets.  
In order to capture the effect of bank size in more detail, the criteria that we use to 
differentiate banks by size is to use the following categories: 10 million, 20 million, 30 
million, 40 million, 50 million, 60 million, 70 million, 80 million, 90 million, 100 
million, 150 million, 200 million, 250 million, 300 million 400 million, 500 million, 600 
                                                                                                                                                 
33 Schedule RI-B in the call report is the form for banks to disclose information related to charge-offs 
recoveries on loans and leases and change in allowance for credit losses.  In this schedule, medium- and 
small-size banks have the same information exposure.  However, one of the major differences to large 
banks is the requirement to categorize each item into the U.S. and non-U.S. operations.  Large banks also 
have to release information on the amount of credit cards and related plans for loans to individuals for 
household, family, and other personal expenditures.  
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million, 700 million, 800 million, 900 million, 1 billion, 1.5 billion, 2 billion, 3 billion, 5 
billion, and 10 billion dollars and above.  This categorization allows bank efficiencies be 
addressed more accurately and the testing results will not be distorted because of the non-
normality in the distribution of bank size. 
 
3.4.3 Specifications of Banks’ Loan Specialization and Charter Location 
To determine loan specialization, the criteria used in Ellinger (1994) and Gilbert 
and Kliesen (1995) is applied.  Banks with a ratio of agricultural loans to total loans of 
more than 25% are classified as agricultural banks and less than 25% as nonagricultural 
banks.  Banks are placed into two categories based on their charter location, MSAs 
(metropolitan statistical areas) and non-MSAs.  We assume that commercial banks focus 
more on the urban market when their charter location is in a MSAs and that commercial 
banks in non-MSAs target their customers in rural areas.  
As to the specifications of bank size, loan specialization, and charter location, 
three major statistical tests are conducted.  First, tests of economies of scale are 
conducted in two different ways, pairwise comparison tests and regression analysis.  
                                                                                                                                                 
34 The banks categorized in the first quartile are the those with total assets more than Q3 in Table 4.  The 
second quartile is between Q3 and Q3.  
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Secondly, the relationship between bank efficiency and agricultural output at the county 
level is examined.  Third, the relationship between the price risks of agricultural products 
and bank efficiency is examined.  
 
3.4.4 Economies of Scale Tests 
3.4.4.1 Efficiency Comparison Tests 
Commercial banks will have efficiency differences across size, loan specialties, 
and charter location.  We hypothesize that the commercial banks with agricultural 
specialties might have superior performance relative to the ones without agricultural 
specialties, that commercial banks in MSAs may operate more efficiently than the ones in 
non-MSAs, and  large commercial banks may outperform smaller banks because of  scale 
economies.  Therefore, pairwise comparison tests are proposed to test the bank efficiency 
based on different bank size,  charter location and loan specialization criteria.   
Banks are categorized according to their size, charter location, and specialty. 
Permutations of the three factors result in a total of 12 categories.  Table 5 shows the 
number of observations in each category. The study period covers 1988 through 1997 for 
all regions of the U.S. 
As discussed in section 3.4.2, the criteria used to categorize banks by size are 
controversial.  Although categorizing bank size in more detail might provide more 
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accurate information, a lack of observations might be a problem for comparisons in 
certain categories.  In order to prevent the bias of unequal variance in the different 
categories, the Cochran and Cox approximation of the probability level of the 
approximate t statistic is employed.  We examine both the FFIEC and our modified 
version of Stiroh’s (2000) size cutoffs. 
Statistics of banks’ efficiency categorized by the different criteria are shown in 
Table 6.  Most of the observations are small banks, which have $100 million or less than 
$100 million in total assets.  On average, only around one fifth of the banks are regarded 
as agricultural banks.  However, the number of banks chartered in MSAs is similar to that 
in non-MSAs.  Considering the bank size, loan specialization, and charter location 
jointly, most banks are urban, non-agricultural banks in the categories of large- and 
medium-size banks.  However, non-agricultural banks chartered in non-MSAs dominate 
in the small-size category.  The comparison results of bank X-efficiency for the 12 
categories of banks are shown in Table 7.  Table 7 indicates that large banks dominate in 
efficiency, but medium banks are not more efficient than small banks.  Metropolitan 
banks are superior to non-metropolitan banks while nonagricultural banks are more 
efficient than agricultural banks.  Greater competition due to bank density in metropolitan 
areas and the uncertainty and volatility in agricultural lending seem to exert major 
influence on bank efficiency.  As to the comparisons based on the bank’s size shown in 
Table 8, banks chartered in MSAs always outperform those chartered in non-MSAs, 
except for medium sized banks.  From the perspective of the agricultural loan 
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specialization, agricultural banks operate more cost efficiently than non-agricultural 
banks in the medium and small size categories. 
Comparisons based on loan specialization and charter location in Table 9, there 
are no economies of scale in the banks with agricultural loan specialization.  Medium size 
appears to be the optimal size for the banks with loan specialties in agriculture to operate 
most efficiently.  Large banks operate the least efficiently in the specialty of agricultural 
lending.  Those banks without agricultural loan specialization still have economies of 
scale in cost efficiency.  However, the results based on the charter location are 
ambiguous. Large banks still operate most efficiently in both MSAs and non-MSAs. 
Banks chartered in MSAs in medium size are least efficient among all banks. Yet, 
medium banks chartered in non-MSAs have the same cost efficiency as large banks. 
In order to inspect the efficiency of banks more appropriately, banks are broken 
into smaller size categories, with cutoffs of $10 million, $20 million, $30 million, $40 
million, $50 million, $60 million, $70 million, $80 million, $90 million, $100 million, 
$150 million, $200 million, $250 million, $300 million $400 million, $500 million, $600 
million, $700 million, $800 million, $900 million, $1 billion, $1.5 billion, $2 billion, $3 
billion, $5 billion, and $10 billion dollars and above.  The averages of X-efficiency in 
every size categories are obtained.  Figure 6 shows economies of scale do exist in the 
banking industry.  The larger the size of banks, the more cost efficient they are.  
However, this is not the case if the sample size is split into categories based on loan 
specialization and charter location.  Interestingly, economies of scale do not apply to the 
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banks with loan specialization in agriculture (Figure 7 and Figure 8).  Actually, there is 
an optimal size for banks with agricultural specialties.  Figure 9 and Figure 10 show that 
economies of scale exist for banks in MSAs and non-MSAs. 
In addition to the comparison based on the cutoff of FFIEC, the comparisons 
between banks with loan specialization and without loan specialization in detail size 
categories are also conducted.  The comparisons in the detailed size categories are to 
determine whether agricultural banks do operate efficiently than non-agricultural banks in 
certain size range as suggested by Figure 7 and Figure 8.  
The results on Table 8 and Table 9 show that medium-size banks with agricultural 
specialization outperform banks with non-agricultural loan specialization.  However, the 
size criteria used in Table 8 and Table 9 are based on the cutoffs in the call report.  It is 
hard to tell where the exact range in which agricultural banks outperform non-agricultural 
banks.  Thus, tests of the more detailed size categories are necessary.  In Table 10, the 
results show that there is a specific range of bank size in which agricultural banks 
outperforming non-agricultural banks.  Between $20 million and $250 million in total 
assets, agricultural banks operate more efficiently than non-agricultural banks.  These 
results are consistent with the results found using the FFIEC cutoffs in Table 8 and Table 
9.  Thus, non-existence of economies of scale in banks with agricultural loan 
specialization is further proven in this test.  This also provides evidence to suggest that 
loan specialization may benefit smaller sized banks and that there is an optimal size at 
which loan specialization is effective. This leads support to the idea that smaller banks do 
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have a valuable survival value and that small banks may survive in environments of 
banking consolidation. 
 
 
3.4.4.2 Regression Analysis 
To study the impact of agricultural factors and scale economy on bank efficiency, 
the X-efficiency of banks is regressed on bank size and selected agricultural factors.  
Three models, the basic fundamental information, the local economic activity effects, and 
the agricultural products price risk effects, are examined.  The fundamental model is 
examined in this section.  
The purpose of the fundamental model is to examine economies of scale of banks 
and seasonal effects on bank X-efficiency.  Due to the unique distribution of all samples, 
a square term and a cube term for bank size are added to test whether there are really 
economies scale in bank efficiency. The following regression model is estimated for both 
agricultural and non-agricultural banks: 
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where size = size of the bank, measured by the log of total assets.  Squared and cubed 
terms for size are also applied to capture of the feature of non- linearity in economies of 
scale.  Based on the results shown in Figure 6 to Figure 10, the relationship between bank 
efficiency and the bank size is not linear.  Thus, the square and cube terms of the size 
should pick up this observed non- linearity. 
AAR = average agricultural loan ratio, calculated from average agricultural loans 
divided by total assets.  This variable is used to classify the bank with loan specializations 
in agriculture. 
Inter = interaction term, testing the relationship between agricultural lending and 
the bank’s size.  If this term is positive, banks with loan specialization might not have 
economies of scale.  
Bkcapita = banks per capita of the county level, measured as the ratio of the 
number of commercial banks chartered in the county to the population of the county.  
This measure is designed to capture bank competitiveness at the county level.  The 
Census of Population is used to develop this measure.  Because of the availability of only 
1980, 1990, and 1999 population data, we assume the growth rate at the county level is 
steady.  Thus, the quarterly population at the county level is obtained in proportion to the 
change of the data in the years for which census data is available.  The sign of the 
coefficient of this variable is expected to be positive because of the increasing level of 
competitiveness within the banking industry.   
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Agprice = volatility of agricultural loans based on the quarterly data of average 
agricultural loans over the 10-year examination period.  If the proportion of agricultural 
lending fluctuates through time, the uncertainty in the bank increases.  Operational 
efficiency is expected to decline because of the uncertainty.  Therefore, the volatility of 
agricultural loans is expected to have negative impact on bank efficiency.  
qj = dummy variables measuring seasonal effect. q1 represents the dummy of the 
first quarter, q2 represents the dummy of the  second quarter, and q3 represents that of the 
third quarter.  The intercept term measures the effect of the fourth quarter.  
XEFFi = quarterly efficiency of each commercial bank over 1988-1997 period.  
Data for dependent and independent variables come from the Call Report, except 
banks per capita (Bkcapita).  
The regression analysis will also be divided individually into 27 individual size 
categories.  Thus, regardless of the size effect, detailed information of the impact on bank 
efficiency caused by bank fundamental information can be observed.  Because of the size 
effect has been considered by doing regression analysis in the smaller size categories, the 
model is revised as follows: 
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Results for equation (11), estimated using all banks, are shown in Table 10.  The 
sign of the size and size3 variables are significant and negative, which the square term is 
positively significant.  The results are consistent with those in Figure 6 and with previous 
studies.  
The average agricultural loan ratio has a significant negative impact on banks’ 
cost efficiency.  This means that the higher the level of agricultural loans, the lower cost 
efficiency.  However, the interaction (Inter) between the agricultural loans and bank size 
(AAR * size) has significant positive influence on bank efficiency.  The dynamic 
relationship implies there might be an optimal size for banks with an agricultural 
specialty.  Figure 7 shows evidence of the regression results.  Banks with agricultural 
specialization operate most efficiently in the optimal size range between 90 million and 
400 million dollars in total assets.   
Banks per capita (Bkcapita) is regarded as a proxy of the competitiveness of 
banks in the local financial market.  Bkcapita has positive influence on bank efficiency.  
Increasing competition in the local financial market increases the cost efficiency of the 
bank.  However, the volatility of agricultural loans (Agprice) influences bank efficiency 
negatively.  In the other words, stability in the agricultural lending environment might 
improve the cost efficiency of the bank.  Other than those fundamental factors, seasonal 
effects also are tested.  The results shows seasonal effects do exist.  The fluctuations of 
loan demand might depend on the seasons.  The seasonal effects might be also caused by 
macro economy. The correlation coefficient matrixes are included in the results as a 
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check for possible multicollinearity based on the observations that we use in the model.  
The results are shown in Table 12, Table 13, and Table 14.  The results show that the 
correlation among the dependent variables, except for size, size2 and size3, are low. 
 
3.4.4.3 Local Economic Activity Effects 
Since this study focus on the cost efficiency of banks specializing in agriculture, 
agricultural production at the county level is regarded as a proxy for the local economic 
factors.  Thus, agricultural production may impact the efficiency of agricultural banks.  
Agricultural productions at county level are included into the fundamental information 
model to test local economic effects on bank efficiency.  According to the criteria in 
Table 15, agricultural products are categorized into ten sectors.  They are food grains, 
feed grains and hay, cotton, tobacco, oil-bearing crops, all fruit and nuts, commercial 
vegetables, meat animals, dairy products, and poultry and eggs.  In order to calculate the 
proportion of agricultural loans to specific agricultural products, we assume that the 
product of the average agricultural loan ratio (AAR) and the specific agricultural product 
ratio among all agricultural products can be regarded as the level agr iculture lending to 
specific agricultural products of the individual bank.  Agricultural products ratios at 
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county level are available from the 1992 Census of Agriculture.35  Thus, the model 
showing the relationship between bank efficiency and various agricultural factors is 
examined on equation (13).  The dependent and independent variables are the quarterly 
average of data between 1988 and 1992 because of the availability of agricultural data.  
Furthermore, we examine the relationship between agricultural price change from 1987 to 
1992 and X-efficiency change from 1988 to 1992 is examined.  The future change of 
bank efficiency from 1992 to 1997 is examined to see if it is influenced by the change of 
agricultural factors from 1988 to 1992.  The above two models, which examine the 
impacts of the change of agricultural factors on the simultaneous and future changes of 
bank efficiency, are shown on equation (14).  
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35 In the Census of Agriculture, agricultural products data are available based on unit, price, land size, and 
farm numbers.  Because of the variety of units of agricultural products, we calculate the agricultural 
product ratios based on price.  Farm size is  not an appropriate proxy.  The production of one acre of 
tobacco is different from that of one acre of vegetables.  Because the census is formed by the voluntary 
submission of information, the number of farms is not representative of all production.  Thus, the value of 
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In order to understand the impact of agricultural factors on banks in different size 
categories, the model similar with equation (13) is also conducted to observe the 
agricultural effect of the smaller size categories.  Due to the level of diversification of 
loan portfolios, agricultural factors are expected to have more explanatory power on 
small banks than on large banks.  The equation can be obtained as follows: 
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The results are split into three groups, all observations, agricultural banks, and 
non-agricultural banks.  This will allow us to determine the specific impact of agricultural 
factors on agricultural banks.  Table 16 shows the results on equation (13).  The 
correlation matrixes of the model based on different observations are shown in Table 17, 
Table 18, and Table 19.  The results in Table 16 show that bank size has positive effect at 
1% significance level on bank X-efficiency in all three different categories based on all 
banks’, agricultural banks’, and non-agricultural banks’ observation.  Average 
agricultural loans have the same effect as well.  Interaction term (Inter), the product of 
bank size and agricultural loans, is 1% positive significant.  However, only agricultural 
                                                                                                                                                 
sale of agricultural products in dollars will be more appropriate to measure the ratio of agricultural products 
in a given county.  
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loan volatility has negative impact on bank efficiency at 1% significance level.  Because 
agricultural banks more rely on agricultural loans, the volatility of agricultural loans play 
a more important role in agricultural banks than non-agricultural banks.  As to 
agricultural factors, food grain is only positive significant on all banks’ observations.  
Feed grains and hay, tobacco, oil-bearing crop, meat animals, and diary products are all 
positive significance on bank efficiency.  Fruit and nuts and vegetable, which are 
regarded as commercial agricultural products, have negative significant impact on only 
agricultural bank efficiency.  Usually, those commercial agricultural products have higher 
profit margin than other crops.  As to the demand and supply theory, more supply may 
make price and profit margin lower.  Thus, the higher production of those products, the 
lower profits they will be.  The probability to pay off agricultural loans may be lower.  
Indirectly, it affects cost of bank operation, which has higher portion of agricultural 
loans.  Thus, the higher production of fruit, nuts, and vegetable only affect agricultural 
bank X-efficiency negatively.  On the other hand, cotton, poultry and eggs affect non-
agricultural banks efficiency positively.  Those products are more relative to urban lives.  
The higher production of cotton, poultry, and egg may drive the price down and reduce 
the costs of industrial production, which are the major target customers of non-
agricultural banks.  Thus, the lower production costs may directly increase the probability 
of industrial borrowers to payoff the loans.  Thus, the cost efficiency of non-agricultural 
banks increases.  As to the adjusted R Square, the results show that our model has more 
predictability on agricultural banks than on non-agricultural banks.   
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Table 20 shows the results of relationship between percentage change of bank 
efficiency between 1988 and 1992 periods and percentage change of agricultural factors 
between 1988 and 1992 periods on equation (14).  The results are split into three 
categories, based on different banks’ observations.  Table 21, Table 22, and Table 23 
show the matrixes of correlation of those independent variables.  Percentage change of 
bank size has positive effect in all three categories.  However, interaction term (Inter), 
product of bank size and agricultural loans, has negative significant impact on all banks’ 
and non agricultural banks’ efficiencies.  It implies that the increase of agricultural loan 
ration decrease all banks’ and non-agricultural banks’ efficiency.  The competitiveness of 
local financial market does not enhance bank efficiency.  The volatility of agricultural 
loans has significant impact on bank efficiency.  It positively affects all bank and non-
agricultural bank efficiencies, but negatively affect agricultural efficiency, which is 
consistent with the previous results.  As to the percentage changes of agricultural factors, 
generally, changes of agricultural factors have more impacts on agricultural banks.  The 
percentages change of food grains, feed grains and hay, cotton, fruit and nuts, meat 
animals, diary products, and poultry and eggs influence agricultural bank efficiency 
negatively.  However, the percentage change of tobacco has positive effect, which is the 
reverse result on non-agricultural banks. .   
We also test whether post information of percentage change of bank fundamental 
information and agricultural factors affect the future percentage change of bank 
efficiency by using the same equation on equation (14).  The percentage change of bank 
efficiency between 1992 and 1997 regresses on the percentage changes of banks’ 
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fundamental information and agricultural factors between 1988 and 1992.  Table 24 
shows that the percentage change of banks’ fundamental information and agricultural 
factors do not affect much the future performance of bank operation.  According to R 
Squares of the model, the changes of agricultural factors have poor predictability of bank 
future efficiency change.  Table 25 shows the results of the relationship between bank 
efficiency change from 1988 to 1997 and changes of bank’s fundamental information and 
agricultural factors from 1988 to 1992.  The results are similar with those in Table 20.  
However, interaction term (inter) is not significant on agricultural banks.  The percentage  
change of tobacco is not significant on agricultural banks, too.  The R Squares are also 
consistent with previous results that the model using agricultural banks’ observations has 
higher adjusted R Square.  
 
3.4.4.4 Agricultural Products Price Risk Effects 
If the bank’s loan portfolios put too much weight on a specific leading 
specialization, bank-operating costs will solely depend on the local economic activities 
related to the bank’s lending specialty.  Thus, economic fluctuation will affect bank’s 
efficiency in some circumstances.  Diversification of loan portfolios might be an 
important issue to bank efficiency.  However, because of the innovation of financial 
markets, there are several financial instruments for hedging the risk in the commodity 
market, such as futures contracts.  We assume banks take advantage of futures contracts 
to hedge risk.  Therefore, the diversification of loan portfolios might not be an issue.   
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In addition to agricultural price as a proxy for agricultural factors, the price 
volatility of agricultural products is also considered in this model.  Price volatilities of the 
agricultural products (AgPV), shown in Table 26, are calculated from the price index of 
each agricultural category at the national level to proxy for the price risk of the 
agricultural products.  The indexes for agricultural products are available from the USDA 
Statistical Bulletin.  A dummy variable (DumFC) is designed to represent the availability 
hedging opportunities by the bank using agricultural commodity futures contracts.  
Although agricultural banks with higher agricultural loans and less diversified loan 
portfolios might have higher risk exposure, banks can employ hedges to minimize price 
risk in order to prevent losses from agricultural shocks. 
The rationale for the hedging variable is as following.  If there is commodity in 
production at the county level and a futures contract on the commodity is also available, 
the bank could require the borrower to engage in a future contract to hedge the position. 36  
The dummy is defined as zero in this situation as all risk would be hedged.  If the 
commodity is not available at the county level, the bank makes no loans on such 
commodities, it is not essential for banks to require borrowers to hedge.  Hence, the 
dummy in this situation is zero as well.  If the commodity is available but the future 
contract is not traded, banks have a risk exposure without any risk hedging.  The dummy 
                                                                                                                                                 
36 Farmers would be short in the futures contract. 
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is one in this case, represented the presence of an unhedged price risk.  Table 27 
summarizes the design of the dummy variable.  Table 28 shows the futures contracts that 
are available for commodities.  Therefore, if there is a risk exposure in the particular 
agricultural product, the volatility of the price should matter.  The interaction terms of 
agricultural price volatility and the futures contract dummy variable (AgPV*DumFC) 
represents the price risk of the agricultural products.  The model considering agricultural 
price risk is given in equation (16).  Because of the availability of agricultural data, a test 
is done by using quarterly average of bank X-efficiency and quarterly average of banks’ 
fundamental information and agricultural factors in 1992 based on three diffe rent 
observation categories.   
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Table 29 shows the results on equation (16).  Interestingly, size effect is not 
consistent with the previous results.  Bank size has negative significant effect on all 
banks’, agricultural banks’, and non-agricultural banks’ efficiencies.  Average 
agricultural loans ratio has the same negative impact as well.  However, interaction term 
(inter), the product of bank size and agricultural loan ratio, has positive influence in three 
categories.  The proxy of local financial market competitiveness has positive impact on 
bank efficiency.  The result of agricultural loan volatility (Agprice) is consistent with 
previous result.  It (Agprice) negatively affects agricultural banks’ efficiency.  As to 
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agricultural factors, feed grains and hay, oil-bearing crop, and diary products have 
positive impacts on banks’ efficiency based on different observation categories.  
Tobacco, meat animals, and poultry and eggs have positive significant effects on non-
agricultural banks’ efficiency instead of agricultural banks’.  Although loans to tobacco 
production do not significantly affect agricultural banks’ efficiency, fluctuation of 
tobacco price does have impact on not only on all bank and non-agricultural banks but 
agricultural banks.  However, the situation for the fruit and nuts and vegetable is 
different.  The loans to fruit and nuts and vegetables have significantly negative impact 
on agricultural banks.  However, the price risks of fruit and nuts and vegetable also have 
insignificantly negatively impact on agricultural banks.  Because agricultural banks are 
specialized in agricultural lending, they are sensitive to the production of those 
commercial products, like fruit and nuts and vegetable.  Although there are no futures 
contract to hedge the risk, agricultural banks have more insider information than non-
agricultural banks.  Thus, agricultural banks may have more ability to protect from the 
price risk of fruit and nuts and vegetable.  As to the adjusted R Squares, the results are 
also consistent with the previous results and our expectation.  The model examined by 
using agricultural banks’ observations has more explanatory power than by using all 
banks’ and non-agricultural banks’ observation.  
According to the previous hypotheses, we also examine previous models by using 
detailed size categories.  The results of bank fundamental information effect model, local 
economic activity effect model, and agricultural price risk effect model in detailed size 
categories are shown in Table 30.  In general, models examined by using agricultural 
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banks’ observations have higher adjusted R Squares than by using all banks’ and non-
agricultural banks’ observations.  Especially in the local economic activity effect model 
and agricultural price risk effect model, agricultural factors have more explanatory power 
on agricultural banks’ efficiency.  Agricultural banks with 70 to 90 million dollars in total 
assets have the highest adjusted R Square among those tests.   
 
 
3.5 Conclusions  
In this study, we investigate two effects on bank efficiency by employing X-
efficiency and agricultural factors at the county level.  First, we examine if bank’s size, 
charter location, and lending specialties explain differences in X-efficiency across 
commercial banks.  We do find support for the hypothesis that bank’s size, charter 
location, and loan specialties play an important role in determining efficiency in the 
banking industry.  Between 1988 and 1997, large commercial banks operate more cost 
efficiently than other smaller commercial banks.  Non-agricultural commercial banks and 
commercial banks chartered in MSAs also outperform agricultural commercial banks and 
commercial banks chartered in non-MSAs.  If the bank’s size, charter location, and 
lending specialties considered jointly, large and small non-agricultural commercial banks 
chartered in MSAs have the highest X-efficiency in those specific categories.  Only in the 
medium-sized commercial bank category do non-agricultural commercial banks chartered 
74 
 
in non-MSAs outperform medium-sized commercial banks in non-MSAs.  Overall, we 
can conclude that commercial banks chartered in MSAs without agricultural specialties 
operate most efficiently.  There is no difference in X-efficiency between agricultural 
commercial banks in MSAs and non-MSAs.  Interestingly, agricultural commercial banks 
operate less efficiently than do non-agricultural commercial banks in non-MSAs.  The 
results show that economies of scale in commercial banks do exist.  However, in the 
perspective of the bank’s loan specialization, it is not necessary that the bank’s size 
should be large to be efficient.  
The results show that there is an optimal size for banks with a loan specialization.  
Banks with loan specialization in agricultural lending are more efficient within the size 
range of 80 million to 400 million dollars in total assets.  This implies that smaller banks 
do have survival value in terms of cost efficiency.  It is not necessary for specialty banks 
to be large to be efficient.  Regulators also do not have to worry about the survival 
problem and competition of the smaller banks.  Banks without large asset size but with 
agricultural loan specialization are expected to remain competitive in the local market.  
As long as those smaller banks still exist and perform well after the deregulation in the 
banking industry, the local financial market will remain competitive and the worry of the 
lack of adequate credit source might be redundant.  
Our second test is that the X-efficiency of commercial banks may be influenced 
by agricultural factors.  We investigate the relationship between the X-efficiency of 
commercial banks and agricultural factors from the 1992 Census of the Agriculture at the 
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county level.  We find that agricultural factors do affect the cost efficiency of commercial 
banks.  Interestingly, non-agricultural commercial banks are also influenced by 
agricultural factors.  Thus, agricultural factors might be one of the considerations in the 
evaluation of the commercial banks’ X-efficiency, especially for small-sized commercial 
banks.  The X-efficiencies of large-sized commercial banks are not shown to be affected 
by agricultural factors.  Large-sized commercial banks may depend less on local 
economic activities or price change, thus, eliminating their dependence on agricultural 
activity. 
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TABLE 1. STATISTICS OF U.S. COMMERCIAL BANKS IN DIFFERENT CATEGORIES   
This table contains numbers (Panel A) and percentages (Panel B) of banks in different categories 
by quarter from 1988 to 1997.  L: Large banks with total assets not less than $300 million.  M: 
Medium banks with total assets between $300 and $100 million.  S: Small banks with total assets 
below $100 million.  A: Agricultural banks with agricultural loan ratio not less than 25 percent of 
total assets.  NA: Non-agricultural banks  M’ & NM’: Banks chartered in MSA and non-MSA. 
PANEL A: NUMBER OF COMMERCIAL BANKS IN DIFFERENT CATEGORIES  
Quarter/Year All banks L M S A NA M’ NM’ 
01/88 13493 895 1837 10761 2219 11274 6230 7263 
02/88 13362 902 1869 10591 2341 11021 6138 7224 
03/88 13188 909 1861 10418 2338 10850 6036 7152 
04/88 13071 930 1899 10242 2198 10873 5965 7106 
01/89 12951 908 1906 10137 2087 10864 5896 7055 
02/89 12901 927 1932 10042 2219 10682 5891 7010 
03/89 12778 946 1949 9883 2272 10506 5820 6958 
04/89 12658 965 2017 9676 2160 10498 5770 6888 
01/90 12547 970 2011 9566 2066 10481 5712 6835 
02/90 12456 975 2027 9454 2189 10267 5652 6804 
03/90 12362 986 2046 9330 2216 10146 5605 6757 
04/90 12298 1007 2080 9211 2130 10168 5574 6724 
01/91 12205 994 2075 9136 2076 10129 5521 6684 
02/91 12108 1010 2067 9031 2204 9904 5465 6643 
03/91 12025 1014 2090 8921 2245 9780 5405 6620 
04/91 11872 1019 2102 8751 2140 9732 5299 6573 
01/92 11759 1019 2126 8614 2054 9705 5238 6521 
02/92 11638 1012 2118 8508 2177 9461 5163 6475 
03/92 11545 1017 2137 8391 2180 9365 5124 6421 
04/92 11424 1030 2141 8253 2023 9401 5265 6159 
01/93 11290 1012 2103 8175 1915 9375 5178 6112 
02/93 11161 1002 2106 8053 2004 9157 5096 6065 
03/93 11047 1015 2132 7900 2060 8987 5023 6024 
04/93 10933 1024 2141 7768 1977 8956 4930 6003 
01/94 10816 1029 2134 7653 1869 8947 4859 5957 
02/94 10694 1026 2129 7539 1977 8717 4779 5915 
03/94 10566 1035 2142 7389 2000 8566 4710 5856 
04/94 10424 1040 2148 7236 1830 8594 4648 5776 
01/95 10212 1022 2093 7097 1740 8472 4538 5674 
02/95 10142 1049 2129 6964 1806 8336 4533 5609 
03/95 10025 1074 2146 6805 1833 8192 4465 5560 
04/95 9914 1081 2198 6635 1695 8219 4434 5480 
01/96 9807 1088 2164 6555 1588 8219 4376 5431 
02/96 9660 1047 2169 6444 1680 7980 4283 5377 
03/96 9556 1060 2187 6309 1662 7894 4231 5325 
04/96 9498 1085 2234 6179 1570 7928 4220 5278 
01/97 9417 1087 2214 6116 1439 7978 4177 5240 
02/97 9266 1041 2214 6011 1533 7733 4088 5178 
03/97 9177 1040 2190 5947 1544 7633 4053 5124 
04/97 9101 1058 2225 5818 1479 7622 4023 5078 
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PANEL B: PERCENTAGE OF COMMERCIAL BANKS IN DIFFERENT CATEGORIES IN THE 
UNITED STATES  
Qt/Yr L M S A NA M' NM' 
01/88 6.63% 13.61% 79.75% 16.45% 83.55% 46.17% 53.83% 
02/88 6.75% 13.99% 79.26% 17.52% 82.48% 45.94% 54.06% 
03/88 6.89% 14.11% 79.00% 17.73% 82.27% 45.77% 54.23% 
04/88 7.11% 14.53% 78.36% 16.82% 83.18% 45.64% 54.36% 
01/89 7.01% 14.72% 78.27% 16.11% 83.89% 45.53% 54.47% 
02/89 7.19% 14.98% 77.84% 17.20% 82.80% 45.66% 54.34% 
03/89 7.40% 15.25% 77.34% 17.78% 82.22% 45.55% 54.45% 
04/89 7.62% 15.93% 76.44% 17.06% 82.94% 45.58% 54.42% 
01/90 7.73% 16.03% 76.24% 16.47% 83.53% 45.52% 54.48% 
02/90 7.83% 16.27% 75.90% 17.57% 82.43% 45.38% 54.62% 
03/90 7.98% 16.55% 75.47% 17.93% 82.07% 45.34% 54.66% 
04/90 8.19% 16.91% 74.90% 17.32% 82.68% 45.32% 54.68% 
01/91 8.14% 17.00% 74.85% 17.01% 82.99% 45.24% 54.76% 
02/91 8.34% 17.07% 74.59% 18.20% 81.80% 45.14% 54.86% 
03/91 8.43% 17.38% 74.19% 18.67% 81.33% 44.95% 55.05% 
04/91 8.58% 17.71% 73.71% 18.03% 81.97% 44.63% 55.37% 
01/92 8.67% 18.08% 73.25% 17.47% 82.53% 44.54% 55.46% 
02/92 8.70% 18.20% 73.11% 18.71% 81.29% 44.36% 55.64% 
03/92 8.81% 18.51% 72.68% 18.88% 81.12% 44.38% 55.62% 
04/92 9.02% 18.74% 72.24% 17.71% 82.29% 46.09% 53.91% 
01/93 8.96% 18.63% 72.41% 16.96% 83.04% 45.86% 54.14% 
02/93 8.98% 18.87% 72.15% 17.96% 82.04% 45.66% 54.34% 
03/93 9.19% 19.30% 71.51% 18.65% 81.35% 45.47% 54.53% 
04/93 9.37% 19.58% 71.05% 18.08% 81.92% 45.09% 54.91% 
01/94 9.51% 19.73% 70.76% 17.28% 82.72% 44.92% 55.08% 
02/94 9.59% 19.91% 70.50% 18.49% 81.51% 44.69% 55.31% 
03/94 9.80% 20.27% 69.93% 18.93% 81.07% 44.58% 55.42% 
04/94 9.98% 20.61% 69.42% 17.56% 82.44% 44.59% 55.41% 
01/95 10.01% 20.50% 69.50% 17.04% 82.96% 44.44% 55.56% 
02/95 10.34% 20.99% 68.66% 17.81% 82.19% 44.70% 55.30% 
03/95 10.71% 21.41% 67.88% 18.28% 81.72% 44.54% 55.46% 
04/95 10.90% 22.17% 66.93% 17.10% 82.90% 44.72% 55.28% 
01/96 11.09% 22.07% 66.84% 16.19% 83.81% 44.62% 55.38% 
02/96 10.84% 22.45% 66.71% 17.39% 82.61% 44.34% 55.66% 
03/96 11.09% 22.89% 66.02% 17.39% 82.61% 44.28% 55.72% 
04/96 11.42% 23.52% 65.06% 16.53% 83.47% 44.43% 55.57% 
01/97 11.54% 23.51% 64.95% 15.28% 84.72% 44.36% 55.64% 
02/97 11.23% 23.89% 64.87% 16.54% 83.46% 44.12% 55.88% 
03/97 11.33% 23.86% 64.80% 16.82% 83.18% 44.16% 55.84% 
04/97 11.63% 24.45% 63.93% 16.25% 83.75% 44.20% 55.80% 
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TABLE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF BANKS  BASED ON BANK’S SIZE  
This table contains the distribution of banks by size, as measured by total assets, for the first 
quarter of 1988 (Panel A) and the first quarter of 1997 (Panel B). Both the frequency and relative 
percentage are shown.  
PANEL A. DISTRIBUTION OF ALL BANKS BASED ON SIZE IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1988 
Size Freq % Size Freq % Size Freq % Size Freq % 
<10M 970 7.19 790-810M 4 0.03 1.59-1.61B 2 0.01 2.39-2.41B 1 0.01 
10-30M 4374 32.41 810-830M 5 0.04 1.61-1.63B 1 0.01 2.41-2.43B 1 0.01 
30-50M 2600 19.27 830-850M 6 0.04 1.63-1.65B 1 0.01 2.43-2.45B 0 0 
50-70M 1592 11.8 850-870M 1 0.01 1.65-1.67B 2 0.01 2.45-2.47B 1 0.01 
70-90M 873 6.47 870-890M 10 0.07 1.67-1.69B 1 0.01 2.47-2.49B 0 0 
90-110M 600 4.45 890-910M 8 0.06 1.69-1.71B 4 0.03 2.49-2.51B 2 0.01 
110-130M 417 3.09 910-930M 2 0.01 1.71-1.73B 2 0.01 2.51-2.53B 0 0 
130-150M 306 2.27 930-950M 6 0.04 1.73-1.75B 1 0.01 2.53-2.55B 1 0.01 
150-170M 217 1.61 950-970M 9 0.07 1.75-1.77B 2 0.01 2.55-2.57B 0 0 
170-190M 153 1.13 970-990M 5 0.04 1.77-1.79B 0 0 2.57-2.59B 0 0 
190-210M 138 1.02 990-1010M 4 0.03 1.79-1.81B 0 0 2.59-2.61B 2 0.01 
210-230M 121 0.9 1.01-1.03B 6 0.04 1.81-1.83B 1 0.01 2.61-2.63B 0 0 
230-250M 85 0.63 1.03-1.05B 3 0.02 1.83-1.85B 3 0.02 2.63-2.65B 0 0 
250-270M 65 0.48 1.05-1.07B 10 0.07 1.85-1.87B 7 0.05 2.65-2.67B 2 0.01 
270-290M 58 0.43 1.07-1.09B 2 0.01 1.87-1.89B 6 0.04 2.67-2.69B 0 0 
290-310M 51 0.38 1.09-1.11B 6 0.04 1.89-1.91B 0 0 2.69-2.71B 0 0 
310-330M 56 0.41 1.11-1.13B 6 0.04 1.91-1.93B 3 0.02 2.71-2.73B 4 0.03 
330-350M 37 0.27 1.13-1.15B 4 0.03 1.93-1.95B 3 0.02 2.73-2.75B 2 0.01 
350-370M 37 0.27 1.15-1.17B 4 0.03 1.95-1.97B 1 0.01 2.75-2.77B 3 0.02 
370-390M 35 0.26 1.17-1.19B 5 0.04 1.97-1.99B 0 0 2.77-2.79B 1 0.01 
390-410M 35 0.26 1.19-1.21B 4 0.03 1.99-2.01B 0 0 2.79-2.81B 0 0 
410-430M 22 0.16 1.21-1.23B 2 0.01 2.01-2.03B 1 0.01 2.81-2.83B 1 0.01 
430-450M 31 0.23 1.23-1.25B 7 0.05 2.03-2.05B 1 0.01 2.83-2.85B 0 0 
450-470M 24 0.18 1.25-1.27B 5 0.04 2.05-2.07B 3 0.02 2.85-2.87B 2 0.01 
470-490M 28 0.21 1.27-1.29B 2 0.01 2.07-2.09B 2 0.01 2.87-2.89B 2 0.01 
490-510M 14 0.1 1.29-1.31B 1 0.01 2.09-2.11B 1 0.01 2.89-2.91B 1 0.01 
510-530M 8 0.06 1.31-1.33B 2 0.01 2.11-2.13B 0 0 2.91-2.93B 2 0.01 
530-550M 17 0.13 1.33-1.35B 4 0.03 2.13-2.15B 3 0.02 2.93-2.95B 1 0.01 
550-570M 12 0.09 1.35-1.37B 4 0.03 2.15-2.17B 1 0.01 2.95-2.97B 0 0 
570-590M 17 0.13 1.37-1.39B 4 0.03 2.17-2.19B 0 0 2.97-2.99B 1 0.01 
590-610M 13 0.1 1.39-1.41B 4 0.03 2.19-2.21B 1 0.01 >2.99B 148 1.1 
610-630M 10 0.07 1.41-1.43B 3 0.02 2.21-2.23B 1 0.01    
630-650M 14 0.1 1.43-1.45B 3 0.02 2.23-2.25B 2 0.01    
650-670M 8 0.06 1.45-1.47B 2 0.01 2.25-2.27B 1 0.01    
670-690M 11 0.08 1.47-1.49B 2 0.01 2.27-2.29B 1 0.01    
690-710M 7 0.05 1.49-1.51B 2 0.01 2.29-2.31B 3 0.02    
710-730M 11 0.08 1.51-1.53B 4 0.03 2.31-2.33B 1 0.01    
730-750M 2 0.01 1.53-1.55B 4 0.03 2.33-2.35B 1 0.01    
750-770M 6 0.04 1.55-1.57B 2 0.01 2.35-2.37B 1 0.01    
770-790M 5 0.04 1.57-1.59B 4 0.03 2.37-2.39B 1 0.01    
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PANEL B.  DISTRIBUTION OF ALL BANKS BASED ON SIZE IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1997 
 
Size Freq Percent Size Freq Percent Size Freq Percent Size Freq Percent 
<10M 236 2.51 790-810M 17 0.18 1.59-1.61B 2 0.02 2.39-2.41B 0 0 
10-30M 1778 18.88 810-830M 9 0.1 1.61-1.63B 1 0.01 2.41-2.43B 1 0.01 
30-50M 1724 18.31 830-850M 11 0.12 1.63-1.65B 2 0.02 2.43-2.45B 2 0.02 
50-70M 1195 12.69 850-870M 12 0.13 1.65-1.67B 3 0.03 2.45-2.47B 0 0 
70-90M 854 9.07 870-890M 8 0.08 1.67-1.69B 2 0.02 2.47-2.49B 1 0.01 
90-110M 634 6.73 890-910M 5 0.05 1.69-1.71B 2 0.02 2.49-2.51B 3 0.03 
110-130M 472 5.01 910-930M 5 0.05 1.71-1.73B 3 0.03 2.51-2.53B 2 0.02 
130-150M 353 3.75 930-950M 8 0.08 1.73-1.75B 5 0.05 2.53-2.55B 2 0.02 
150-170M 246 2.61 950-970M 4 0.04 1.75-1.77B 1 0.01 2.55-2.57B 1 0.01 
170-190M 208 2.21 970-990M 2 0.02 1.77-1.79B 1 0.01 2.57-2.59B 0 0 
190-210M 157 1.67 990-1010M 2 0.02 1.79-1.81B 2 0.02 2.59-2.61B 1 0.01 
210-230M 140 1.49 1.01-1.03B 9 0.1 1.81-1.83B 0 0 2.61-2.63B 1 0.01 
230-250M 124 1.32 1.03-1.05B 2 0.02 1.83-1.85B 3 0.03 2.63-2.65B 1 0.01 
250-270M 107 1.14 1.05-1.07B 4 0.04 1.85-1.87B 0 0 2.65-2.67B 0 0 
270-290M 75 0.8 1.07-1.09B 11 0.12 1.87-1.89B 3 0.03 2.67-2.69B 2 0.02 
290-310M 57 0.61 1.09-1.11B 8 0.08 1.89-1.91B 0 0 2.69-2.71B 0 0 
310-330M 62 0.66 1.11-1.13B 5 0.05 1.91-1.93B 2 0.02 2.71-2.73B 3 0.03 
330-350M 55 0.58 1.13-1.15B 5 0.05 1.93-1.95B 1 0.01 2.73-2.75B 1 0.01 
350-370M 37 0.39 1.15-1.17B 5 0.05 1.95-1.97B 0 0 2.75-2.77B 1 0.01 
370-390M 42 0.45 1.17-1.19B 6 0.06 1.97-1.99B 0 0 2.77-2.79B 3 0.03 
390-410M 28 0.3 1.19-1.21B 7 0.07 1.99-2.01B 1 0.01 2.79-2.81B 1 0.01 
410-430M 31 0.33 1.21-1.23B 3 0.03 2.01-2.03B 3 0.03 2.81-2.83B 0 0 
430-450M 44 0.47 1.23-1.25B 6 0.06 2.03-2.05B 3 0.03 2.83-2.85B 0 0 
450-470M 25 0.27 1.25-1.27B 5 0.05 2.05-2.07B 0 0 2.85-2.87B 0 0 
470-490M 35 0.37 1.27-1.29B 2 0.02 2.07-2.09B 1 0.01 2.87-2.89B 0 0 
490-510M 23 0.24 1.29-1.31B 2 0.02 2.09-2.11B 0 0 2.89-2.91B 0 0 
510-530M 29 0.31 1.31-1.33B 2 0.02 2.11-2.13B 4 0.04 2.91-2.93B 1 0.01 
530-550M 31 0.33 1.33-1.35B 8 0.08 2.13-2.15B 2 0.02 2.93-2.95B 1 0.01 
550-570M 17 0.18 1.35-1.37B 4 0.04 2.15-2.17B 3 0.03 2.95-2.97B 0 0 
570-590M 12 0.13 1.37-1.39B 2 0.02 2.17-2.19B 3 0.03 2.97-2.99B 3 0.03 
590-610M 20 0.21 1.39-1.41B 3 0.03 2.19-2.21B 1 0.01 >2.99B 190 2.02 
610-630M 12 0.13 1.41-1.43B 5 0.05 2.21-2.23B 2 0.02    
630-650M 9 0.1 1.43-1.45B 3 0.03 2.23-2.25B 2 0.02    
650-670M 11 0.12 1.45-1.47B 1 0.01 2.25-2.27B 0 0    
670-690M 11 0.12 1.47-1.49B 0 0 2.27-2.29B 1 0.01    
690-710M 2 0.02 1.49-1.51B 3 0.03 2.29-2.31B 0 0    
710-730M 6 0.06 1.51-1.53B 4 0.04 2.31-2.33B 1 0.01    
730-750M 6 0.06 1.53-1.55B 1 0.01 2.33-2.35B 0 0    
750-770M 13 0.14 1.55-1.57B 2 0.02 2.35-2.37B 2 0.02    
770-790M 11 0.12 1.57-1.59B 2 0.02 2.37-2.39B 0 0    
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TABLE 3  CONSUMER PRICE INDEX AND PRODUCER PRICE INDEX 
This table contains the consumer price index (Panel A) and producer price index (Panel B) for 
each quarter of 1988 to 1997. 
PANEL A. CONSUMER PRICE INDEX AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE  
Year Quarter Value Annual Average Yearly Percent Change 
1988 1 116.6   
1988 2 118.1   
1988 3 119.6   
1988 4 120.8 118.4 4.1 
1989 1 122.3   
1989 2 124.1   
1989 3 124.9   
1989 4 126.4 124 4.8 
1990 1 128.6   
1990 2 130   
1990 3 132.6   
1990 4 134.3 130.8 5.4 
1991 1 134.9   
1991 2 136.1   
1991 3 137.1   
1991 4 138.3 136.3 4.2 
1992 1 139.2   
1992 2 140.2   
1992 3 141.2   
1992 4 142.4 140.4 3 
1993 1 143.4   
1993 2 144.4   
1993 3 145.1   
1993 4 146.4 144.6 3 
1994 1 147.2   
1994 2 148   
1994 3 149.4   
1994 4 150.2 148.3 2.6 
1995 1 151.3   
1995 2 152.5   
1995 3 153.2   
1995 4 154.1 152.5 2.8 
1996 1 155.6   
1996 2 156.8   
1996 3 157.8   
1996 4 159.2 157 2.9 
1997 1 159.9   
1997 2 160.3   
1997 3 161.3   
1997 4 161.9 160.6 2.3 
Source: Federal Reserve of Dallas 
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PANEL B. PRODUCER PRICE INDEX AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE 
Year Month Value Annual Average Year-over-Year Percent Change 
1988 1 106.6   
1988 2 107.5   
1988 3 109   
1988 4 110 108 2.5 
1989 1 112.3   
1989 2 114   
1989 3 114   
1989 4 115.5 113.5 5.1 
1990 1 117.5   
1990 2 117.6   
1990 3 120.7   
1990 4 122 119.1 4.9 
1991 1 121.4   
1991 2 121.4   
1991 3 121.5   
1991 4 122.1 121.7 2.2 
1992 1 122.4   
1992 2 123.4   
1992 3 123.7   
1992 4 124.2 123.2 1.2 
1993 1 125   
1993 2 125.2   
1993 3 124.1   
1993 4 124.4 124.7 1.2 
1994 1 125.1   
1994 2 125.2   
1994 3 125.9   
1994 4 126.6 125.5 0.6 
1995 1 127.4   
1995 2 127.8   
1995 3 128.1   
1995 4 129.3 127.9 1.9 
1996 1 130.5   
1996 2 131.3   
1996 3 131.8   
1996 4 132.8 131.3 2.6 
1997 1 132.6   
1997 2 131.3   
1997 3 131.8   
1997 4 131.2 131.8 0.4 
Source: Federal Reserve of Dallas  
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TABLE 4. QUARTILE CRITERIA BOUNDARIES FOR BANK SIZE 
Quartile criteria are applied to classify the bank size. Q1, Q2, and Q3 are the cutoffs of the bank 
size in total assets. 
  Quartile Boundary 
Year Quarter Q1(x1,000) Q2(x1,000) Q3(x1,000) 
1988 q1 20045 39700 82256 
 q2 20268 40030 83851 
 q3 20490 40334 84249 
 q4 21024 41291 86371 
1989 q1 21249 41597 86866 
 q2 21332 41822 88376 
 q3 21565 42324 90434 
 q4 22090 43900 93702 
1990 q1 22495 44462 94207 
 q2 22861 45046 96538 
 q3 23078 45581 98354 
 q4 23746 46936 100406 
1991 q1 24039 47281 100492 
 q2 24401 47676 101718 
 q3 24877 48373 103620 
 q4 25578 49125 104925 
1992 q1 25999 50089 106683 
 q2 26124 50640 107319 
 q3 26640 51456 108507 
 q4 27291 52979 110950 
1993 q1 27542 52925 110143 
 q2 27788 53515 110752 
 q3 28179 54688 112788 
 q4 28951 55743 115101 
1994 q1 29066 55995 116303 
 q2 29210 56222 116829 
 q3 29566 57132 119454 
 q4 30093 58210 121334 
1995 q1 29925 58192 121375 
 q2 30566 59706 124625 
 q3 31043 61016 126872 
 q4 32073 62796 130256 
1996 q1 32213 63200 131231 
 q2 32157 63317 131421 
 q3 32546 64745 133979 
 q4 33326 65896 137337 
1997 q1 33237 65954 138596 
 q2 33604 66052 138728 
 q3 33968 66626 139240 
 q4 34449 68231 142863 
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TABLE 5. NUMBER OF COMMERCIAL BANKS IN DIFFERENT SIZE, AGRICULTURAL, AND 
MSA CATEGORIES IN THE UNITED STATES  
L: Large banks with total assets not less than $300 million.  M: Medium banks with total assets 
between $300 and $100 million.  S: Small banks with total assets below $100 million.  A: 
Agricultural banks with agricultural loan ratio not less than 25 percent of total assets.  NA: Non-
agricultural banks with agricultural loan ratio less than 25 percent of total assets.  M’ & NM’: 
Banks chartered in MSA and non-MSA respectively 
Qt/Yr LAM’ LANM’ LNAM’ LNANM’ MAM’ MANM’ MNAM’MNANM’ SAM’ SANM’ SNAM’SNANM’ 
01/88 1 0 839 55 3 25 1214 595 167 2023 4006 4565 
02/88 0 0 849 53 5 27 1225 612 177 2132 3882 4400 
03/88 0 0 854 55 4 29 1207 621 175 2130 3796 4317 
04/88 0 0 872 58 3 36 1221 639 166 1993 3703 4380 
01/89 0 0 851 57 2 28 1217 659 153 1904 3673 4407 
02/89 0 0 869 58 2 29 1229 672 166 2022 3625 4229 
03/89 0 0 884 62 5 34 1231 679 169 2064 3531 4119 
04/89 0 0 898 67 5 38 1261 713 157 1960 3449 4110 
01/90 0 0 902 68 4 36 1243 728 145 1881 3418 4122 
02/90 1 0 903 71 3 40 1249 735 159 1986 3337 3972 
03/90 0 0 910 76 3 43 1256 744 164 2006 3272 3888 
04/90 1 1 925 80 7 44 1257 772 157 1920 3227 3907 
01/91 1 0 913 80 7 43 1251 774 153 1872 3196 3915 
02/91 1 0 925 84 7 49 1234 777 161 1986 3137 3747 
03/91 1 1 922 90 8 57 1237 788 161 2017 3076 3667 
04/91 1 1 926 91 7 61 1228 806 159 1911 2978 3703 
01/92 1 1 925 92 7 64 1239 816 141 1840 2925 3708 
02/92 1 0 918 93 6 64 1231 817 159 1947 2848 3554 
03/92 1 1 921 94 7 69 1243 818 159 1943 2793 3496 
04/92 1 1 930 98 8 69 1261 803 170 1774 2895 3414 
01/93 1 1 909 101 7 62 1232 802 156 1688 2873 3458 
02/93 1 1 899 101 10 67 1233 796 155 1770 2798 3330 
03/93 1 1 906 107 9 73 1254 796 164 1812 2689 3235 
04/93 1 1 910 112 9 72 1246 814 156 1738 2608 3266 
01/94 1 1 914 113 8 67 1227 832 136 1656 2573 3288 
02/94 1 0 907 118 8 75 1214 832 151 1742 2498 3148 
03/94 1 0 916 118 11 82 1221 828 149 1757 2412 3071 
04/94 1 0 918 121 10 74 1219 845 142 1603 2358 3133 
01/95 1 0 897 124 7 70 1194 822 130 1532 2309 3126 
02/95 2 1 923 123 7 82 1214 826 130 1584 2257 2993 
03/95 4 2 940 128 10 85 1207 844 135 1597 2169 2904 
04/95 3 2 945 131 7 86 1241 864 121 1476 2117 2921 
01/96 3 1 948 136 7 70 1217 870 109 1398 2092 2956 
02/96 4 1 908 134 11 86 1217 855 122 1456 2021 2845 
03/96 3 1 914 142 10 82 1223 872 114 1452 1967 2776 
04/96 3 1 938 143 9 81 1238 906 105 1371 1927 2776 
01/97 2 1 937 147 5 72 1218 919 90 1269 1925 2832 
02/97 3 4 887 147 9 77 1226 902 101 1339 1862 2709 
03/97 3 5 874 158 8 82 1213 887 98 1348 1857 2644 
04/97 3 5 881 169 7 89 1217 912 93 1282 1822 2621 
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TABLE 6. THE NUMBER, MEAN, AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF X-EFFICIENCY OF ALL 
COMMERCIAL BANKS IN DIFFERENT CATEGORIES  
This table contains average X-efficiency of all commercial banks sorted by various 
characteristics.  The X-efficiency is calculated using quarterly data from 1988 – 1997 using the 
translog cost function and estimated using the distribution free approach of Berger (1993).  L: 
Large banks with total assets not less than $300 million.  M: Medium banks with total assets 
between $300 and $100 million.  S: Small banks with total assets below $100 million.  A: 
Agricultural banks with agricultural loan ratio not less than 25 percent of total assets.  NA: Non-
agricultural banks with agricultural loan ratio less than 25 percent of total assets.  M’ & NM’: 
Banks chartered in MSA and non-MSA respectively. 
  
    
Banks sorted based on size  N Mean STD 
L 1947 0.9652 0.015 
M 4580 0.9625 0.0145 
S 12141 0.9624 0.0126 
Banks sorted based on specialties   
A 3071 0.9611 0.0128 
NA 13493 0.9627 0.0126 
Banks sorted based on charter location  
M’ 7703 0.9633 0.0133 
NM’ 7675 0.9618 0.0118 
Interaction of s ize, specialties, and charter location 
LAM’ 5 0.9614 0.015 
LANM’ 7 0.9549 0.0052 
LNAM’ 1712 0.9655 0.0152 
LNANM’ 267 0.9637 0.0157 
    
MAM’ 24 0.9584 0.0144 
MANM’ 172 0.9637 0.0148 
MNAM’ 2928 0.9622 0.0151 
MNANM’ 1665 0.9629 0.0141 
    
SAM’ 320 0.9603 0.0149 
SANM’ 2733 0.9611 0.0127 
SNAM’ 5377 0.9629 0.0136 
SNANM’ 5612 0.9617 0.0122 
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TABLE 7. PAIRWISE COMPARISON OF X-EFFICIENCY MEANS BASED ON SIZE, LOAN 
SPECIALTIES , AND CHARTER LOCATION OF THE COMMERCIAL BANKS IN THE 
UNITED STATES  
The following table contains pairwise comparisons of X-efficiencies across different categories of 
banks.  L: large size commercial banks, M: medium size, S: small size commercial banks, A: 
agricultural commercial banks (agricultural loans ratio are greater than 25% of total assets), M’: 
metropolitan statistical area (MSA), and N: non. For example, MNANM represents medium non-
agricultural commercial banks in non-MSA.  
 
Comparason of Samples t Value Relationship of the Comparison 
Banks sorted based on size   
L – M 6.62***  
L – S 7.8*** L > M=S 
M - S 0.57  
Banks sorted based on loan specialties  
A - NA -6.45*** A < NA 
Banks sorted based on charter location  
M’ – NM’ 7.65*** M’ > NM’ 
Interaction of size, specialties, and charter location 
LAM’ – LANM’ 0.92 LAM’ = LANM’ 
LAM’ – LNAM’ -0.62 LAM’ = LNAM’ 
LAM’ – LNANM’ -0.36 LAM’ = LNANM’ 
LANM’ – LNAM’ -5.35*** LANM’ < LNAM’ 
LANM’ – LNANM’ -4.1*** LANM’ < LNANM’ 
LNAM’ – LNANM’ 1.85* LNAM’ > LNANM’ 
   
MAM’ – MANM’ -1.64 MAM’ = MANM’ 
MAM’ – MNAM’ -1.23 MAM’ = MNAM’ 
MAM’ – MNANM’ -1.62 MAM’ = MNANM’ 
MANM’ – MNAM’ 1.25 MANM’ = MNAM’ 
MANM’ – MNANM’ 0.68 MANM’ = MNANM’ 
MNAM’ – MNANM’ -1.69* MNAM’ < MNANM’ 
   
SAM’ – SANM’ -0.97 SAM’ = SANM’ 
SAM’ – SNAM’ -3.08*** SAM’ < SNAM’ 
SAM’ – SNANM’ -1.66* SAM’ < SNANM’ 
SANM’ – SNAM’ -5.86*** SANM’ < SNAM’ 
SANM’ – SNANM’ -1.95* SANM’ < SNANM’ 
SNAM’ – SNANM’ 4.93*** SNAM’ > SNANM’ 
***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels respectively. Values are for the 
statistics using the Cochran and Cox approximation. 
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TABLE 8. PAIRWISE COMPARISON OF X-EFFICIENCY MEANS BASED ON BANK SIZE IN 
DIFFERENT CATEGORIES  
The following table contains the results of pairwise comparison of x-efficiency based on bank 
size. 
L: large size commercial banks, M: medium size, S: small size commercial banks, A: agricultural 
commercial banks (agricultural loans ratio are greater than 25% of total assets), M’: metropolitan 
statistical area (MSA), and N: non. For example, MNANM represents medium non-agricultural 
commercial banks in non-MSA. 
 
Bank Size A - NA Relationship 
L -7.83*** NA>A 
M 3.35*** A>NA 
S 2.49** A>NA 
 
Bank Size M' - NM' Relationship 
L 4.40*** M'>NM' 
M -5.82*** NM'>M' 
S 8.23*** M'>NM' 
 
 
TABLE 9. PAIRWISE COMPARISON OF X-EFFICIENCY MEANS BASED ON LOAN 
SPECIALIZATION AND CHARTER LOCATION IN DIFFERENT CATEGORIES  
The following table contains the results of pairwise comparison of x-efficiency based on loan 
specialization and charter location. 
L: large size commercial banks, M: medium size, S: small size commercial banks, A: agricultural 
commercial banks (agricultural loans ratio are greater than 25%), M’: metropolitan statistical area 
(MSA), and N: non. For example, MNANM represents medium non-agricultural commercial 
banks in non-MSA. 
 
Loan Specialization L - M L - S M - S Relationship 
A -6.09*** -2.64*** 5.63*** M>S>L 
NA 16.12*** 26.32*** 13.16*** L>M>S 
 
Charter Location L - M L - S M - S Relationship 
M' 18.14*** 16.30*** -2.22** L>S>M 
NM' 0.02 3.39*** 11.01*** L=M>S 
***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively. Values are for the 
statistics using the Cochran and Cox approximation. 
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TABLE 10. COMPARISON OF BANK EFFICIENCY BASED ON LOAN SPECIALIZATION IN 
DETAILED SIZE CATEGORIES  
This table contains the comparison of bank efficiency based on loan specialization by using the 
detailed size categories.  Cochran statistics are used to test the difference between efficiencies of 
banks without agricultural loan specialization (NA) and banks with agricultural loan 
specialization (A).  Because of the lack of observations of banks with agricultural loan 
specialization, the results of the banks with $600 million or higher in total assets are not available.  
 
Size (total assets, million dollars) t Value (NA-A) Results 
0-10 24.18*** NA>A 
10-20 13.12*** NA>A 
20-30 -19.62*** A>NA 
30-40 -18.99*** A>NA 
40-50 -24.59*** A>NA 
50-60 -16.45*** A>NA 
60-70 -16.63*** A>NA 
70-80 -12.92*** A>NA 
80-90 -8.27*** A>NA 
90-100 -10.18*** A>NA 
100-150 -9.7*** A>NA 
150-200 -2.51** A>NA 
200-250 -3.11*** A>NA 
250-300 1.29 NA=A 
300-400 3.8*** NA>A 
400-500 4.33*** NA>A 
500-600 . . 
600-700 . . 
700-800 . . 
800-900 . . 
900-1000 . . 
1000-1500 . . 
1500-2000 . . 
2000-3000 . . 
3000-5000 . . 
5000-10000 . . 
>10000 . . 
***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels respectively. Values are for the 
statistics using the Cochran and Cox approximation. 
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TABLE 11. THE FUNDAMENTAL INFORMATION MODEL  
This table contains results of the estimation of the fundamental information model for explaining 
banks’ X-efficiencies.  Size is the size of the bank, measured by total assets in logarithm term.  
Size2 represents the size of the bank in squared.  Size3 shows the size of the bank in cubed.  AAR 
is the average agricultural loan ratio, calculated from the average agricultural loans divided by the 
total assets.  Inter is an interaction term, testing the relationship between agricultural loans and 
bank’s size.  Bkcapita represents banks per capita in the county level, which is the proxy of the 
competitiveness of the local financial market.  Bkcapita is the ratio of number of commercial 
banks chartered in the county to the population of the county.  Agprice shows the volatility of 
agricultural loans based on the quarterly data of average agricultural loans over the 10-year 
examination period.  qj = dummy variables measuring seasonal effect.  q1 represents first quarter, 
q2 represents second quarter, and q3 represents third quarter.  XEFFi is the average efficiency of 
each commercial bank over 1988-1997 periods.  
 
 
Observations All Banks Agricultural Banks Non-Agricultural Banks 
    
Variable     
Intercept 1.07545*** 2.62388*** 1.07718*** 
Size -0.02762*** -0.49307*** -0.02642*** 
size2 0.00203*** 0.04795*** 0.00182*** 
size3 -4.37E-05*** -0.00153*** -3.59E-05*** 
AAR -0.10998*** -0.06214*** -0.23956*** 
Inter 0.01082*** 0.00732*** 0.02158*** 
Bkcapita 4.14366*** 3.79562*** 7.35801*** 
Agprice -2.87701E-8*** -5.56486E-7*** -3.28334E-8*** 
q1 0.00194*** 0.00207*** 0.00194*** 
q2 0.00092125*** 0.00092995*** 0.00094170*** 
q3 0.00023268*** 0.00028747* 0.00023137*** 
    
Adjusted R2: 0.0341 0.086 0.0341 
***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels respectively. 
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TABLE 12. CORRELATION OF ESTIMA TES OF THE FUNDAMENTAL INFORMATION MODEL BASED ON ALL BANKS ’ OBSERVATIONS 
This table contains the correlation coefficient matrix of basic model.  Size is the size of the bank, measured by total assets in logarithm term.  Size2 
represents the size of the bank in squared.  Size3 shows the size of the bank in cubed.  AAR is the average agricultural loan ratio, calculated from 
the average agricultural loans divided by the total assets.  Inter is an interaction term, testing the relationship between agricultural loans and bank’s 
size.  Bkcapita represents banks per capita in the county level, which is the proxy of the competitiveness of the local financial market.  Bkcapita is 
the ratio of number of commercial banks chartered in the county to the population of the county.  Agprice shows the volatility of agricultural loans 
based on the quarterly data of average agricultural loans over the 10-year examination period.  qj = dummy variables measuring seasonal effect.  
q1 represents first quarter, q2 represents second quarter, and q3 represents third quarter.   
Variable  Intercept size Size2 size3 AAR Inter Bkcapita Agprice q1 q2 q3 
            
Intercept 1 -0.9992 0.9972 -0.9942 0.1333 -0.1311 -0.0253 0.0022 0.0047 0.0066 -0.0016 
size -0.9992 1 -0.9994 0.9976 -0.1394 0.137 0.0297 -0.0015 -0.0053 -0.0071 0.001 
size2 0.9972 -0.9994 1 -0.9994 0.142 -0.1394 -0.034 0.0009 0.0054 0.0069 -0.001 
size3 -0.9942 0.9976 -0.9994 1 -0.1418 0.139 0.0381 -0.0003 -0.0054 -0.0067 0.001 
AAR 0.1333 -0.1394 0.142 -0.1418 1 -0.9983 -0.0455 0.0343 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0019 
Inter -0.1311 0.137 -0.1394 0.139 -0.9983 1 0.014 -0.0458 0.0008 -0.0005 0.001 
Bkcapita -0.0253 0.0297 -0.034 0.0381 -0.0455 0.014 1 0.0383 -0.0067 0.0059 0.0079 
Agprice 0.0022 -0.0015 0.0009 -0.0003 0.0343 -0.0458 0.0383 1 -0.0084 -0.0058 -0.0049 
q1 0.0047 -0.0053 0.0054 -0.0054 -0.0001 0.0008 -0.0067 -0.0084 1 0.5308 0.5266 
q2 0.0066 -0.0071 0.0069 -0.0067 0.0001 -0.0005 0.0059 -0.0058 0.5308 1 0.5233 
q3 -0.0016 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.0019 0.001 0.0079 -0.0049 0.5266 0.5233 1 
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TABLE 13. CORRELATION OF ESTIMA TES OF THE FUNDAMENTAL INFORMATION MODEL BASED ON BANKS’ OBSERVATIONS WITH 
AGRICULTURAL LOAN SPECIALIZATION  
This table contains the correlation coefficient matrix of basic model. Size is the size of the bank, measured by total assets in logarithm term.  Size2 
represents the size of the bank in squared.  Size3 shows the size of the bank in cubed.  AAR is the average agricultural loan ratio, calculated from 
the average agricultural loans divided by the total assets.  Inter is an interaction term, testing the relationship between agricultural loans and bank’s 
size.  Bkcapita represents banks per capita in the county level, which is the proxy of the competitiveness of the local financial market.  Bkcapita is 
the ratio of number of commercial banks chartered in the county to the population of the county.  Agprice shows the volatility of agricultural loans 
based on the quarterly data of average agricultural loans over the 10-year examination period.  qj = dummy variables measuring seasonal effect.  
q1 represents first quarter, q2 represents second quarter, and q3 represents third quarter.   
 
Variable  Intercept size Size2 size3 AAR Inter Bkcapita Agprice q1 q2 q3 
            
Intercept 1 -0.9966 0.9888 -0.9791 -0.0761 0.0741 0.0139 0.1499 -0.0048 -0.0043 -0.0037 
size -0.9966 1 -0.9977 0.9921 0.0169 -0.0148 -0.0167 -0.1766 0.0032 0.0031 0.0023 
size2 0.9888 -0.9977 1 -0.9983 0.0225 -0.025 0.0169 0.2025 -0.0038 -0.0038 -0.0028 
size3 -0.9791 0.9921 -0.9983 1 -0.0424 0.0453 -0.0159 -0.228 0.0045 0.0045 0.0033 
AAR -0.0761 0.0169 0.0225 -0.0424 1 -0.9972 -0.0117 0.1635 -0.0042 -0.0116 -0.0106 
Inter 0.0741 -0.0148 -0.025 0.0453 -0.9972 1 -0.0065 -0.18 0.0062 0.0125 0.0106 
Bkcapita 0.0139 -0.0167 0.0169 -0.0159 -0.0117 -0.0065 1 0.0303 -0.0101 0.0067 0.0132 
Agprice 0.1499 -0.1766 0.2025 -0.228 0.1635 -0.18 0.0303 1 -0.0209 -0.0162 -0.0104 
q1 -0.0048 0.0032 -0.0038 0.0045 -0.0042 0.0062 -0.0101 -0.0209 1 0.5052 0.5061 
q2 -0.0043 0.0031 -0.0038 0.0045 -0.0116 0.0125 0.0067 -0.0162 0.5052 1 0.5134 
q3 -0.0037 0.0023 -0.0028 0.0033 -0.0106 0.0106 0.0132 -0.0104 0.5061 0.5134 1 
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TABLE 14. CORRELATION OF ESTIMA TES OF THE FUNDAMENTAL INFORMATION MODEL BASED ON BANKS’ OBSERVATIONS WITHOUT 
AGRICULTURAL LOAN SPECIALIZATION  
It is the correlation coefficient matrix of basic model. size  is the size of the bank, measured by total assets in logarithm term. size2 represents the 
size of the bank in square term, measuring the square effect of the bank size. size3 shows the size of the bank in cube term. AAR is the average 
agricultural loan ratio, calculated from the average agricultural loans divided by the total assets. Inter is interaction term, testing the relationship 
between agricultural and bank’s size. Bkcapita represents banks per capita in the county level, which is the proxy of the competitiveness of the 
local financial market. It is the ratio of number of commercial banks chartered in the county to the population of the county. Agprice shows the 
volatility of agricultural loans based on the quarterly data of average agricultural loans over 10-year examination period. qj = dummy variables 
measuring seasonal effect. q1 represents first quarter, q2 represents second quarter, and q3 represents third quarter. 
 
Variable  Intercept size Siz2 siz3 AAR Inter Bkcapita Agprice q1 q2 q3 
            
Intercept 1 -0.9964 0.986 -0.9693 -0.2132 0.2156 -0.0144 0.179 -0.0089 -0.0087 -0.0082 
size -0.9964 1 -0.9966 0.9863 0.1736 -0.176 -0.0009 -0.2071 0.0019 0.0018 0.0015 
size2 0.986 -0.9966 1 -0.9965 -0.1356 0.1378 0.0103 0.2379 -0.0015 -0.0014 -0.0012 
size3 -0.9693 0.9863 -0.9965 1 0.1014 -0.1032 -0.0163 -0.2719 0.0012 0.001 0.001 
AAR -0.2132 0.1736 -0.1356 0.1014 1 -0.9954 -0.1321 0.172 -0.0038 -0.0008 -0.0001 
Inter 0.2156 -0.176 0.1378 -0.1032 -0.9954 1 0.0845 -0.1815 0.0045 0.0005 -0.0004 
Bkcapita -0.0144 -0.0009 0.0103 -0.0163 -0.1321 0.0845 1 0.0039 -0.0071 0.0024 0.0055 
Agprice 0.179 -0.2071 0.2379 -0.2719 0.172 -0.1815 0.0039 1 -0.0034 -0.0004 0.0006 
q1 -0.0089 0.0019 -0.0015 0.0012 -0.0038 0.0045 -0.0071 -0.0034 1 0.5063 0.5044 
q2 -0.0087 0.0018 -0.0014 0.001 -0.0008 0.0005 0.0024 -0.0004 0.5063 1 0.5018 
q3 -0.0082 0.0015 -0.0012 0.001 -0.0001 -0.0004 0.0055 0.0006 0.5044 0.5018 1 
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TABLE 15. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS CATEGORIES  
This table contains relative weights of commodities in the indexes of pr ices received by farmers, 
base weight period 1990-92, from the USDA Statistical Bulletin.  
Commodity and Group Relative Weight 
(percent) 
Commodity and Group Relative Weight 
(percent) 
Wheat                    4.0  Onions                  0.5 
Rice                     0.7  Sweet Corn              0.4 
  Food Grains            4.7  Tomatoes                1.6 
                           Broccoli                0.2 
Corn                     8.3  Cantaloupes             0.2 
Oats                     0.1  Caulif lower             0.2 
Barley                   0.5  Cucumbers               0.3 
Grain Sorghum            0.7  Snap Beans              0.3 
All Hay                  1.8    Commercial  Vegetables      5.1 
  Feed Grains and Hay    11.4            
                                                    
American Upland Cotton 2.8  Dry Edible Beans        0.3 
   Potatoes                1.3 
                             Potatoes and Dry Beans   1.6 
Tobacco                  1.7   
                                                    
Cottonseed               0.3  Other Crops             7.5 
Peanuts                  0.8                           
Soybeans                 6.5  All Crops               48.4 
Sunflower                0.2                           
  Oil-Bearing Crops      7.8  Beef Cattle             22 
                           Calves                  1.9 
Apples                   1.2  Hogs                    6.7 
Grapefruit               0.3    Meat Animals          30.6 
Lemons                   0.2                           
Oranges                  1.2  Milk, Wholesale         11.7 
Peaches                  0.3    Dairy Products        11.7 
Pears                    0.2                           
Strawberries             0.5  Eggs                    2.4 
Grapes                   1.4  Broilers                5.4 
Almonds                  0.5  Turkeys                 1.5 
  Fruit and Nuts         5.8    Poultry and Eggs      9.3 
                                                    
Asparagus                0.1  Livestock and            
Carrots                  0.3  Products                51.6 
Celery                   0.2                           
Lettuce                  0.8  All Farm Products       100 
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TABLE 16. LOCAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY EFFECT MODEL 
This table contains the results of the estimation of the relationship between bank’s X-efficiency 
and bank’s fundamental information and agricultural factors effects.  Size is the size of the bank, 
measured by total assets in logarithm term.  Size2 represents the size of the bank in squared. Size3 
shows the size of the bank in cubed.  AAR is the average agricultural loan ratio, calculated from 
the average agricultural loans divided by the total assets of the bank.  Inter is interaction term, 
testing the relationship between agricultural loans and bank’s size.  Bkcapita represents banks per 
capita at the county level, which is the proxy of the competitiveness of the local financial market.  
Bkcapita is the ratio of number of commercial banks chartered in the county to the population of 
the county.  Agprice shows the volatility of agricultural loans based on quarterly data of average 
agricultural loans over 10-year examination period.  AgR is agricultural products ratio.  Thus, 
AgR*AAR represents the agricultural loans on specified agricultural products at the county level.  
XEFFi is the quarterly average efficiency of each commercial bank over 1988-1992 periods. 
 
 
 
 
Observations All Banks Agricultural Banks Non-Agricultural Banks 
Variables    
    
Intercept 1.1254*** 2.8542*** 1.10323*** 
size -0.04557*** -0.56022*** -0.03798*** 
size2 0.00376*** 0.05414*** 0.00299*** 
size3 -0.00009436*** -0.00172*** -7.04E-05*** 
AAR -0.18112*** -0.13063*** -0.35185*** 
Inter 0.01539*** 0.01296*** 0.02816*** 
Bkcapita 5.14*** 5.2596*** 8.73733*** 
Agprice -4.06E-09 -7.44E-07*** -1.51E-08 
Food Grains 0.02097*** 0.00393 0.01545 
Feed Grains and Hay 0.05672*** 0.03788*** 0.0949*** 
Cotton -0.00366 -0.00727 -0.02654** 
Tobacco 0.05435*** 0.15327*** 0.06661*** 
Oil-Bearing Crop 0.04338*** 0.03074*** 0.10568*** 
Fruit and Nuts -0.04548*** -0.04207** -0.01785 
Vegetable  -0.06797*** -0.09699*** 0.00788 
Meat Animals 0.02448*** 0.00968*** 0.03*** 
Diary Products 0.06294*** 0.06367*** 0.0917*** 
Poultry and Egg 0.01954*** -0.0009893 0.05364*** 
    
Adj R-Sq 0.1197 0.2123 0.1137 
***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels respectively. 
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TABLE 17. CORRELATION OF ESTIMA TES OF LOCAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY EFFECT MODEL BASED ON ALL BANKS ’ OBSERVATIONS 
This table contains the correlation coefficient matrix of agricultural effect model.  size  is the size of the bank.  size 2 represents the size of the bank 
in square term.  size 3 shows the size of the bank in cube term.  AAR is the average agricultural loan ratio.  Inter is interaction term, testing the 
relationship between agricultural and bank’s size.  Bkcapita represents banks per capita in the county level.  Agprice shows the volatility of 
agricultural loans.  Ag1, Ag2, Ag3, Ag4, Ag5, Ag6, Ag7, Ag8, Ag9 and Ag10 are food grains, feed grains and hay, cotton, tobacco, oil-bearing 
crop, fruit and nuts, vegetable, meat animals, diary products, and poultry and egg. 
 
Variable Intercept size size2 size3 AAR Inter Bkcapita Agprice Ag1 Ag2 Ag3 Ag4 Ag5 Ag6 Ag7 Ag8 Ag9 Ag10 
Intercept 1 -0.997 0.9883 -0.9741 -0.3349 0.3783 -0.0126 0.2499 0.0085 0.0072 -0.0075 0.0086 0.0075 -0.0082 -0.0105 0.0021 0.0039 0.0042 
size -0.997 1 -0.9971 0.9884 0.3015 -0.3417 0 -0.2756 -0.0055 -0.0037 0.0077 -0.0093 -0.0086 0.0083 0.0094 0.0006 -0.0058 -0.0042 
size2 0.9883 -0.9971 1 -0.997 -0.2682 0.3046 0.0081 0.3033 0.0037 0.0013 -0.0075 0.0094 0.0096 -0.0087 -0.0088 -0.0021 0.0072 0.0039 
size3 -0.9741 0.9884 -0.997 1 0.2362 -0.2685 -0.0133 -0.3335 -0.0026 0.0003 0.0071 -0.009 -0.0105 0.0091 0.0084 0.0028 -0.0082 -0.0036 
AAR -0.3349 0.3015 -0.2682 0.2362 1 -0.9007 -0.0117 0.083 -0.4326 -0.3763 -0.3028 -0.0984 -0.2783 -0.1124 -0.1194 -0.4605 -0.2931 -0.256 
Inter 0.3783 -0.3417 0.3046 -0.2685 -0.9007 1 0.0093 -0.1184 0.0764 0.1017 -0.0122 0.005 0.015 -0.0041 -0.0167 0.0551 0.0093 0.0384 
Bkcapita -0.0126 0 0.0081 -0.0133 -0.0117 0.0093 1 0.0046 -0.1435 -0.1085 -0.0244 -0.0373 -0.0321 0.0332 0.0428 -0.1137 -0.0137 -0.0299 
Agprice 0.2499 -0.2756 0.3033 -0.3335 0.083 -0.1184 0.0046 1 0.0221 0.0149 0.0179 0.0062 0.0241 -0.0081 -0.0037 0.0287 0.0199 0.0127 
Ag1 0.0085 -0.0055 0.0037 -0.0026 -0.4326 0.0764 -0.1435 0.0221 1 0.5378 0.5989 0.2005 0.581 0.2187 0.2689 0.774 0.5536 0.4489 
Ag2 0.0072 -0.0037 0.0013 0.0003 -0.3763 0.1017 -0.1085 0.0149 0.5378 1 0.5023 0.1566 -0.044 0.179 0.1577 0.5434 0.4018 0.3575 
Ag3 -0.0075 0.0077 -0.0075 0.0071 -0.3028 -0.0122 -0.0244 0.0179 0.5989 0.5023 1 0.1638 0.4023 0.1929 0.183 0.684 0.4976 0.3801 
Ag4 0.0086 -0.0093 0.0094 -0.009 -0.0984 0.005 -0.0373 0.0062 0.2005 0.1566 0.1638 1 0.1424 0.0649 0.0545 0.2153 0.1228 0.1118 
Ag5 0.0075 -0.0086 0.0096 -0.0105 -0.2783 0.015 -0.0321 0.0241 0.581 -0.044 0.4023 0.1424 1 0.175 0.2002 0.6262 0.4277 0.2797 
Ag6 -0.0082 0.0083 -0.0087 0.0091 -0.1124 -0.0041 0.0332 -0.0081 0.2187 0.179 0.1929 0.0649 0.175 1 -0.085 0.2535 0.1432 0.1358 
Ag7 -0.0105 0.0094 -0.0088 0.0084 -0.1194 -0.0167 0.0428 -0.0037 0.2689 0.1577 0.183 0.0545 0.2002 -0.085 1 0.2895 0.1478 0.1389 
Ag8 0.0021 0.0006 -0.0021 0.0028 -0.4605 0.0551 -0.1137 0.0287 0.774 0.5434 0.684 0.2153 0.6262 0.2535 0.2895 1 0.6022 0.4901 
Ag9 0.0039 -0.0058 0.0072 -0.0082 -0.2931 0.0093 -0.0137 0.0199 0.5536 0.4018 0.4976 0.1228 0.4277 0.1432 0.1478 0.6022 1 0.2405 
Ag10 0.0042 -0.0042 0.0039 -0.0036 -0.256 0.0384 -0.0299 0.0127 0.4489 0.3575 0.3801 0.1118 0.2797 0.1358 0.1389 0.4901 0.2405 1 
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TABLE 18. CORRELATION OF ESTIMA TES OF LOCAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY EFFECT MODEL BASED ON AGRICULTURAL BANKS ’ 
OBSERVATIONS  
This table contains the correlation coefficient matrix of agricultural effect model.  size  is the size of the bank.  size 2 represents the size of the bank 
in square term. size 3 shows the size of the bank in cube term.  AAR is the average agricultural loan ratio.  Inter is interaction term, testing the 
relationship between agricultural and bank’s size.  Bkcapita represents banks per capita in the county level.  Agprice shows the volatility of 
agricultural loans. Ag1, Ag2, Ag3, Ag4, Ag5, Ag6, Ag7, Ag8, Ag9 and Ag10 are food grains, feed grains and hay, cotton, tobacco, oil-bearing 
crop, fruit and nuts, vegetable, meat animals, diary products, and poultry and egg. 
 
Variable Intercept size size2 size3 AAR Inter Bkcapita Agprice Ag1 Ag2 Ag3 Ag4 Ag5 Ag6 Ag7 Ag8 Ag9 Ag10 
Intercept 1 -0.9968 0.9894 -0.9801 -0.1406 0.141 0.0095 0.081 -0.0079 0.0107 0.0081 -0.2141 0.0067 -0.002 0.0084 -0.0141 0.0241 -0.0306 
size -0.9968 1 -0.9978 0.9925 0.0843 -0.0833 -0.0113 -0.1042 0.0042 -0.0132 -0.0138 0.2086 -0.0089 0.003 -0.0107 0.0077 -0.0269 0.0275 
size2 0.9894 -0.9978 1 -0.9984 -0.0461 0.0435 0.0108 0.1267 -0.001 0.0162 0.0186 -0.2026 0.0099 -0.0041 0.012 -0.0019 0.0288 -0.0252 
size3 -0.9801 0.9925 -0.9984 1 0.0259 -0.022 -0.0097 -0.1488 -0.0012 -0.019 -0.0225 0.1965 -0.0103 0.0049 -0.0127 -0.0028 -0.0305 0.0237 
AAR -0.1406 0.0843 -0.0461 0.0259 1 -0.9776 -0.0103 0.1474 -0.1157 -0.1361 -0.0776 0.0121 -0.0826 -0.0527 -0.0227 -0.106 -0.1013 -0.0502 
Inter 0.141 -0.0833 0.0435 -0.022 -0.9776 1 0.0239 -0.1891 -0.0573 -0.0052 -0.0674 -0.0251 -0.0326 0.0153 -0.0276 -0.0888 -0.0076 -0.0391 
Bkcapita 0.0095 -0.0113 0.0108 -0.0097 -0.0103 0.0239 1 0.0215 -0.1714 -0.1543 -0.0311 0.0046 0.0129 0.0446 0.0455 -0.146 0.0294 -0.0077 
Agprice 0.081 -0.1042 0.1267 -0.1488 0.1474 -0.1891 0.0215 1 0.0947 0.0833 0.0848 0.0038 0.0989 -0.0166 0.0307 0.1252 0.104 0.0527 
Ag1 -0.0079 0.0042 -0.001 -0.0012 -0.1157 -0.0573 -0.1714 0.0947 1 0.5871 0.6289 0.0655 0.5991 0.1723 0.2488 0.8094 0.496 0.4066 
Ag2 0.0107 -0.0132 0.0162 -0.019 -0.1361 -0.0052 -0.1543 0.0833 0.5871 1 0.5243 0.0566 0.0137 0.1438 0.1449 0.5932 0.3708 0.3295 
Ag3 0.0081 -0.0138 0.0186 -0.0225 -0.0776 -0.0674 -0.0311 0.0848 0.6289 0.5243 1 0.0518 0.4321 0.1534 0.161 0.7005 0.459 0.3437 
Ag4 -0.2141 0.2086 -0.2026 0.1965 0.0121 -0.0251 0.0046 0.0038 0.0655 0.0566 0.0518 1 0.0415 0.0152 -0.0091 0.0724 0.0424 -0.0175 
Ag5 0.0067 -0.0089 0.0099 -0.0103 -0.0826 -0.0326 0.0129 0.0989 0.5991 0.0137 0.4321 0.0415 1 0.1509 0.1764 0.6207 0.4002 0.2385 
Ag6 -0.002 0.003 -0.0041 0.0049 -0.0527 0.0153 0.0446 -0.0166 0.1723 0.1438 0.1534 0.0152 0.1509 1 -0.1009 0.1945 0.0973 0.0892 
Ag7 0.0084 -0.0107 0.012 -0.0127 -0.0227 -0.0276 0.0455 0.0307 0.2488 0.1449 0.161 -0.0091 0.1764 -0.1009 1 0.2542 0.1156 0.094 
Ag8 -0.0141 0.0077 -0.0019 -0.0028 -0.106 -0.0888 -0.146 0.1252 0.8094 0.5932 0.7005 0.0724 0.6207 0.1945 0.2542 1 0.5276 0.4366 
Ag9 0.0241 -0.0269 0.0288 -0.0305 -0.1013 -0.0076 0.0294 0.104 0.496 0.3708 0.459 0.0424 0.4002 0.0973 0.1156 0.5276 1 0.1499 
Ag10 -0.0306 0.0275 -0.0252 0.0237 -0.0502 -0.0391 -0.0077 0.0527 0.4066 0.3295 0.3437 -0.0175 0.2385 0.0892 0.094 0.4366 0.1499 1 
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TABLE 19.  CORRELATION OF ESTIMATES OF LOCAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY EFFECT MODEL BASED ON NON-AGRICULTURAL BANKS ’ 
OBSERVATIONS  
This Table contains the correlation coefficient matrix of agricultural effect model. size  is the size of the bank.  size 2 represents the size of the bank 
in square term. size 3 shows the size of the bank in cube term. AAR is the average agricultural loan ratio.  Inter is interaction term, testing the 
relationship between agricultural and bank’s size.  Bkcapita represents banks per capita in the county level.  Agprice shows the volatility of 
agricultural loans.  Ag1, Ag2, Ag3, Ag4, Ag5, Ag6, Ag7, Ag8, Ag9 and Ag10 are food grains, feed grains and hay, cotton, tobacco, oil-bearing 
crop, fruit and nuts, vegetable, meat animals, diary products, and poultry and egg. 
 
Variable Intercept size size2 size3 AAR Inter Bkcapita Agprice Ag1 Ag2 Ag3 Ag4 Ag5 Ag6 Ag7 Ag8 Ag9 Ag10 
Intercept 1 -0.997 0.9883 -0.9745 -0.1765 0.1948 -0.0033 0.2688 -0.0192 -0.0056 -0.0021 0.0302 0.0116 -0.0099 -0.006 -0.0095 0.013 0.0153 
size -0.997 1 -0.9971 0.9887 0.141 -0.1569 -0.0091 -0.2965 0.022 0.0071 0.0028 -0.0293 -0.0096 0.0104 0.0057 0.0118 -0.0114 -0.0142 
size2 0.9883 -0.9971 1 -0.9972 -0.1079 0.121 0.0162 0.3255 -0.0237 -0.0079 -0.0033 0.0282 0.0081 -0.011 -0.0057 -0.013 0.0101 0.0131 
size3 -0.9745 0.9887 -0.9972 1 0.0786 -0.0891 -0.0202 -0.3561 0.0246 0.0084 0.0037 -0.027 -0.007 0.0116 0.0058 0.0135 -0.0089 -0.0119 
AAR -0.1765 0.141 -0.1079 0.0786 1 -0.9284 -0.0643 0.1468 -0.2704 -0.21 -0.2521 -0.1745 -0.2203 -0.1391 -0.1452 -0.3777 -0.3382 -0.2524 
Inter 0.1948 -0.1569 0.121 -0.0891 -0.9284 1 0.0728 -0.1803 0.052 0.0274 0.0021 0.0195 0.0342 -0.0058 -0.0069 0.0529 0.0578 0.0159 
Bkcapita -0.0033 -0.0091 0.0162 -0.0202 -0.0643 0.0728 1 -0.002 -0.114 -0.0366 -0.0271 -0.0626 -0.0951 0.0203 0.0435 -0.1491 -0.0363 -0.0698 
Agprice 0.2688 -0.2965 0.3255 -0.3561 0.1468 -0.1803 -0.002 1 0.0015 0.0139 0.0175 0.0211 0.0176 -0.0005 0.0026 0.0233 0.0203 0.0232 
Ag1 -0.0192 0.022 -0.0237 0.0246 -0.2704 0.052 -0.114 0.0015 1 0.285 0.3762 0.2798 0.3122 0.2221 0.2539 0.4615 0.4848 0.4114 
Ag2 -0.0056 0.0071 -0.0079 0.0084 -0.21 0.0274 -0.0366 0.0139 0.285 1 0.4311 0.2208 -0.369 0.2012 0.1186 0.3147 0.3207 0.3421 
Ag3 -0.0021 0.0028 -0.0033 0.0037 -0.2521 0.0021 -0.0271 0.0175 0.3762 0.4311 1 0.2866 0.2257 0.2609 0.2179 0.5839 0.5296 0.4403 
Ag4 0.0302 -0.0293 0.0282 -0.027 -0.1745 0.0195 -0.0626 0.0211 0.2798 0.2208 0.2866 1 0.2241 0.1713 0.1613 0.3688 0.299 0.2865 
Ag5 0.0116 -0.0096 0.0081 -0.007 -0.2203 0.0342 -0.0951 0.0176 0.3122 -0.369 0.2257 0.2241 1 0.2022 0.2722 0.5197 0.4621 0.32 
Ag6 -0.0099 0.0104 -0.011 0.0116 -0.1391 -0.0058 0.0203 -0.0005 0.2221 0.2012 0.2609 0.1713 0.2022 1 -0.0027 0.3407 0.2687 0.2534 
Ag7 -0.006 0.0057 -0.0057 0.0058 -0.1452 -0.0069 0.0435 0.0026 0.2539 0.1186 0.2179 0.1613 0.2722 -0.0027 1 0.3537 0.2713 0.254 
Ag8 -0.0095 0.0118 -0.013 0.0135 -0.3777 0.0529 -0.1491 0.0233 0.4615 0.3147 0.5839 0.3688 0.5197 0.3407 0.3537 1 0.6368 0.5587 
Ag9 0.013 -0.0114 0.0101 -0.0089 -0.3382 0.0578 -0.0363 0.0203 0.4848 0.3207 0.5296 0.299 0.4621 0.2687 0.2713 0.6368 1 0.4376 
Ag10 0.0153 -0.0142 0.0131 -0.0119 -0.2524 0.0159 -0.0698 0.0232 0.4114 0.3421 0.4403 0.2865 0.32 0.2534 0.254 0.5587 0.4376 1 
 
 
97 
 
TABLE 20. CHANGE OF LOCAL ECONOMIC EFFECT MODEL BASED ON X-EFFICIENCY 
CHANGE BETWEEN 1988 AND 1992 
This table contains the results of the estimation of the relationship between the percentage change 
of bank’s X-efficiency (1988-1992) and the percentage changes of bank’s fundamental 
information and agricultural factors effects (1988-1992).  DSize is the percentage change of 
bank’s size, measured by total assets in logarithm term.  DAAR is the percentage change of 
agricultural loan ratio, calculated from the average agricultural loans divided by the total assets of 
the bank.  DInter is percentage change of interaction term, testing the relationship between 
agricultural loans and bank’s size.  DBkcapita represents the percentage change of banks per 
capita at the county level, which is the proxy of the competitiveness of the local financial market.  
Bkcapita is the ratio of number of commercial banks chartered in the county to the population of 
the county.  Agprice shows the volatility of agricultural loans based on quarterly data of average 
agricultural loans over 10-year examination period.  AgR is agricultural products ratio.  
D(AgR*AAR) represents the percentage change of agricultural loans on the specified agricultural 
products at the county level. 
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Observations All Banks Agricultural Banks Non-Agricultural Banks 
Variables    
    
Intercept -0.0039*** -0.00123*** -0.00493*** 
Dsize 0.00165*** 0.00369*** 0.00171*** 
DAAR 6.92E-05*** -6.57E-04 6.76E-05*** 
Dinter -5.02E-05*** 3.01E-07 -4.54E-05*** 
Dbkcapita 0.0006281 0.00015833 -0.00034287 
agprice 1.17E-07*** -3.16E-07*** 1.20E-07*** 
DFood Grains 9.61E-06 -0.03434* 0.00029646 
DFeed Grains and Hay -0.00059716* -0.05046*** -0.00046287 
DCotton 0.00074237 -0.03169** 0.00063059 
DTobacco -0.00054836* 0.32956*** -0.00060796** 
DOil-Bearing Crop 0.00005784 -0.02236 -0.0001146 
DFruit and Nuts -0.00181*** -0.38629*** -0.0018*** 
DVegetable  -0.00063112* 0.12726** -0.00065501* 
DMeat Animals -0.00004208 -0.01945* -0.00009472 
DDiary Products -0.00010571 -0.13442*** -0.00013577 
DPoultry and Eggs -0.00040832 -0.02926*** -0.00032553 
    
Adj R-Sq 0.0125 0.0183 0.0168 
***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels respectively.
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TABLE 21. CORRELATION OF ESTIMA TES OF CHANGE OF LOCAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY EFFECT MODEL BASED ON ALL BANKS’ 
OBSERVATIONS BETWEEN 1988 AND 1992 PERIODS. 
This table contains the correlation coefficient matrix of change of agricultural effect model based on all banks’ observations.  D represents 
percentage change of the specified variable.  size  is the size of the bank.  AAR is the average agricultural loan ratio.  Inter is interaction term, 
testing the relationship between agricultural and bank’s size.  Bkcapita represents banks per capita in the county level.  Agprice shows the 
volatility of agricultural loans.  Ag1, Ag2, Ag3, Ag4, Ag5, Ag6, Ag7, Ag8, Ag9 and Ag10 are food grains, feed grains and hay, cotton, tobacco, 
oil-bearing crop, fruit and nuts, vegetable, meat animals, diary products, and poultry and egg. 
 
Variable  InterceptDsize DAAR Dinter Dbkcapita agprice DAg1 DAg2 DAg3 DAg4 DAg5 DAg6 DAg7 DAg8 DAg9 DAg10 
                 
Intercept 1 -0.4093 -0.0239 0.0185 0.3942 -0.1257 -0.0166 -0.0198 0.0153 0.0005 0.0145 0.0112 -0.0007 0.0151 -0.0088 -0.0239 
Dsize -0.4093 1 0.1927 -0.2062 0.0375 -0.074 -0.0009 -0.0252 -0.0104 0.0063 -0.0003 -0.0196 0.0262 0.0427 0.0219 0.0111 
DAAR -0.0239 0.1927 1 -0.9336 -0.015 -0.0985 0.047 -0.14 -0.06 -0.1109 -0.0824 -0.2023 -0.0032 0.1599 0.0577 0.0405 
Dinter 0.0185 -0.2062 -0.9336 1 0.0267 0.0574 -0.041 0.028 0.0718 0.009 0.0395 0.1374 -0.1389 -0.1733 -0.1649 -0.0449 
Dbkcapita 0.3942 0.0375 -0.015 0.0267 1 -0.0054 0.0167 0.0062 -0.0039 0.0004 -0.0166 0.0062 -0.0129 -0.0122 -0.0025 -0.0052 
agprice -0.1257 -0.074 -0.0985 0.0574 -0.0054 1 0.0295 0.1032 0.0019 0.064 0.0118 -0.063 -0.0213 -0.0083 0.1367 0.0647 
DAg1 -0.0166 -0.0009 0.047 -0.041 0.0167 0.0295 1 0.3344 -0.2993 -0.1045 -0.4619 -0.0351 -0.0027 -0.2932 0.085 -0.1175 
DAg2 -0.0198 -0.0252 -0.14 0.028 0.0062 0.1032 0.3344 1 -0.1542 -0.0868 -0.265 0.187 0.1669 -0.4788 0.3105 -0.1557 
DAg3 0.0153 -0.0104 -0.06 0.0718 -0.0039 0.0019 -0.2993 -0.1542 1 0.0448 0.6278 0.0368 -0.0599 0.3065 -0.0614 0.0995 
DAg4 0.0005 0.0063 -0.1109 0.009 0.0004 0.064 -0.1045 -0.0868 0.0448 1 0.1651 0.1414 0.2354 0.3189 0.403 0.0356 
DAg5 0.0145 -0.0003 -0.0824 0.0395 -0.0166 0.0118 -0.4619 -0.265 0.6278 0.1651 1 0.0394 0.0575 0.4098 -0.0087 0.1481 
DAg6 0.0112 -0.0196 -0.2023 0.1374 0.0062 -0.063 -0.0351 0.187 0.0368 0.1414 0.0394 1 0.5186 0.0811 0.0743 -0.0215 
DAg7 -0.0007 0.0262 -0.0032 -0.1389 -0.0129 -0.0213 -0.0027 0.1669 -0.0599 0.2354 0.0575 0.5186 1 0.1478 0.2944 0.0626 
DAg8 0.0151 0.0427 0.1599 -0.1733 -0.0122 -0.0083 -0.2932 -0.4788 0.3065 0.3189 0.4098 0.0811 0.1478 1 0.0549 0.2062 
DAg9 -0.0088 0.0219 0.0577 -0.1649 -0.0025 0.1367 0.085 0.3105 -0.0614 0.403 -0.0087 0.0743 0.2944 0.0549 1 -0.1023 
DAg10 -0.0239 0.0111 0.0405 -0.0449 -0.0052 0.0647 -0.1175 -0.1557 0.0995 0.0356 0.1481 -0.0215 0.0626 0.2062 -0.1023 1 
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TABLE 22. CORRELATION OF ESTIMATES OF CHANGE OF LOCAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY EFFECT MODEL BASED ON AGRIC ULTURAL 
BANKS’ OBSERVATIONS BETWEEN 1988 AND 1992 PERIODS. 
This table contains the correlation coefficient matrix of change of agricultural effect model based on agricultural banks’ observations.  D represents 
percentage change of the specified variable.  size  is the size of the bank.  AAR is the average agricultural loan ratio.  Inter is interaction term, 
testing the relationship between agricultural and bank’s size.  Bkcapita represents banks per capita in the county level.  Agprice shows the 
volatility of agricultural loans.  Ag1, Ag2, Ag3, Ag4, Ag5, Ag6, Ag7, Ag8, Ag9 and Ag10 are food grains, feed grains and hay, cotton, tobacco, 
oil-bearing crop, fruit and nuts, vegetable, meat animals, diary products, and poultry and egg. 
 
Variable  Intercept Dsize DAAR Dinter Dbkcapita agprice DAg1 DAg2 DAg3 DAg4 DAg5 DAg6 DAg7 DAg8 DAg9 DAg10 
                 
Intercept 1 -0.0861 0.0031 -0.0132 0.275 -0.4849 0.0197 0.0307 0.0491 0.0171 0.0455 -0.0163 -0.0147 0.0029 0.0095 0.0083 
Dsize -0.0861 1 0.6824 -0.842 0.005 -0.1944 0.1787 0.3204 0.2747 0.0645 0.1279 0.0321 0.054 0.3501 0.1655 0.3728 
DAAR 0.0031 0.6824 1 -0.7766 -0.0119 -0.0843 0.0854 0.1788 0.322 0.0318 0.211 0.0141 -0.0317 0.3888 0.3238 0.3281 
Dinter -0.0132 -0.842 -0.7766 1 0.0409 0.016 -0.2312 -0.4401 -0.3756 -0.08 -0.1858 -0.0422 -0.0683 -0.4921 -0.2234 -0.5277 
Dbkcapita 0.275 0.005 -0.0119 0.0409 1 0.0104 0.0235 -0.0339 -0.0103 0.004 0.0041 0.0173 -0.0011 -0.0074 0.0148 -0.009 
agprice -0.4849 -0.1944 -0.0843 0.016 0.0104 1 -0.0001 0.0222 0.0208 -0.0035 0.0003 0.0085 0.0033 0.0413 -0.0319 0.042 
DAg1 0.0197 0.1787 0.0854 -0.2312 0.0235 -0.0001 1 0.3091 0.3385 0.0438 0.2847 0.0805 0.0897 0.4581 0.0727 0.4351 
DAg2 0.0307 0.3204 0.1788 -0.4401 -0.0339 0.0222 0.3091 1 0.6088 0.0411 0.237 0.1345 0.1293 0.5655 0.0679 0.5693 
DAg3 0.0491 0.2747 0.322 -0.3756 -0.0103 0.0208 0.3385 0.6088 1 -0.0123 0.4158 0.1174 0.0872 0.45 0.1035 0.413 
DAg4 0.0171 0.0645 0.0318 -0.08 0.004 -0.0035 0.0438 0.0411 -0.0123 1 -0.0181 0.0497 0.005 0.1315 0.1504 0.1821 
DAg5 0.0455 0.1279 0.211 -0.1858 0.0041 0.0003 0.2847 0.237 0.4158 -0.0181 1 -0.0134 0.1007 0.2571 -0.0116 0.1894 
DAg6 -0.0163 0.0321 0.0141 -0.0422 0.0173 0.0085 0.0805 0.1345 0.1174 0.0497 -0.0134 1 0.1438 0.1698 0.1055 0.208 
DAg7 -0.0147 0.054 -0.0317 -0.0683 -0.0011 0.0033 0.0897 0.1293 0.0872 0.005 0.1007 0.1438 1 0.1372 -0.0978 0.1867 
DAg8 0.0029 0.3501 0.3888 -0.4921 -0.0074 0.0413 0.4581 0.5655 0.45 0.1315 0.2571 0.1698 0.1372 1 0.1897 0.8805 
DAg9 0.0095 0.1655 0.3238 -0.2234 0.0148 -0.0319 0.0727 0.0679 0.1035 0.1504 -0.0116 0.1055 -0.0978 0.1897 1 0.5283 
DAg10 0.0083 0.3728 0.3281 -0.5277 -0.009 0.042 0.4351 0.5693 0.413 0.1821 0.1894 0.208 0.1867 0.8805 0.5283 1 
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TABLE 23. CORRELATION OF ESTIMA TES OF CHANGE OF LOCAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY EFFECT MODEL BASED ON NON-
AGRICULTURAL BANKS ’ OBSERVATIONS BETWEEN  1988 AND 1992 PERIODS. 
This table contains the correlation coefficient matrix of change of agricultural effect model based on non-agricultural banks’ observations.  D 
represents percentage change of the specified variable.  size  is the size of the bank.  AAR is the average agricultural loan ratio.  Inter is interaction 
term, testing the relationship between agricultural and bank’s size.  Bkcapita represents banks per capita in the county level.  Agprice shows the 
volatility of agricultural loans.  Ag1, Ag2, Ag3, Ag4, Ag5, Ag6, Ag7, Ag8, Ag9 and Ag10 are food grains, feed grains and hay, cotton, tobacco, 
oil-bearing crop, fruit and nuts, vegetable, meat animals, diary products, and poultry and egg. 
 
Variable  Intercept Dsize DAAR Dinter Dbkcapita agprice DAg1 DAg2 DAg3 DAg4 DAg5 DAg6 DAg7 DAg8 DAg9 DAg10 
                 
Intercept 1 -0.4279 -0.0302 0.021 0.421 -0.0995 -0.0176 -0.0186 0.0162 0.0041 0.0167 0.0097 -0.0012 0.0182 -0.0027 -0.0249 
Dsize -0.4279 1 0.1895 -0.2023 0.0172 -0.0631 -0.0018 -0.025 -0.0093 0.0074 0.0008 -0.0194 0.0255 0.0421 0.0214 0.0145 
DAAR -0.0302 0.1895 1 -0.9336 -0.0176 -0.0987 0.0469 -0.1401 -0.0601 -0.1108 -0.0823 -0.2023 -0.0029 0.1599 0.0574 0.0396 
Dinter 0.021 -0.2023 -0.9336 1 0.0288 0.057 -0.0409 0.0281 0.0719 0.0086 0.0394 0.1373 -0.1391 -0.1735 -0.1652 -0.0418 
Dbkcapita 0.421 0.0172 -0.0176 0.0288 1 -0.0045 0.0162 0.006 -0.0032 0.0014 -0.0163 0.0066 -0.0137 -0.0114 -0.0014 -0.0059 
agprice -0.0995 -0.0631 -0.0987 0.057 -0.0045 1 0.0298 0.1038 0.0016 0.0644 0.0119 -0.0639 -0.0215 -0.0084 0.1375 0.0666 
DAg1 -0.0176 -0.0018 0.0469 -0.0409 0.0162 0.0298 1 0.3362 -0.3012 -0.1047 -0.4636 -0.0348 -0.0025 -0.2948 0.086 -0.1184 
DAg2 -0.0186 -0.025 -0.1401 0.0281 0.006 0.1038 0.3362 1 -0.1564 -0.0866 -0.2669 0.1872 0.1669 -0.4796 0.3117 -0.1582 
DAg3 0.0162 -0.0093 -0.0601 0.0719 -0.0032 0.0016 -0.3012 -0.1564 1 0.0451 0.6289 0.0365 -0.0601 0.3079 -0.0624 0.0998 
DAg4 0.0041 0.0074 -0.1108 0.0086 0.0014 0.0644 -0.1047 -0.0866 0.0451 1 0.1653 0.1415 0.2354 0.3192 0.4033 0.0302 
DAg5 0.0167 0.0008 -0.0823 0.0394 -0.0163 0.0119 -0.4636 -0.2669 0.6289 0.1653 1 0.0391 0.0572 0.4111 -0.0098 0.1477 
DAg6 0.0097 -0.0194 -0.2023 0.1373 0.0066 -0.0639 -0.0348 0.1872 0.0365 0.1415 0.0391 1 0.5186 0.0809 0.0748 -0.0249 
DAg7 -0.0012 0.0255 -0.0029 -0.1391 -0.0137 -0.0215 -0.0025 0.1669 -0.0601 0.2354 0.0572 0.5186 1 0.1476 0.2944 0.0588 
DAg8 0.0182 0.0421 0.1599 -0.1735 -0.0114 -0.0084 -0.2948 -0.4796 0.3079 0.3192 0.4111 0.0809 0.1476 1 0.0546 0.2 
DAg9 -0.0027 0.0214 0.0574 -0.1652 -0.0014 0.1375 0.086 0.3117 -0.0624 0.4033 -0.0098 0.0748 0.2944 0.0546 1 -0.1113 
DAg10 -0.0249 0.0145 0.0396 -0.0418 -0.0059 0.0666 -0.1184 -0.1582 0.0998 0.0302 0.1477 -0.0249 0.0588 0.2 -0.1113 1 
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Table 24. Change of local economic effect model based on X-efficiency change 
between 1992 and 1997. 
This table contains the results of the estimation of the relationship between the change of bank’s 
X-efficiency (1992-1997) and the changes of bank’s fundamental information and agricultural 
factors effects (1988-1992).  DSize is the percentage change of bank’s size, measured by total 
assets in logarithm term.  DAAR is the percentage change of agricultural loan ratio, calculated 
from the average agricultural loans divided by the total assets of the bank.  DInter is percentage 
change of interaction term, testing the relationship between agricultural loans and bank’s size.  
DBkcapita represents the percentage change of banks per capita at the county level, which is the 
proxy of the competitiveness of the local financial market.  Bkcapita is the ratio of number of 
commercial banks chartered in the county to the population of the county.  Agprice shows the 
volatility of agricultural loans based on quarterly data of average agricultural loans over 10-year 
examination period.  AgR is agricultural products ratio.  D(AgR*AAR) represents the percentage 
change of agricultural loans on the specified agricultural products at the county level. 
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Observations All Banks Agricultural Banks Non-Agricultural Banks 
Variables    
    
Intercept -0.00598*** -0.00489*** -0.00607*** 
Dsize 0.00033719** 0.00048794 0.00058088*** 
DAAR 6.21E-06 0.00301*** 5.97E-06 
Dinter -3.36E -06 -0.00072735 -4.54E -06 
Dbkcapita 0.00090138* 0.00104 0.0008212 
agprice -6.44E -09 -6.55E -07*** 6.10E-09 
DFood Grains -0.00104 -0.04518** -0.00092753 
DFeed Grains and Hay 0.000187 -0.00965 0.00024445 
DCotton 0.00050344 -0.0228* 0.00054114 
DTobacco 0.00002577 -0.10522 5.38E-05 
DOil-Bearing Crop 0.00128** 0.01415 0.00129** 
DFruit and Nuts -0.00060253 0.12949 -0.0006462 
DVegetable  0.00050578 0.05056 0.00050025 
DMeat Animals 0.00011158 0.01576 0.00011055 
DDiary Products -0.00021002 -0.02329 -0.0001638 
DPoultry and Eggs 0.00179*** 0.00612 0.00183*** 
    
Adj R-Sq 0.0011 0.0128 0.0019 
***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% statis tical significance levels respectively. 
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TABLE 25. CHANGE OF LOCAL ECONOMIC EFFECT MODEL BASED ON X-EFFICIENCY 
CHANGE BETWEEN 1988 AND 1997. 
This table contains the results of the estimation of the relationship between the percentage change 
of bank’s X-efficiency (1988-1997) and the percentage changes of bank’s fundamental 
information and agricultural factors effects (1988-1992).  DSize is the percentage change of 
bank’s size, measured by total assets in logarithm term.  DAAR is the percentage change of 
agricultural loan ratio, calculated from the average agricultural loans divided by the total assets of 
the bank.  DInter is percentage change of interaction term, testing the relationship between 
agricultural loans and bank’s size.  DBkcapita represents the percentage change of banks per 
capita at the county level, which is the proxy of the competitiveness of the local financial market.  
Bkcapita is the ratio of number of commercial banks chartered in the county to the population of 
the county.  Agprice shows the volatility of agricultural loans based on quarterly data of average 
agricultural loans over 10-year examination period.  AgR is agricultural products ratio.  
D(AgR*AAR) represents the percentage change of agricultural loans on the specified agricultural 
products at the county level. 
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Observations All Banks Agricultural Banks Non-Agricultural Banks 
Variables    
    
Intercept -0.0099*** -0.00615*** -0.01101*** 
Dsize 0.00198*** 0.00411*** 0.00229*** 
DAAR 7.45E-05** 0.00235* 7.27E-05** 
Dinter -5.31E -05** -0.00069532 -4.95E -05** 
Dbkcapita 0.00154*** 0.00119 0.00049986 
agprice 1.11E-07*** -9.69E -07*** 1.26E-07*** 
DFood Grains -0.00101 -0.07914*** -0.00061653 
DFeed Grains and Hay -0.00039865 -0.06039*** -0.00020762 
DCotton 0.00124* -0.05424*** 0.00116* 
DTobacco -0.00051782 0.21912 -0.00054883 
DOil-Bearing Crop 0.00133** -0.00714 0.00117* 
DFruit and Nuts -0.00239*** -0.25684 -0.00243*** 
DVegetable  -0.00013437 0.17669** -0.00016336 
DMeat Animals 6.87E-05 -0.00375 1.55E-05 
DDiary Products -0.00031403 -0.15883*** -0.00029746 
DPoultry and Eggs 0.0014** -0.0235 0.00152*** 
    
Adj R-Sq 0.0091 0.021 0.0145 
***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels respectively.  
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TABLE 26. PRICE VOLATILITY OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 
The price volatility of the agricultural products is calculated based on the monthly price index of 
each products during the periods between 1988 and 1997. 
 
Agricultural Products Categories Price Volatility 
Food Grains 0.04410 
Feed Grains and Hay 0.04319 
Cotton 0.04059 
Tobacco 0.07272 
Oil-Bearing Crop 0.04334 
Fruit and Nuts 0.08198 
Vegetable  0.15201 
Meat Animals 0.02540 
Diary Products 0.03154 
Poultry and Egg 0.04085 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 27. THE DESIGN OF DUMMY VARIABLE FOR THE FUTURE CONTRACT 
The dummy variables are designed for distinguishing the risk exposure of the bank. If the risk is 
hedged, the dummy variable is 0. If the risk is not hedged, the bank has the exposure to the risk 
and the dummy is 1. 
 
Availability of commodity  
in the county level 
Availability of the Future Contract Risk Exposure Dummy Variable  
Available  Available  Hedged 0 
Available  Not Available  Not Hedged 1 
Not Available  Available  Hedged 0 
Not Available  Not Available  Hedged 0 
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TABLE 28. AVAILABILITY OF FUTURE CONTRACTS IN DIFFERENT SECTORS 
 
Future Contract Listings  
Energies Financials 
Crude Oil  
Heating Oil  
Unleaded Gas  
Natural Gas  
Propane  
 
U.S. Treasury Bonds  
U.S. Treasury Notes  
U.S. Treasury Bills  
U.S. Eurodollars  
Euroyen  
Tropicals Grains  
Coffee  
Cocoa  
Sugar  
Orange Juice  
Cotton  
Lumber  
 
Soybeans  
Bean Oil  
Bean Meal  
Corn  
Wheat  
Oats  
Meats Stock Indices 
Pork Bellies  
Lean Hogs  
Live Cattle  
Feeder Cattle  
Dow Jones Index  
NASDAQ 100 Index  
S&P 500 Index  
Value Line  
Russell 200  
 
Metals  E-Mini's (electronic minis) 
Gold  
Silver  
Platinum  
Palladium  
Copper  
 
E-Mini Yen  
E-Mini Euro Currency  
E-Mini S&P 500  
E-Mini NASDAQ 100  
Midam Contracts  Currencies 
Corn  
Soybeans  
Soymeal  
Wheat  
Live Cattle  
Lean Hogs  
US Treasury Bonds  
Swiss Franc  
Japanese Yen  
British Pound  
Euro Currency  
Swiss Franc  
Japanese Yen  
US Dollar Index  
British Pound  
Canadian Dollar  
Australian Dollar  
Data source: ALTAVEST Worldwide Trading, Inc http://www.altavest.com/  
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TABLE 29. AGRICULTURAL PRICE RISK EFFECT MODEL RESULTS  
This table  contains the results of the estimations of the relationship between banks’ X-efficiency, 
banks’ fundamental information and banks’ agricultural price risk.  size  is the size of the bank, 
measured by total assets in logarithm term.  AAR is the average agricultural loan ratio, calculated 
from the average agricultural loans divided by the total assets.  Inter is interaction term, testing 
the relationship between agricultural loan ratio and banks’ size.  Bkcapita represents banks per 
capita at the county level.  Agprice shows the volatility of agricultural loans based on the 
quarterly data of average agricultural loans.  XEFF is the quarterly average efficiency of each 
commercial bank in 1992.  AgR is agricultural products ratio.  AgR*AAR represents agricultural 
loans on the specified agricultural products at the county level.  AgPV is the price volatility of 
agricultural.  DumFC is the design of the dummy variable for risk exposure.  
 
Observations All Banks Agricultural  Banks Non-Agricultural  Banks 
Variables    
Intercept 1.12199*** 2.8236*** 1.10241*** 
size -0.04487*** -0.55239*** -0.03787*** 
size2 0.00369*** 0.05338*** 0.00297*** 
size3 -9.23E-05*** -0.0017*** -6.98E-05*** 
AAR -0.17767*** -0.12551*** -0.34406*** 
Inter 0.01537*** 0.01303*** 0.02804*** 
Bkcapita 4.84658*** 5.15926*** 8.50451*** 
Agprice -4.13E-09 -7.63E-07*** -1.48229E-08 
Food Grains 0.01614*** -0.00217 0.00393 
Feed Grains and Hay 0.05284*** 0.03189*** 0.08789*** 
Cotton -0.00054965 -0.00037908 -0.023** 
Tobacco 0.03251** 0.05549 0.04742*** 
Oil-Bearing Crop 0.03858*** 0.02158*** 0.09767*** 
Fruit and Nuts -0.04351*** -0.0421** -0.01804 
Vegetable  -0.05646*** -0.10811*** 0.01879 
Meat Animals 0.02066*** 0.00449 0.02154*** 
Diary Products 0.05466*** 0.04849*** 0.08008*** 
Poultry and Egg 0.01139** -0.00912 0.0396*** 
Price Risk of Food Grains 0 0 0 
Price Risk of Feed Grains and Hay 0 0 0 
Price Risk of Cotton 0 0 0 
Price Risk of Tobacco 0.01137*** 0.10145*** 0.00789** 
Price Risk of Oil-Bearing Crop 0 0 0 
Price Risk of Fruit and Nuts -0.00486*** -0.00211 -0.00422** 
Price Risk of Vegetable  -0.0034*** -0.00098792 -0.00385*** 
Price Risk of Meat Animals 0 0 0 
Price Risk of Diary Products 0.04511*** 0.13933*** 0.03489*** 
Price Risk of Poultry and Egg 0.01758*** 0.00090549 0.01861*** 
Adjust R2 0.1222 0.2218 0.1156 
***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels respectively. 
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TABLE 30. ADJUSTED R SQUARE OF MODELS BASED ON DIFFERENT SIZE AND LOAN 
SPECIALIZATION 
Model 1, model 2, and model 3 represent bank fundamental information effect model, local 
economic activity effect model, and agricultural price risk effect model.  M and B represent 
million and billion dollars.  All, Ag, and Nag are the models examined based on all banks’, 
agricultural banks’ and non-agricultural banks’ observation, respectively. 
Adjusted R2 Model1 Model2 Model3 
Size All Ag Nag All Ag Nag All Ag Nag 
All 0.0341 0.086 0.0341 0.1197 0.2123 0.1137 0.1248 0.2267 0.1178 
<10M 0.1081 0.1028 0.1444 0.1275 0.137 0.1779 0.1503 0.1678 0.2003 
10-20M 0.0127 0.025 0.0408 0.0688 0.1196 0.0714 0.07 0.1308 0.0751 
20-30M 0.0114 0.0257 0.0053 0.0906 0.1375 0.0581 0.0966 0.1819 0.0644 
30-40M 0.0235 0.0402 0.0105 0.1223 0.1605 0.0843 0.1368 0.1888 0.1017 
40-50M 0.0428 0.0481 0.0243 0.1625 0.1927 0.1053 0.1735 0.2148 0.1186 
50-60M 0.0509 0.1058 0.0335 0.1783 0.2974 0.1273 0.1921 0.3322 0.1401 
60-70M 0.0415 0.0902 0.0243 0.1713 0.2726 0.1193 0.1808 0.3328 0.1284 
70-80M 0.0396 0.0797 0.0323 0.1303 0.345 0.1154 0.1453 0.4617 0.1319 
80-90M 0.038 0.0718 0.0335 0.183 0.3752 0.1729 0.2007 0.4139 0.1895 
90-100M 0.0341 0.0758 0.0275 0.1265 0.2206 0.1047 0.14 0.1907 0.1193 
100-150M 0.0276 0.0945 0.0239 0.0899 0.3262 0.0669 0.0962 0.4411 0.0717 
150-200M 0.0244 0.3349 0.0245 0.0796  0.0594 0.1015  0.0819 
200-250M 0.0177 0.2764 0.0179 0.0938  0.086 0.114  0.1037 
250-300M 0.0215 0.06 0.0214 0.06  0.0636 0.108  0.112 
300-400M 0.0093 0.1119 0.0088 0.093  0.0925 0.1094  0.1088 
400-500M 0.0142 0.3725 0.0139 0.0423  0.0446 0.0904  0.0897 
500-600M 0.0231  0.0228 0.1699  0.1699 0.2012  0.2012 
600-700M 0.0303  0.0304 0.0922  0.0922 0.2176  0.2176 
700-800M 0.0229  0.0229 0.06  0.06 0.2894  0.2894 
800-900M 0.006  0.006 -0.0314  -0.0314 0.0952  0.0952 
900-1000M 0.0136  0.0136 0.0447  0.0447 0.152  0.152 
1-1.5B 0.0268  0.0268 0.1476  0.1476 0.2293  0.2293 
1.5-2B 0.0279  0.0279 0.1134  0.1134 0.2617  0.2617 
2-3B 0.0366  0.0366 0.222  0.222 0.333  0.333 
3-5B 0.0166  0.0166 0.1282  0.1282 0.2126  0.2126 
5-10B 0.0415  0.0415 0.1092  0.1092 0.2646  0.2646 
>10B 0.1264  0.1264 0.1901  0.1901 0.7123  0.7123 
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FIGURE 2. THE NUMBER OF ALL U.S. BANKS AND U.S. COMMERCIAL BANKS  
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FIGURE 3. NUMBER OF SPECIALTY BANK, 1996 
 
 
108 
 
Agriculture (including Farm 
Mortages)
1.08%
Commercial and Industrial 
14.87%
Other Consumer Lending (Not Credit 
Cards)
0.83%
Mortgage (Residential  Only)
1.84%
Mortage (Non-Residential and RE 
Development)
5.60%
Leasing
0.09%
Credit Cards
8.07%
General
67.62%
 
FIGURE 4. MANAGED ASSETS OF SPECIALTIES BANKS , 1996 
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FIGURE 5. QUARTILE CRITERION BOUNDARIES BASED ON BANK’S SIZE  
The trend of the bank’s size quartile boundaries is increasing through the examination periods. 
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FIGURE 6. X-EFFICIENCY OF ALL COMMERCIAL BANKS  
Every data point is the quarterly average X-efficiency of all commercial banks in the smaller size 
category during the examination period (1988-1997) 
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FIGURE 7. X-EFFICIENCY OF COMMERCIAL BANKS WITH SPEC IALIZATION IN 
AGRICULTURAL LOANS 
Every data point is quarterly average of X-efficiency of commercial banks with specialization in 
agricultural loans during the examination period (1988-1997). 
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FIGURE 8. X-EFFICIENCY OF COMMERCIAL BANKS WITHOUT SPECIALIZATION IN 
AGRICULTURAL LOANS 
Every data point is quarterly average of X-efficiency of commercial banks without specialization 
in agricultural loans during the examination period (1988-1997). 
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FIGURE 9. X-EFFICIENCY OF COMMERCIAL BANKS CHARTERED IN MSA AREAS 
Every data point is quarterly average of X-efficiency of commercial banks chartered in a MSA 
during the examination period (1988-1997). 
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FIGURE 10. X-EFFICIENCY OF COMMERCIAL BANKS CHARTERED IN NON-MSA AREA 
Every data point is quarterly average of X-efficiency of commercial banks chartered in non-MSA 
during the examination period (1988-1997). 
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CHAPTER 4 
DOES BANK EFFICIENCY CHANGE WITH THE BUSINESS CYCLE? 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MONETARY POLICY, ECONOMIC 
GROWTH, AND BANK CONDITION 
 
4.1 Abstract 
The goal of this essay is to examine estimates of individual bank X-efficiency 
across time.  First, we estimate a translog flexible function specification of bank 
efficiency during the period 1988-1997.  Then, we estimate a time-series/cross-sectional 
model with independent variables that reflect business cycle and monetary policy 
conditions that may affect bank performance.  Like Calomiris and Mason (1997, 2000), 
we find that leading business conditions are positively related to bank performance. 
Though this result suggests that regulators should attempt to anticipate business cycle 
downturns and influence bank portfolio risk accordingly, the business condition elasticity 
of bank X-efficiency is low enough to suggest that the banking sector is not significantly 
susceptible to a systemic event due to business cycle conditions alone.  Lead and lag 
relationship between large and small banks are also examined.  Like Gilbert (1997), the 
entrance of large banks into the local financial market does enhance small bank 
efficiency simultaneously. 
113 
 
4.2 Introduction  
Given that banks are intermediaries in the financial market, the operation of banks 
may be highly correlated to the pulse of the macro economy.  For example, the outputs of 
commercial banks, commercial loans, real estate loans, agricultural loans, individual 
loans, checking, saving and time deposits, are closely tied to the interest rates in the 
macro economy.  Monetary policy may directly or indirectly affect the outputs of 
commercial banks.  Moreover, the price input variables of commercial banks’ operation, 
including total interest expenses, occupancy expenses, furniture, equipment and other 
non- interest expenses, and salaries and employees benefits are also correlated with 
interest rates and, thus, the whole macro economic situation.  Since the translog function, 
which is used to the cost efficiency of commercial banks, is a function of a bank’s output 
and input factors, the results and the extension of the translog function may be impacted 
by macro economic factors. 
We examine these effects through estimates of individual bank X-efficiency 
estimates across time.  First, we estimate a translog flexible function specification of 
bank efficiency during the period 1988-1997 (Berger, Hunter, and Timme 1993; 
Peristiani 1997).  Then, we estimate a cross sectional model with independent variables 
that reflect business cycle and monetary policy conditions that may affect bank 
performance.  Like Calomiris and Mason (1997), we hypothesize that leading business 
conditions are positively related to bank performance.  Though this result suggests that 
regulators should attempt to anticipate business cycle downturns and influence bank 
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portfolio risk accordingly, the business condition elasticity of bank X-efficiency is low 
enough to suggest that the banking sector is not significantly susceptible to a systemic 
event due to business cycle conditions alone. 
Most literature on bank failures tends to deal with incidents of financial crisis, 
panic, or contagion. Some, such as Wigmore (1987) and Donaldson (1992), attribute 
these episodes primarily to speculative attacks on the numeraire or illiquidity shocks by 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Donaldson (1993), whereas others attribute these 
episodes to increased asymmetric information regarding the incidence of financial 
distress, shown by Calomiris and Kahn (1991); Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993); 
Kaufman (1994), and; Calomiris and Mason (1997).  Recent corporate bankruptcy 
literature further distinguishes between failure arising from systemic events like crisis, 
panic, or contagion, and unrelated financial pressures (Denis and Denis 1995). 
Though effective safety and soundness regulation should mitigate the risk of bank 
failures attributable to individual bank effects like fraud and mismanagement, the 
industry could still be susceptible to financial weakness arising from a general 
deterioration in economic conditions. Such an occurrence could presumably lead to 
conditions of increased bank weakness that would cause a systemic crisis, panic, or 
contagion. Jensen, Mercer,and Johnson (1996), Kleim and Stambaugh (1986), Campbell 
(1987), Fama and French (1988, 1989), Schwert (1990), and Howton and Peterson (1998) 
all provide evidence that business conditions proxies like dividend yields, default 
spreads, and term spreads explain significant variation in stock and bond spreads. We 
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hypothesize that similar indicators reflect the diversification and flexibility of bank loan 
portfolios. Changes in portfolio condition will ultimately affect bank earnings and 
expenses like interest revenue and loan chargeoffs.  
In Figure 11, we can observe that there is a pattern in the time series of the 
efficiency for banks in metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs).  There may be some macro 
economic factors that impact this pattern.  Thus, in this study, we try to test two 
hypotheses.  First, business cycle conditions may be correlated with the total efficiency of 
banks.  We examine the time series properties of bank efficiency to determine if bank 
efficiency has a lead or lag response to business cycle conditions.  Second, we will test 
whether a monetary policy change will affect the efficiency of the banks.  Aga in, we 
examine lead and lag relationships between the monetary policy change and the 
efficiency change.  Therefore, in this study, the relationship between macro economic 
factors and commercial banks’ X-efficiency will be investigated.  Additionally, we 
examine if there is a lead/lag pattern in the efficiencies of banks of different sizes.  
Previous results in essay I show economies of scale in the bank industry as a whole.  
Thus, it is possible that increase in efficiency by large banks may be causing efficiency 
improvement in smaller banks. 
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4.3 Literature Review 
Diamond and Dybvig (1986) argued that bank regulatory policies regarding the 
involvement of the banking industry in the money supply process are an important 
determinant of the survival of banks.  If the regulatory policies were made solely based 
on macroeconomic goals, there might be no need for banks as other existing institutions, 
such as mutual funds, can substitute for the roles of banks.  Thus, regulatory policies 
might affect the operation efficiency of banks.  During the examination period of this 
study, there are the three important regulatory polices related to the banking industry.  
They are 1989 Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA), 
the 1991 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement (FDICIA), and the 1994 
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act.  Regulation in the banking 
industry may also influence the efficiency of the banking industry.  The information and 
purposes of those acts are discussed in Table 31.  Many studies show that there is an 
impact on banks from major regulatory changes.  For example, Allen and Wilhelm 
(1988) showed that there was a significant effect on the banking industry from the 
enactment of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act 
(DIDMCA) of 1980 on the financial institutions.  Cornett and Tehranian (1990) 
examined the impact of the Depository Institutions Act of 1982 (Garn-St. Germain) on 
commercial banks and savings and loans.  They found positive abnormal returns to 
stockholders of large savings and loans and commercial banks from the enactment of the 
Garn-St. Germain Act.  Stockholders of small savings and loans and commercial banks 
experienced negative abnormal returns.  If legislation changes affect banks’ X-
117 
 
efficiencies, different reactions of banks’ shareholders are expected.  Evanoff (1998) 
assessed the impact of regulation on bank cost efficiency.  He assumed that the 1980 
Depository Institution Deregulation and Monetary Control Act and the 1982 Garn-St 
Germain Act relaxed constraints on industry prices, products, and geographic expansion.  
He found an approximately 7% cost saving after the deregulation.  During the eight-year 
regulation period, 1972-1979, technology decreased costs only by 5%.  He concluded that 
2% of cost saving was caused by the deregulation.  He explained that the deregulation 
increased banks’ ability and incentives to take advantage of employing more efficient 
production techniques.  
In terms of the financial institution risk perspective, regulatory changes can affect 
the risk of the commercial banks.  Bundt, Cosimano, and Halloran (1992) and Madura 
and Wiley (2000) examine the impact of the DIDMCA and FIRREA, respectively, on 
financial institutions.  Madura and Wiley (2000) showed that smaller saving institutions 
have more reduction in interest rate risk and real estate risk than the larger institutions 
after FIRREA.  FDICIA might also play an important role in the banking industry.  One 
of the important features of the FDICIA is to provide greater discipline against excessive 
risk taking by banks.  Carow and Larsen Jr. (1997) examine market reaction to legislative 
announcements surrounding the passage of the FDICIA of 1991.  Their results showed 
that FDICIA affected shareholder wealth adversely.  They also concluded that the 
removal of Federal regulator’s discretionary authority and the imposition of mandatory 
regulations in the FDICIA had a negative influence on the bank holding companies.  
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DeYoung (1998) asserted that deregulation might enhance industry productivity 
in general.  However, removing a long-standing regulation was unlikely to provide a 
Pareto improvement.  If state laws, which prevent local banks from the entry of large out-
of-state competitors, functioned as anticompetitive entry barriers, the X-efficiency of 
local banks should have improved most in the markets where entry from out-of-state 
banks was the most intense.  If state laws were to preserving local control over the 
financial infrastructure, the improvement of the X-efficiency might not be that 
significant.  DeYoung, Hasan, and Kirchhoff (1998) investigated X-efficiency of local 
commercial banks in 1994 and tested the relationship between the local market cost 
efficiency and the deregulation of out-of-state entry37.  They found that the initial period 
of the entry of large out-of-state competitors decreased the local market cost efficiency.  
However, in the long run, the cost efficiency improved with increased entry of out-of-
state banks.  They also expected that similar efficiency improvements in local market 
after the realization of the Riegle-Neal Act in the beginning of 1997.  Carow and Heron 
(1998) also found that there was a positive wealth effect on a sample of large bank 
holding company after the passage of the Riegle-Neal Act.  
King and Levine (1993) show cross-country evidence that financial systems 
promote economic growth.  They examine the relationship between the level of financial 
                                                                                                                                                 
37 Those banks were operated primarily in a single metropolitan area in 1994. The deregulation is based on 
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development and future rates of long-run economic growth, physical capital 
accumulation, and economic efficiency improvement on 80 countries over the 1960-1989 
periods.  The results showed a robust relationship between the level of financial 
development and both the current and future rate of economic growth, which is measured 
by the real per capita GDP.  Given that commercial banks are intermediaries in the 
financial markets, the change of commercial banks’ efficiency might be related to the 
economic growth.  Thakor (1998) showed that the relationship between banks and the 
capital market is competitive and complementary.  He suggested that banks’ inefficiency 
led borrowers away from the market.  In other words, improvements in banks’ efficiency 
enhanced borrowers to access the market.  Berger, Kyle, and Scalise (1999) provided 
some support that supervisory toughness, which might influence bank lending, was 
affected by business conditions.  Supervisory toughness increased during the credit 
crunch period (1989-1992) and decreased during the boom period (1993-1998).  Berger, 
Bonime, Covitz, and Hancock (2000) found that local, state, and regional shocks 
continued to affect the relative performance of the banks at both the high and low end of 
the distribution.  They suggested that banks manage risk with greater geographic 
diversification and greater use of financial engineering techniques still can not 
significantly decrease the impacts from the regional and macroeconomic shocks.   
                                                                                                                                                 
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Act Efficiency Act of 1994. 
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There are several studies that employ different variables as the proxy of the 
business conditions and monetary policy.  Bhardwaj and Brooks (1993) and Howton and 
Peterson (1998) differentiated the bull and bear quarter using the following criteria38.  
First, the market return is defined as the CRSP NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq equal-weighted 
index returns during the examination period.  The median market return is picked as the 
standard to classify the bull and bear markets.  If the market return is higher the median, 
it is classified as a bull market period.  If it is below the median, it is a bear market 
period.  Lakonishok and Shapiro (1984) and Pettengill, Sundaram, and Mathur (1995) 
differentiated up and down markets by using the market excess returns.  Market excess 
returns are defined as the difference between the market returns and the risk-free rate.  Up 
markets have positive market excess returns and down markets have negative market 
excess returns.  Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Sims (1972), and Christiano and 
Ljungqvist (1988) showed that business conditions have a linkage with monetary 
aggregates.  Moreover, Lynge (1981), Cornell (1983), and Pearce and Roley (1983) also 
found that monetary policy, as measured by money supply announcements affected the 
financial market.  Federal Reserve discount-rate changes also have similar impacts on 
financial markets as well (Waud (1970), Smirlock and Yawitz (1985), Pearce and Roley 
                                                                                                                                                 
38 Bhardwaj and Brooks (1993) found a strong correlation between their classifications of bull and bear 
markets with the situation of business cycle highs and lows.  Howton and Peterson (1998) used bull and 
bear months as business cycle conditions.  In this study, in order to be consistent with the quarterly data 
from the Call Report, we decide to employ bull and bear quarters as the measure of the business cycle 
conditions. 
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(1985), and Cook and Hahn (1988)). Bernanke and Blinder (1992) found that federal 
funds premium, which is the difference between the federal funds rate and the three-
month Treasury-bill rate, can be regarded as an indicator of monetary policy 
developments.  
 
 
4.4 Data and Methodology 
X-efficiency is the approach that we employ to measure the efficiency of banks.  
The Reports of Condition and Income Report Guide (Call Report) is the source of the 
banks’ output and input data.  The study period is from the first quarter of 1988 to the 
fourth quarter of 1997.  We use the translog flexible function form to estimate the cost 
structure of banks and to derive the measure of the bank efficiency. 39  The translog 
function has been widely used to analyze the cost characteristics of depository 
institutions.40  The standard tranlog function is given by the following: 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
39 The translog function is also used as the cost equation in Mester (1987) and English et al. (1993) 
40 See the survey of Berger, Hunter, and Timme (1993) 
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where xt i represents the X-efficiency factor and ut i is the random error.  The current 
specification assumes six standard bank outputs and four input prices.  The specifications 
are the following: 
TCt i = total costs of bank i at time t = (total operating expenses + interest 
expenses) 
yk = bank outputs; (k=1) real estate loans, (k=2) agricultural loans, (k=3) 
commercial and industrial loans, (k=4) loans to individual for household, family, and 
other personal expenditures, (k=5)deposit liability – transaction accounts, and (k=6) 
deposit liability – nontransaction accounts.  
pl = price inputs; (l=1) total interest expenses, (l=2) price of capital (occupancy 
expenses, furniture, equipment and other non- interest expenses), and (l=3) salaries and 
employees benefits. 
Cost-share equations are derived from Shephard’s Lemma as follow: 
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A share equation is omitted in order to prevent singularity.  We estimate the equation 
formed by equation (17) and (18) subject to homogeneity and symmetry restrictions by 
the method of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR).  
If a firm systematically incurs relatively higher costs than the other firms in a 
competitive environment, it is considered X-inefficient.  In the survey of Berger, Hunter, 
and Timme (1993), there are several econometric and linear programming techniques 
have been proposed for estimating X-efficiency.  They are Econometric Frontier 
Approach (EFA), Thick Frontier Approach (TFA), Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), 
and Distribution-Free Approach (DFA).  In this study, we assume the efficiency 
differences are stable over time, and the random error averages out over time.  Thus, we 
employ the distribution-free approach proposed by Berger (1993) to estimate the 
efficiency of the banks41.  From equation (17), we can define et i = ln(xt i) + ut i. Peristiani 
(1997) indicates that residual can be transformed so that the minimum is zero.  Thus:  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
41 See also the discussion in DeYoung (1997) for a diagnostic test for the distribution –free efficiency 
estimator. 
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By taking the exponential of equation (19), we can obtain the efficiency as 
 
 
Thus, XEFFti is normalized to fall between zero and one.  However, XEFFt i is not 
robust to outliers.  Berger modifies the observations so that observations falling below the 
p-th percentile are set to the p-th percentile value ( )(ˆ ptie ), and observations that exceed 
the (1-p)-th percentile are valued at ( )1(ˆ pti
-e ).  Thus, the modified X-efficiency can be 
defined as: 
 
All commercial banks are used to form the cost frontier.  The criteria that we use 
as a filter is that the charter type in the call report should be 200, 210, 250, or 340, and 
the primary issuer code and total assets are both greater than zero.  The valid quarterly X-
efficiency observations are shown in Table 32.  Table 32 also shows summary statistics 
of all commercial banks X-efficiency in each examining period.  The information related 
to business cycles comes from the Conference Board's Business Cycle Indicators web 
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site.  Interest rate information, such as prime interest rates and the monetary policy 
components, comes from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors.  The gross domestic 
product (GDP) and industry production index are also from the same resource as well.  
The CRSP NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq equal-weighted market index is used to represent the 
condition of the stock market. 
In this study, we investigate the relationship between the banks’ X-efficiency and 
macro economic factors.  We employ the similar approach of business conditions, such as 
dividend yields, default spread, term spread, and Federal Reserve discount-rate changes, 
as the proxy of the monetary policy conditions, like Jensen, Mercer, and Johnson (1996).  
Because the examination period from 1988 to 1997 is during the unit-banking era, a 
variable measuring commercial banks per capita is also considered.  In addition, seasonal 
effects are also included in the regression analysis.  Three dummy variables are set to 
differentiate the four quarters of the year.  The unemployment rate is also used as a proxy 
of economic conditions.  Regression analysis will be conducted to examine the 
determinants of X-efficiency change.  The model can be written as follows: 
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DXEFFit is the percentage change of X-efficiency of the individual commercial 
bank i at t time period.  MR is the market return, which is the return of CRSP 
NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq equal-weighted market index.  BB is the dummy variable of the 
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bull and bear markets, which 1 means bull market and 0 means bear market.  The criteria 
used in Bhardwaj and Brooks (1993) and Howton and Peterson (1998) to differentiate the 
bull and bear quarter are employed.  First, the market return is defined as the CRSP 
NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq equal-weighted index returns during the examination period.  The 
median market return is picked as the standard to classify the bull and bear markets.  If the 
market return is higher the median, it is classified as a bull market period, which is defined 
as 1.  If it is below the median, it is a bear market period, which is defined as 0. 
DSize is the percentage change of the bank size.  Total assets of the bank are 
regarded as the proxy of the bank size.  DTL is the percentage change of the total loans.  
Chen, Mason, and Higgins (2000) found the relationship between X-efficiency and bank 
size.  The size of total loans also impacts the cost efficiency of banks.  DP represents the 
market dividend yield.  The procedure is to calculate the dividend yield similar with that 
of Fama and French (1988) and Jensen, Mercer, and Johnson (1996).  Quarterly CRSP 
NYSE/AMEX indexes are used to compute the quarterly dividend.  The dividend yield in 
quarter t is derived by the sum of quarterly dividends between the quarter t-3 and quarter t 
and divided by the without-dividend index value (P) at the end of quarter t.  Fama and 
French (1989) employ the value-weighted index in deriving the dividend yield.  Yet, 
Jensen, Mercer, and Johnson (1996) showed that there is not much different in deriving 
the dividend yield by using value-weighted and equal-weighted indexes.  DEF represents 
default premium.  The default premium also follows the measurement of Jensen, Mercer, 
and Johnson (1996).  It is the difference between the quarterly average of daily rates on 
the Baa corporate bond and the ten-year Treasury bond from the Federal Reserve 
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Statistical Release H.15, Selected Interest Rates.  DIR is the dummy variables of Federal 
Reserve discount-rate changes.  Waud (1970), Smirlock and Yawitz (1985), Pearce and 
Roley (1985), and Cook and Hahn (1988) showed that Federal Reserve discount-rate 
changes have an impact on financial markets.  Thus, a dummy variable is employed to 
represent the direction of Federal Reserve discount-rate changes (Jensen, Mercer, and 
Johnson (1996)).  When the change of the rate is positive, the dummy variable is one.  
Otherwise, it is zero.  FFP is the federal funds premium, the difference between the federal 
funds rate and the three-month Treasury-bill rate.  Bernanke and Blinder (1992) found that 
the federal funds premium could be regarded as an indicator of monetary policy 
developments.  BCP shows the number of commercial banks per capital and is used as an 
indicator of the competitiveness of the banking environment.  SEASON is the dummy 
variables for controlling the seasonal effect.  Q1=1 represents the first quarter (January – 
March), Q2=1 represents the second quarter (April – June), and Q3=1 is the third quarter 
(July – September.  DGDP and DUNEMP are the change of gross domestic production and 
the change of the unemployment rate respectively.  
DLEAD is the percentage change of the leading economic indicator.42  The 
components of those composite indexes, such as leading, coincident, and lagging 
                                                                                                                                                 
42 The components of the index of leading indicators are the followings: average weekly hours of 
production workers in manaufacturing, average weekly initial claims for unemployment insurance, new 
orders for consumer goods and materials (in 1987 dollars), vendor performance index (percent of 
companies reporting slower deliveries), contracts and orders, plant and equipment (1987 dollars), building 
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indicators, are shown in Table 33.  Fama and French (1989) and Chauvet and Potter 
(2000) found evidence of significant state dependence in the conditional distribution of 
stock returns.  Chauvet and Potter (2000) also showed a time-varying relationship 
between risk and return around business cycle turning points.  Lynge (1981), Cornell 
(1983), and Pearce and Roley (1983) found that the monetary policy as measured by 
money supply announcement affected the financial market.  Moreover, Friedman and 
Schwartz (1963), Sims (1972), and Christiano and Lyungqvist (1988) showed that 
business conditions have a linkage with the monetary aggregates.  According to Figure 
11, there is only one period of recession that is the faded area in Figure 11 between the 
third quarter of 1989 and the first quarter of 1990.  Because money supply M2 is one of 
the components in leading indicator, the percentage change of the leading indicator is 
regarded as the proxy of the business cycles and the monetary policy condition. 
FIRREA, FDICIA, and RNIBBEA are the dummy variables that represent the 
banking regulatory policies.  FIRREA is the dummy variable to control the effect of the 
Federal Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989, which 
was signed by President Bush on August 9, 1989.  The dummy variable is 1 at the third 
quarter of 1989 and the dummy variable of the other periods is 0.  FDICIA is the dummy 
                                                                                                                                                 
permits index (new private housing units), change in unfilled orders (durable goods in 1987 dollars), 
percentage change in sensitive material prices, stock price index (Standard and Poors 500), money supply 
(M2 in 1987 dollars), and index of Comsumer expectations (from the University of Michigan). The source 
of the information is from Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1995.  
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variable for Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991, 
which was signed by President Bush into law on December 20, 199143.  Thus, we define 
the dummy variable FDICIA as 1 at the fourth quarter of 1991 and the others are 0.  
RNIBBEA represents the dummy variable for the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, enacted in September 1994.  Therefore, RNIBBEA of 
the third quarter of 1994 is 1 and that of others periods is 0.   
The model will be estimated for all commercial banks and for sub sets of 
commercial banks based upon their size.  Also, due to potential multi-collinearity 
problems, various sub-sets of the independent variables will be examined separately. 
Furthermore, according to the results of Gilbert (1997, 2000), competition from 
the entrance of large banks should compel small banks in the rural areas to operate more 
efficiently.  This means that large banks with more resources are likely to expand into 
rural area leading to greater competition and efficiency.  If the assumption is true, the 
average efficiency of the banking industry should increase through time when more large 
banks intrude into the rural market.  From most bank efficiency studies, economies of 
scale do exist in the banking industry.  Thus, large banks may be leading change in the  
efficiency of smaller banks.  On the other hand, because of the competitiveness in the 
rural market, small banks operate more cost efficiently than large banks.  In order to be 
                                                                                                                                                 
43 Carow and Larsen Jr. (1997) provided the detail information of the passage of FDICIA in section II. 
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more competitive in the rural market, large banks increase their cost significantly after 
entering the market.  Thus, the lead and lag relationship of the efficiency change of large 
and small banks is ambiguous.  We also examine the lead and lag relationship of the 
average efficiency change of large and small banks.  The model is tested as the following: 
 
 
where S and L represent small and large banks respectively.  The design of the small and 
large banks is as following.  Based on the distribution of banks size in Table 34 Panel A 
and B, banks with total assets equal to or more than $3 billion are defined as large banks.  
The rest of banks are regarded as small banks.  Since, economies of scale do exist in the 
banking industry, those gigantic banks should operate most efficiently among the 
industry.  Thus, the quarterly average change of large bank efficiency might be expected 
to lead the quarterly average change of small bank efficiency.    
 
 
4.5 Results  
Table 35 shows the results of the model on equation (22).  The results show that 
the proxies for market conditions, business cycles, and macroeconomic conditions have 
higher explanatory power for banks between 50 million and 200 million dollars in total 
assets.  Large banks are less dependent on the macroeconomic and market conditions.  
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Large banks are more independent on those factors because of their more diversified 
portfolios. 
The results shown in Table 35 also indicate that the percentage change of banks 
size has significant negative impact on the percentage change of bank efficiency.  This 
result is contradictory to previous studies.  However, if the regression model is split into 
different size categories, we can find the percentage change of bank size has significantly 
positive impact on the change of bank efficiency when bank size is larger than 400 
million dollars in total assets.  As to the proxy of the market conditions, in general, 
market returns have significant negative impact on the bank efficiency change.  The 
bull/bear market conditions positively affect the efficiency change of banks.  Moreover, 
the percentage changes of gross domestic production, unemployment rate, and leading 
indicator all have significant results.  Especially strong is the percentage change of 
leading indicator when negatively affects the efficiency changes of banks.  This might be 
interpreted that banks should operate more efficiently when the economy is going down, 
otherwise, banks with lower efficiency might go bankruptcy. 
Regulation in the banking industry plays an important role in bank efficiency 
change.  The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) 
does not affect the change bank efficiency.  However, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) and Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act (RNIBBEA) have significantly positive and negative impacts 
on bank efficiency change, respectively.  Establishment of risk-based capital premiums in 
FDICIA improved the efficiency of the banking industry.  However, RNIBBEA has a 
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significant negative influence on the bank efficiency change.  Banks with total assets 
more than $50 million are neutral to the passage of the act for the interstate branching.  
Smaller banks with less than $50 million in total assets are negatively affected by the 
passage of the law.   
Table 36 and Table 37 show the simple statistics of X-efficiency for large and 
small bank.44  In generally, there are less than 200 valid large bank observations through 
the examination periods, from 1988 to 1997.  The number of large banks is increasing 
during the 10-year examination periods.  The number of small banks with less than $3 
billion dollars in total assets is much more than that of large banks.  Yet, the number of 
small banks is decreasing through the examination periods.  On average, large banks 
outperform small banks in terms of X-efficiency.  The simple statistics of the percentage 
change of large and small bank efficiencies are also shown in Table 38 and Table 39.  
Autocorrelation is also examined for the time series of large and small bank efficiency in 
Table 40 and Table 41 respectively.  The results show that the bank efficiencies of both 
large and small banks are autocorrelated up to six lags.  The time series of large and small 
bank efficiency both are not stationary.  Percentage of changes of both large and small 
bank efficiencies make both time series stationary.  The results are shown in Table 42 and 
Table 43. 
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Since the time series data of percentage changes of large and small bank 
efficiency are stationary, lead or lag relationship between large and small bank efficiency 
change is examined.  As to the hypotheses based on the assumption in the previous 
section, the efficiency change of large banks may lead that of small banks because of the 
competitiveness of the local financial market.  However, the results in Table 44 show that 
this is not the case.  The results show that efficiency changes of large and small banks do 
not have lead and lag relationships.  Efficiencies of large and small banks change 
simultaneously.  The percentage efficiency change of large banks is positively correlated 
to that of small banks.  When large bank efficiency increases by 1%, small bank 
efficiency increases by 0.83%.  On the other hand, small bank efficiency decreases by 
0.83% when large bank efficiency declines by 1%.  Thus, the efficiency change of large 
banks is more volatile than that of small banks.  Overall, lead and lag relationships 
between large and small bank efficiency change do not exist.  Both efficiencies of large 
and small bank move closely together.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
44 In this essay, large banks are defined as the one with equal to or more than $3 billion dollars in total 
assets.  Small banks are the ones with less than $3 billion dollars in total assets. 
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4.6 Conclusions  
Macroeconomic conditions do affect bank efficiency.  Large banks are less 
affected by those economic factors because of the diversification of their portfolios.  
Seasonal effects also exist in bank efficiency changes.  The results show that the second 
quarter has a negative and significant impact on bank efficiency change.  Moreover, 
regulation in the banking industry is an important factor.  The passage of FDICIA 
improves overall bank efficiency significantly.   
Lead or lag relationship between large and small bank efficiency changes are also 
examined in this essay.  Lead and lag relationships do not exist.  The efficiency change of 
large and small banks is simultaneous.  The results support the argument of Gilbert 
(1997) that the entrance of large bank into the local financial market improves the 
efficiency of the banking industry.   
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TABLE 31. MAJOR BANKING LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES FROM 1988 TO 1997 
 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989 
§ Provided funds to resolve Savings and Loans (S&Ls) failure 
§ Eliminated the Federal Savings and Loans Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) and 
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
§ Created a new insurance fund (SAIF) under the management of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
§ Created the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) to regulate thrifts 
§ Created the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) to resolve insolvent thrifts 
§ Raised deposit insurance premiums 
§ Re-imposed restriction on Savings and Loans (S&Ls) activities 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 
§ Re-capitalized the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
§ Limited brokered deposits and the too-big-to-fail policy 
§ Set provisions for prompt corrective action (PCA), requiring mandatory 
interventions by regulators whenever a bank’s capital falls 
§ Instructed the FDIC to establish risk-based premiums beginning in 1993 
§ Increased examinations, capital requirements, and reporting requirements 
§ Included the Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act (FBSEA), which 
strengthened the Fed’s authority to supervise foreign banks 
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 
§ Permited banks holding companies to acquire banks in other states, starting 
September 1995 
§ Invalidated the laws of states that only allow interstate banking on a regional or 
reciprocal basis 
§ Beginning June 1997, bank holding companies was permitted to convert out-of-
state subsidiary banks into branches of a single interstate bank 
§ Newly chartered branches were also permitted interstate if allowed by state law 
* This information comes from Mishkin and Eakins (1998) and Saunders (1997) 
136 
 
TABLE 32. STATISTICS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS ’ X-EFFICIENCY  
Number (N), mean (Mean), standard deviation (STD), minimum (Minimum), and maximum 
(Maximum) of all available commercial banks’ X-efficiency in each period 
 
Quarter/Year N Mean STD Minimum Maximum 
01/88 13493 0.9615389 0.0164629 0.9342307 1 
02/88 13362 0.962879 0.0154328 0.9386537 1 
03/88 13188 0.9653512 0.0142411 0.9441017 1 
04/88 13071 0.9650262 0.0140527 0.9448373 1 
01/89 12951 0.9702176 0.0120363 0.9534684 1 
02/89 12901 0.969858 0.0119853 0.9538302 1 
03/89 12778 0.9698037 0.0119138 0.9539253 1 
04/89 12658 0.9664573 0.0128582 0.9496647 1 
01/90 12547 0.9716948 0.011123 0.9565151 1 
02/90 12456 0.971914 0.0109893 0.9572652 1 
03/90 12362 0.9712227 0.0111101 0.9565828 1 
04/90 12298 0.9705493 0.011386 0.955826 1 
01/91 12205 0.9704031 0.0114006 0.9555581 1 
02/91 12108 0.9672958 0.0125561 0.950956 1 
03/91 12025 0.9684136 0.0121872 0.9528333 1 
04/91 11872 0.9689972 0.0121807 0.9539456 1 
01/92 11759 0.9623393 0.0144966 0.9449686 1 
02/92 11638 0.9620402 0.0146812 0.9450204 1 
03/92 11545 0.9610776 0.0150112 0.9439562 1 
04/92 11424 0.9556204 0.0173887 0.9351169 1 
01/93 11290 0.9531283 0.0177285 0.9337138 1 
02/93 11161 0.948415 0.0194748 0.9275312 1 
03/93 11047 0.9517172 0.0186091 0.93076 1 
04/93 10933 0.9530229 0.0174107 0.9350429 1 
01/94 10816 0.9563527 0.0157603 0.9403875 1 
02/94 10694 0.9561427 0.0157536 0.9401388 1 
03/94 10566 0.9559631 0.0159887 0.9390213 1 
04/94 10424 0.9564464 0.0156869 0.9402391 1 
01/95 10212 0.958814 0.0145525 0.943151 1 
02/95 10142 0.9595763 0.0145391 0.9436393 1 
03/95 10025 0.9602 0.0143501 0.9447016 1 
04/95 9914 0.9586622 0.01486 0.9423382 1 
01/96 9807 0.9615499 0.0138218 0.9451512 1 
02/96 9660 0.9598226 0.0144524 0.9420214 1 
03/96 9556 0.9468016 0.0203983 0.9169477 1 
04/96 9498 0.9574082 0.0155628 0.9380668 1 
01/97 9417 0.9587427 0.0150062 0.9401945 1 
02/97 9266 0.9559556 0.015883 0.9371955 1 
03/97 9177 0.9540928 0.0161803 0.9353275 1 
04/97 9101 0.9526131 0.016795 0.9331643 1 
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TABLE 33. COMPONENTS OF THE COMPOSITE INDEXES  
 
The composite indexes of leading, coincident, and lagging indicators are summary statistics for 
the U.S. economy. They are constructed by averaging their individual components in order to 
smooth out a good part of the volatility of the individual series.  Historically, the cyclical turning 
points in the leading index have occurred before those in aggregate economic activity, cyclical 
turning points in the coincident index have occurred at about the same time as those in aggregate 
economic activity, and cyclical turning points in the lagging index generally have occurred after 
those in aggregate economic activity.  
 
 Standardization Factor 
Leading Index  
Average weekly hours, manufacturing 0.1899 
Average weekly initial claims for unemployment insurance 0.024 
Manufacturers' new orders, consumer goods and materials 0.0489 
Vendor performance, slower deliveries diffusion index 0.0271 
Manufacturers' new orders, non-defense capital goods 0.0125 
Building permits, new private housing units 0.0184 
Stock prices, 500 common stocks 0.0304 
Money supply, M2 0.3034 
Interest rate spread, 10-year Treasury bonds less federal funds 0.3274 
Index of consumer expectations 0.018 
  
Coincident Index  
Employees on nonagricultural payrolls 0.4822 
Personal income less transfer payments 0.2795 
Industrial production 0.1292 
Manufacturing and trade sales 0.1091 
  
  
Lagging Index  
Average duration of unemployment 0.0371 
Inventories to sales ratio, manufacturing and trade 0.1224 
Labor cost per unit of output, manufacturing 0.0615 
Average prime rate 0.2445 
Commercial and industrial loans 0.1275 
Consumer installment credit to personal income ratio 0.2204 
Consumer price index for services 0.1866 
  
Source: http://www.tcb-indicators.org/lei/component_description.htm 
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TABLE 34. DISTRIBUTION OF BANKS  BASED ON BANK’S SIZE  
The table shows the number of banks (Feq) and relative percentage (%) in the various size range 
in the first quarter of 1988 (Panel A) and the first quarter of 1997 (Panel B).  Size is measured 
using total assets.  M and B represent million dollars and billion dollars respectively. 
PANEL A. DISTRIBUTION OF ALL BANKS BASED ON SIZE IN THE FIRST QURTER OF 1988 
Size Freq % Size Freq % Size Freq % Size Freq % 
<10M 970 7.19 790-810M 4 0.03 1.59-1.61B 2 0.01 2.39-2.41B 1 0.01 
10-30M 4374 32.41 810-830M 5 0.04 1.61-1.63B 1 0.01 2.41-2.43B 1 0.01 
30-50M 2600 19.27 830-850M 6 0.04 1.63-1.65B 1 0.01 2.43-2.45B 0 0 
50-70M 1592 11.8 850-870M 1 0.01 1.65-1.67B 2 0.01 2.45-2.47B 1 0.01 
70-90M 873 6.47 870-890M 10 0.07 1.67-1.69B 1 0.01 2.47-2.49B 0 0 
90-110M 600 4.45 890-910M 8 0.06 1.69-1.71B 4 0.03 2.49-2.51B 2 0.01 
110-130M 417 3.09 910-930M 2 0.01 1.71-1.73B 2 0.01 2.51-2.53B 0 0 
130-150M 306 2.27 930-950M 6 0.04 1.73-1.75B 1 0.01 2.53-2.55B 1 0.01 
150-170M 217 1.61 950-970M 9 0.07 1.75-1.77B 2 0.01 2.55-2.57B 0 0 
170-190M 153 1.13 970-990M 5 0.04 1.77-1.79B 0 0 2.57-2.59B 0 0 
190-210M 138 1.02 990-1010M 4 0.03 1.79-1.81B 0 0 2.59-2.61B 2 0.01 
210-230M 121 0.9 1.01-1.03B 6 0.04 1.81-1.83B 1 0.01 2.61-2.63B 0 0 
230-250M 85 0.63 1.03-1.05B 3 0.02 1.83-1.85B 3 0.02 2.63-2.65B 0 0 
250-270M 65 0.48 1.05-1.07B 10 0.07 1.85-1.87B 7 0.05 2.65-2.67B 2 0.01 
270-290M 58 0.43 1.07-1.09B 2 0.01 1.87-1.89B 6 0.04 2.67-2.69B 0 0 
290-310M 51 0.38 1.09-1.11B 6 0.04 1.89-1.91B 0 0 2.69-2.71B 0 0 
310-330M 56 0.41 1.11-1.13B 6 0.04 1.91-1.93B 3 0.02 2.71-2.73B 4 0.03 
330-350M 37 0.27 1.13-1.15B 4 0.03 1.93-1.95B 3 0.02 2.73-2.75B 2 0.01 
350-370M 37 0.27 1.15-1.17B 4 0.03 1.95-1.97B 1 0.01 2.75-2.77B 3 0.02 
370-390M 35 0.26 1.17-1.19B 5 0.04 1.97-1.99B 0 0 2.77-2.79B 1 0.01 
390-410M 35 0.26 1.19-1.21B 4 0.03 1.99-2.01B 0 0 2.79-2.81B 0 0 
410-430M 22 0.16 1.21-1.23B 2 0.01 2.01-2.03B 1 0.01 2.81-2.83B 1 0.01 
430-450M 31 0.23 1.23-1.25B 7 0.05 2.03-2.05B 1 0.01 2.83-2.85B 0 0 
450-470M 24 0.18 1.25-1.27B 5 0.04 2.05-2.07B 3 0.02 2.85-2.87B 2 0.01 
470-490M 28 0.21 1.27-1.29B 2 0.01 2.07-2.09B 2 0.01 2.87-2.89B 2 0.01 
490-510M 14 0.1 1.29-1.31B 1 0.01 2.09-2.11B 1 0.01 2.89-2.91B 1 0.01 
510-530M 8 0.06 1.31-1.33B 2 0.01 2.11-2.13B 0 0 2.91-2.93B 2 0.01 
530-550M 17 0.13 1.33-1.35B 4 0.03 2.13-2.15B 3 0.02 2.93-2.95B 1 0.01 
550-570M 12 0.09 1.35-1.37B 4 0.03 2.15-2.17B 1 0.01 2.95-2.97B 0 0 
570-590M 17 0.13 1.37-1.39B 4 0.03 2.17-2.19B 0 0 2.97-2.99B 1 0.01 
590-610M 13 0.1 1.39-1.41B 4 0.03 2.19-2.21B 1 0.01 >2.99B 148 1.1 
610-630M 10 0.07 1.41-1.43B 3 0.02 2.21-2.23B 1 0.01    
630-650M 14 0.1 1.43-1.45B 3 0.02 2.23-2.25B 2 0.01    
650-670M 8 0.06 1.45-1.47B 2 0.01 2.25-2.27B 1 0.01    
670-690M 11 0.08 1.47-1.49B 2 0.01 2.27-2.29B 1 0.01    
690-710M 7 0.05 1.49-1.51B 2 0.01 2.29-2.31B 3 0.02    
710-730M 11 0.08 1.51-1.53B 4 0.03 2.31-2.33B 1 0.01    
730-750M 2 0.01 1.53-1.55B 4 0.03 2.33-2.35B 1 0.01    
750-770M 6 0.04 1.55-1.57B 2 0.01 2.35-2.37B 1 0.01    
770-790M 5 0.04 1.57-1.59B 4 0.03 2.37-2.39B 1 0.01    
139 
 
PANEL B.  THE DISTRIBUTION OF BANKS BASED ON SIZE (TOTAL ASSETS) 
The table shows the number of banks (Feq) in the size range in the first quarter of 1997. M and B 
represent million dollars and billion dollars respectively. Percent shows the proportion of all 
sample size.  
 
Size Freq % Size Freq % Size Freq % Size Freq % 
<10M 236 2.51 790-810M 17 0.18 1.59-1.61B 2 0.02 2.39-2.41B 0 0 
10-30M 1778 18.88 810-830M 9 0.1 1.61-1.63B 1 0.01 2.41-2.43B 1 0.01 
30-50M 1724 18.31 830-850M 11 0.12 1.63-1.65B 2 0.02 2.43-2.45B 2 0.02 
50-70M 1195 12.69 850-870M 12 0.13 1.65-1.67B 3 0.03 2.45-2.47B 0 0 
70-90M 854 9.07 870-890M 8 0.08 1.67-1.69B 2 0.02 2.47-2.49B 1 0.01 
90-110M 634 6.73 890-910M 5 0.05 1.69-1.71B 2 0.02 2.49-2.51B 3 0.03 
110-130M 472 5.01 910-930M 5 0.05 1.71-1.73B 3 0.03 2.51-2.53B 2 0.02 
130-150M 353 3.75 930-950M 8 0.08 1.73-1.75B 5 0.05 2.53-2.55B 2 0.02 
150-170M 246 2.61 950-970M 4 0.04 1.75-1.77B 1 0.01 2.55-2.57B 1 0.01 
170-190M 208 2.21 970-990M 2 0.02 1.77-1.79B 1 0.01 2.57-2.59B 0 0 
190-210M 157 1.67 990-1010M 2 0.02 1.79-1.81B 2 0.02 2.59-2.61B 1 0.01 
210-230M 140 1.49 1.01-1.03B 9 0.1 1.81-1.83B 0 0 2.61-2.63B 1 0.01 
230-250M 124 1.32 1.03-1.05B 2 0.02 1.83-1.85B 3 0.03 2.63-2.65B 1 0.01 
250-270M 107 1.14 1.05-1.07B 4 0.04 1.85-1.87B 0 0 2.65-2.67B 0 0 
270-290M 75 0.8 1.07-1.09B 11 0.12 1.87-1.89B 3 0.03 2.67-2.69B 2 0.02 
290-310M 57 0.61 1.09-1.11B 8 0.08 1.89-1.91B 0 0 2.69-2.71B 0 0 
310-330M 62 0.66 1.11-1.13B 5 0.05 1.91-1.93B 2 0.02 2.71-2.73B 3 0.03 
330-350M 55 0.58 1.13-1.15B 5 0.05 1.93-1.95B 1 0.01 2.73-2.75B 1 0.01 
350-370M 37 0.39 1.15-1.17B 5 0.05 1.95-1.97B 0 0 2.75-2.77B 1 0.01 
370-390M 42 0.45 1.17-1.19B 6 0.06 1.97-1.99B 0 0 2.77-2.79B 3 0.03 
390-410M 28 0.3 1.19-1.21B 7 0.07 1.99-2.01B 1 0.01 2.79-2.81B 1 0.01 
410-430M 31 0.33 1.21-1.23B 3 0.03 2.01-2.03B 3 0.03 2.81-2.83B 0 0 
430-450M 44 0.47 1.23-1.25B 6 0.06 2.03-2.05B 3 0.03 2.83-2.85B 0 0 
450-470M 25 0.27 1.25-1.27B 5 0.05 2.05-2.07B 0 0 2.85-2.87B 0 0 
470-490M 35 0.37 1.27-1.29B 2 0.02 2.07-2.09B 1 0.01 2.87-2.89B 0 0 
490-510M 23 0.24 1.29-1.31B 2 0.02 2.09-2.11B 0 0 2.89-2.91B 0 0 
510-530M 29 0.31 1.31-1.33B 2 0.02 2.11-2.13B 4 0.04 2.91-2.93B 1 0.01 
530-550M 31 0.33 1.33-1.35B 8 0.08 2.13-2.15B 2 0.02 2.93-2.95B 1 0.01 
550-570M 17 0.18 1.35-1.37B 4 0.04 2.15-2.17B 3 0.03 2.95-2.97B 0 0 
570-590M 12 0.13 1.37-1.39B 2 0.02 2.17-2.19B 3 0.03 2.97-2.99B 3 0.03 
590-610M 20 0.21 1.39-1.41B 3 0.03 2.19-2.21B 1 0.01 >2.99B 190 2.02 
610-630M 12 0.13 1.41-1.43B 5 0.05 2.21-2.23B 2 0.02    
630-650M 9 0.1 1.43-1.45B 3 0.03 2.23-2.25B 2 0.02    
650-670M 11 0.12 1.45-1.47B 1 0.01 2.25-2.27B 0 0    
670-690M 11 0.12 1.47-1.49B 0 0 2.27-2.29B 1 0.01    
690-710M 2 0.02 1.49-1.51B 3 0.03 2.29-2.31B 0 0    
710-730M 6 0.06 1.51-1.53B 4 0.04 2.31-2.33B 1 0.01    
730-750M 6 0.06 1.53-1.55B 1 0.01 2.33-2.35B 0 0    
750-770M 13 0.14 1.55-1.57B 2 0.02 2.35-2.37B 2 0.02    
770-790M 11 0.12 1.57-1.59B 2 0.02 2.37-2.39B 0 0    
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TABLE 35. REGRESSION MODEL RESULTS 
This table contains the results of the estimation of the regression model for bank efficiency changes by size categories.  The variables used in the 
model are the percentage change of bank size, percentage change of total loans, market return based on CRSP equal weighted index, bull/bear 
market dummy variable, dividend yield, default premium, dummy variable for federal discount-rate change, federal funds premium, banks per 
capita at the county level, quarter dummy variables (q1 q2 q3), percentage change of gross domestic production, percentage change of 
unemployment rate, percentage change of leading indicator, and dummy variables of important deregulation acts, respectively. 
 ALL Banks <20M 20M-50M 50M-100M 100M-200M 200M-300M 300M-400M 400M-500M 500M-1000M 1000M-2000M >3000M 
Adjusted R2 0.0774 0.0712 0.0859 0.0982 0.0945 0.0882 0.0802 0.084 0.062 0.0349 0.0419 
Intercept -0.01501*** -0.01867*** -0.01697*** -0.01432*** -0.01191*** -0.00924*** -0.01171*** -0.00885*** -0.01047*** -0.01098*** -0.00885*** 
DSize -0.00055894*** -0.00504*** -0.0033*** -0.00017761 -0.00088213*** -0.00075138*** -0.00091457*** 0.00088501** 0.00010227 0.00020199 0.00072683*** 
DTL 0.00000332*** 0.00002561*** 0.0000009961329 -0.00008692*** -0.00001028 0.00000174 -0.00022019*** -0.00014922 0.00006292 -0.00000674 -0.00011546* 
MR -0.00564*** -0.00639*** -0.00752*** -0.00571*** -0.00364*** -0.00261*** -0.00606*** -0.00297 -0.00334** -0.00312 0.00483** 
BB 0.00408*** 0.00431*** 0.00424*** 0.00406*** 0.00397*** 0.00361*** 0.00384*** 0.00418*** 0.00392*** 0.00352*** 0.00305*** 
DP 1.26744*** 2.05376*** 1.66769*** 1.11366*** 0.62368*** 0.38665*** 0.48246** -0.0231 0.47467* 0.68709* 0.50941 
DEF -0.00938 -0.04549** 0.0029 0.01257 -0.00087903 -0.08631** 0.05403 -0.02894 -0.08709 -0.0516 -0.15452* 
DIR -0.00014495*** -0.00044588*** -0.00014691** -0.00013565* 0.00005915 0.00003329 0.0000969 0.00074372* -0.00003701 -0.00019995 0.00010557 
FFP 0.08767*** 0.03782*** 0.07409*** 0.10793*** 0.12017*** 0.08537*** 0.13358*** 0.09044** 0.0819** 0.1734*** 0.05276 
BPC 0.31135*** 0.15321 0.1139 0.02093 -0.04622 1.31985 0.20273 -2.56383 8.1987** -1.22246 1.20988 
q1 0.00204*** 0.00207*** 0.00263*** 0.00209*** 0.00134*** 0.00113*** 0.00185*** 0.0012*** 0.00138*** 0.00102** -0.00112** 
q2 -0.00054744*** 0.00018554* 0.00004093 -0.00072158*** -0.00141*** -0.00178*** -0.0015*** -0.00243*** -0.00169*** -0.0014*** -0.00207*** 
q3 0.0019*** 0.00296*** 0.0024*** 0.00169*** 0.00104*** 0.0009558*** 0.00082544*** 0.0000232 0.00122*** 0.0015*** -0.00007945 
DGDP 0.49055*** 0.53968*** 0.45901*** 0.46316*** 0.49461*** 0.51761*** 0.47615*** 0.57331*** 0.56256*** 0.49822*** 0.63003*** 
DUNEMP  0.03982*** 0.02904*** 0.03429*** 0.04058*** 0.04896*** 0.05493*** 0.0465*** 0.0687*** 0.05486*** 0.04238*** 0.07045*** 
DLEAD -0.29672*** -0.31543*** -0.26379*** -0.28501*** -0.31058*** -0.3485*** -0.27971*** -0.33879*** -0.37976*** -0.24304*** -0.40605*** 
FIRREA -0.00003819 -0.00049575** 0.00005346 -0.00005926 0.00013246 0.00042532 0.00029759 0.00153* -0.00003406 -0.0013 -0.00051812 
FDICIA 0.00206*** 0.00281*** 0.0024*** 0.00188*** 0.00152*** 0.00136*** 0.00128*** 0.00067231 0.00142** 0.00193* 0.00117 
RNIBBEA -0.00041174*** -0.00202*** -0.00068227*** 0.0000072 0.00018953 0.00025646 0.00015102 -0.00034234 -0.00006125 0.00035237 0.00067799 
***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 36. SUMMARY STATISTICS OF LARGE BANK EFFICIENCY  
Large banks have more than $3 billion in total assets.  Max and Min mean the maximum and 
minimum X-efficiency among the large banks.  Mean is the average of X-efficiency of large 
banks.  N represents the sample size and STD is the standard deviation of X-efficiency of the 
samples.  
Quarter/Year MAX MEAN MIN N STD 
0188 1 0.967201 0.934231 148 0.023169957 
0288 1 0.967528 0.938654 152 0.018821537 
0388 1 0.970177 0.944102 159 0.016415619 
0488 1 0.96978 0.944837 164 0.01579249 
0189 1 0.975412 0.953468 161 0.013110313 
0289 1 0.977161 0.95383 165 0.012703865 
0389 1 0.976003 0.953925 165 0.012367783 
0489 1 0.974055 0.949665 169 0.012506418 
0190 1 0.977454 0.956515 165 0.010857815 
0290 1 0.978436 0.957265 166 0.01073283 
0390 1 0.978401 0.956583 173 0.011035825 
0490 1 0.978751 0.955826 172 0.011040612 
0191 1 0.981431 0.955558 168 0.013084662 
0291 1 0.980596 0.950956 173 0.015656986 
0391 1 0.982063 0.952833 175 0.013170081 
0491 1 0.984602 0.953946 179 0.011959936 
0192 1 0.979612 0.944969 181 0.013644163 
0292 1 0.978866 0.94502 179 0.014214949 
0392 1 0.978614 0.943956 177 0.014353996 
0492 1 0.976301 0.935117 178 0.017478277 
0193 1 0.96928 0.933714 174 0.019118399 
0293 1 0.965417 0.927531 180 0.022456088 
0393 1 0.97019 0.93076 181 0.02031283 
0493 1 0.970881 0.935043 184 0.020071359 
0194 1 0.972529 0.940388 188 0.017346073 
0294 1 0.972265 0.940139 188 0.018996405 
0394 1 0.973117 0.939021 187 0.018453163 
0494 1 0.972554 0.940239 195 0.018404661 
0195 1 0.974341 0.943151 191 0.019236062 
0295 1 0.974897 0.943639 197 0.019761723 
0395 1 0.976677 0.944702 198 0.017596232 
0495 1 0.976955 0.942338 201 0.017971244 
0196 1 0.975804 0.945151 199 0.017089791 
0296 1 0.976058 0.942021 191 0.017074016 
0396 1 0.959155 0.916948 189 0.031922537 
0496 1 0.970853 0.938067 189 0.016474249 
0197 1 0.974965 0.940195 190 0.017385715 
0297 1 0.975609 0.937196 180 0.018908579 
0397 1 0.971433 0.935327 174 0.019382833 
0497 1 0.968595 0.933164 170 0.020281795 
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TABLE 37. SIMPLE STATISTICS OF SMALL BANK EFFICIENCY 
Small banks have less than $3 billion in total assets.  Max and Min mean the maximum and 
minimum X-efficiency among the samples of small banks respectively.  Mean is the average of 
X-efficiency of small banks.  N represents the sample size and STD is the standard deviation of 
X-efficiency of the samples. 
Quarter/Year MAX MEAN MIN N STD 
0188 1 0.961476 0.934231 13345 0.016363 
0288 1 0.962826 0.938654 13210 0.015382 
0388 1 0.965292 0.944102 13029 0.014203 
0488 1 0.964966 0.944837 12907 0.01402 
0189 1 0.970152 0.953468 12790 0.012008 
0289 1 0.969763 0.95383 12736 0.011947 
0389 1 0.969723 0.953925 12613 0.011887 
0489 1 0.966354 0.949665 12489 0.012833 
0190 1 0.971618 0.956515 12382 0.011107 
0290 1 0.971826 0.957265 12290 0.010967 
0390 1 0.971121 0.956583 12189 0.011078 
0490 1 0.970433 0.955826 12126 0.011349 
0191 1 0.970249 0.955558 12037 0.0113 
0291 1 0.967103 0.950956 11935 0.012402 
0391 1 0.968212 0.952833 11850 0.012057 
0491 1 0.968758 0.953946 11693 0.012028 
0192 1 0.962069 0.944969 11578 0.014346 
0292 1 0.961777 0.94502 11459 0.014535 
0392 1 0.960805 0.943956 11368 0.014859 
0492 1 0.955293 0.935117 11246 0.017189 
0193 1 0.952876 0.933714 11116 0.017589 
0293 1 0.948136 0.927531 10981 0.019299 
0393 1 0.951409 0.93076 10866 0.018424 
0493 1 0.952717 0.935043 10749 0.017202 
0194 1 0.956067 0.940388 10628 0.015581 
0294 1 0.955854 0.940139 10506 0.015539 
0394 1 0.955654 0.939021 10379 0.015772 
0494 1 0.956139 0.940239 10229 0.015469 
0195 1 0.958518 0.943151 10021 0.014287 
0295 1 0.959273 0.943639 9945 0.014253 
0395 1 0.959868 0.944702 9827 0.014081 
0495 1 0.958284 0.942338 9713 0.014549 
0196 1 0.961255 0.945151 9608 0.01359 
0296 1 0.959495 0.942021 9469 0.014206 
0396 1 0.946552 0.916948 9367 0.020022 
0496 1 0.957135 0.938067 9309 0.015424 
0197 1 0.958409 0.940195 9227 0.014768 
0297 1 0.955566 0.937196 9086 0.01557 
0397 1 0.953758 0.935327 9003 0.015929 
0497 1 0.952309 0.933164 8931 0.016574 
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TABLE 38. SUMMARY STATISTICS OF PERCENTAGE CHANGE OF LARGE BANK 
EFFICIENCY 
Large banks have more than $3 billion in total assets.  Max and Min mean the maximum and 
minimum of percentage change of X-efficiency among the samples of large banks respectively.  
Mean is the average percentage change of X-efficiency of large banks.  N represents the sample 
size and STD is the standard deviation of percentage change of X-efficiency of the samples. 
Quarter/Year MAX MEAN MIN N STD 
0288 0.070399 0.000795 -0.02188 152 0.012258 
0388 0.041205 0.003172 -0.02093 158 0.008847 
0488 0.020264 0.000151 -0.01705 164 0.004285 
0189 0.045482 0.005751 -0.02418 160 0.010126 
0289 0.01134 0.00184 -0.0075 165 0.003149 
0389 0.007634 -0.00102 -0.01355 164 0.003074 
0489 0.036569 -0.00194 -0.01846 169 0.006124 
0190 0.031877 0.003392 -0.03679 165 0.006257 
0290 0.008802 0.000938 -0.02088 166 0.003051 
0390 0.01114 -1.6E-05 -0.00901 173 0.002824 
0490 0.021711 0.000453 -0.01042 172 0.003303 
0191 0.046215 0.002582 -0.02104 165 0.007908 
0291 0.029607 -0.00049 -0.02431 173 0.007419 
0391 0.023249 0.001235 -0.04717 174 0.006876 
0491 0.024644 0.002979 -0.00742 179 0.003941 
0192 0.031321 -0.00532 -0.02786 181 0.006891 
0292 0.014931 -0.00019 -0.04976 179 0.005669 
0392 0.011973 -0.00034 -0.01722 177 0.003603 
0492 0.026136 -0.00236 -0.04365 177 0.008785 
0193 0.044307 -0.00678 -0.03843 174 0.010168 
0293 0.070992 -0.00356 -0.06234 180 0.010743 
0393 0.058452 0.004538 -0.06924 181 0.014058 
0493 0.039188 0.00116 -0.05716 183 0.01157 
0194 0.06947 0.001382 -0.0287 188 0.011999 
0294 0.016943 -0.00044 -0.02746 188 0.006783 
0394 0.063673 0.000469 -0.06098 187 0.011271 
0494 0.018177 0.000695 -0.02655 195 0.004648 
0195 0.063559 0.00209 -0.04682 191 0.013406 
0295 0.024138 0.000652 -0.03398 197 0.007061 
0395 0.04761 0.001996 -0.02452 198 0.006948 
0495 0.034209 0.000763 -0.0409 201 0.006596 
0196 0.06119 -0.00089 -0.03686 199 0.010579 
0296 0.035118 -0.00052 -0.05731 191 0.00813 
0396 0.061547 -0.0173 -0.08305 189 0.033917 
0496 0.0762 0.013598 -0.03735 189 0.027277 
0197 0.066022 0.003988 -0.05981 189 0.014363 
0297 0.024022 0.000228 -0.04053 178 0.005978 
0397 0.008425 -0.00383 -0.05175 173 0.006829 
0497 0.011948 -0.00239 -0.0273 170 0.005099 
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TABLE 39. SUMMARY STATISTICS OF PERCENTAGE CHANGE OF SMALL BANK 
EFFICIENCY 
Small banks have less than $3 billion in total assets.  Max and Min mean the maximum and 
minimum of percentage change of X-efficiency among the samples of small banks respectively.  
Mean is the average percentage change of X-efficiency of small banks.  N represents the sample 
size and STD is the standard deviation of percentage change of X-efficiency of the samples. 
Quarter/Year MAX MEAN MIN N STD 
0288 0.070399 0.001355 -0.06135 13147 0.00704 
0388 0.065356 0.002508 -0.0559 12981 0.005319 
0488 0.059208 -0.00048 -0.05516 12834 0.004534 
0189 0.058383 0.005325 -0.04653 12736 0.008029 
0289 0.048802 -0.00051 -0.04617 12669 0.003835 
0389 0.048405 -0.00011 -0.04607 12571 0.003184 
0489 0.0483 -0.00359 -0.05034 12444 0.004468 
0190 0.053003 0.005404 -0.04348 12337 0.007145 
0290 0.045462 0.00017 -0.04273 12241 0.003552 
0390 0.044643 -0.00079 -0.04342 12143 0.002991 
0490 0.045388 -0.00079 -0.04417 12073 0.003509 
0191 0.046215 -0.00019 -0.04444 12010 0.006731 
0291 0.046509 -0.00336 -0.04904 11890 0.00484 
0391 0.051573 0.001093 -0.04717 11810 0.004013 
0491 0.049502 0.000613 -0.04605 11670 0.003998 
0192 0.048278 -0.00696 -0.05503 11556 0.007608 
0292 0.058236 -0.00031 -0.05498 11445 0.004434 
0392 0.058178 -0.00103 -0.05604 11354 0.003435 
0492 0.059371 -0.00581 -0.06488 11205 0.007001 
0193 0.069385 -0.00254 -0.06629 11100 0.010136 
0293 0.070992 -0.00501 -0.07247 10961 0.006418 
0393 0.078131 0.003487 -0.06924 10849 0.007172 
0493 0.074391 0.001367 -0.05741 10727 0.007159 
0194 0.06947 0.00354 -0.05961 10612 0.00891 
0294 0.063391 -0.00024 -0.05986 10487 0.004791 
0394 0.063673 -0.00023 -0.06098 10365 0.004906 
0494 0.064939 0.000424 -0.05976 10208 0.005064 
0195 0.063559 0.002503 -0.05685 9998 0.008569 
0295 0.060276 0.000744 -0.05636 9909 0.004494 
0395 0.059727 0.000596 -0.05303 9799 0.003516 
0495 0.058535 -0.00177 -0.05766 9675 0.004253 
0196 0.06119 0.003055 -0.05485 9576 0.007616 
0296 0.058032 -0.00195 -0.05798 9431 0.004436 
0396 0.061547 -0.01368 -0.08305 9318 0.013656 
0496 0.090575 0.011164 -0.06193 9264 0.01154 
0197 0.066022 0.001244 -0.05981 9176 0.010057 
0297 0.06361 -0.0031 -0.0628 9030 0.005306 
0397 0.067013 -0.00219 -0.06467 8944 0.003999 
0497 0.069144 -0.00171 -0.06684 8872 0.005276 
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TABLE 40. TIME SERIES PROPERTIES OF LARGE BANK X-EFFICIENCY 
 
Autocorrelations 
Lag Covariance Correlation Std Error 
    
0 2.46E-05 1 0 
1 1.52E-05 0.6162 0.158114 
2 9.08E-06 0.36877 0.209727 
3 6.03E-06 0.24462 0.225355 
4 4.83E-06 0.19593 0.231898 
5 2.91E-06 0.11831 0.236 
6 -1.27E-06 -0.05158 0.237478 
7 -2.38E-06 -0.09667 0.237758 
8 -5.11E-06 -0.20766 0.238739 
 
Autocorrelation Check for White Noise 
   To        Chi-                  Pr > 
  Lag      Square     DF     ChiSq    --------------------Autocorrelations-------------------- 
 
    6       27.68         6          0.0001     0.616     0.369     0.245     0.196     0.118    -0.052 
 
 
TABLE 41. TIME SERIES PROPERTIES OF SMALL BANK X-EFFICIENCY 
 
Autocorrelations 
Lag Covariance Correlation Std Error 
    
0 4.74E-05 1 0 
1 3.99E-05 0.84026 0.158114 
2 3.51E-05 0.7408 0.245564 
3 3.24E-05 0.68226 0.296212 
4 2.83E-05 0.59719 0.33319 
5 2.32E-05 0.48889 0.358953 
6 1.57E-05 0.332 0.375231 
7 1.11E-05 0.23331 0.382504 
8 6.76E-06 0.14261 0.386045 
 
 
Autocorrelation Check for White Noise 
   To        Chi-                    Pr > 
  Lag      Square     DF     ChiSq    --------------------Autocorrelations-------------------- 
 
    6      109.37         6        <.0001     0.840     0.741     0.682     0.597     0.489     0.332 
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TABLE 42. TIME SERIES PROPERTIES OF PERCENTAGE CHANGE OF LARGE BANK X-
EFFICIENCY 
 
Autocorrelations 
Lag Covariance Correlation Std Error 
    
0 1.87E-05 1 0 
1 -3.30E-06 -0.17654 0.160128 
2 -2.27E-06 -0.12145 0.165044 
3 -2.18E-06 -0.11675 0.167319 
4 1.08E-06 0.05789 0.169395 
5 1.33E-06 0.0711 0.169902 
6 -9.25E-07 -0.04946 0.170663 
7 6.89E-07 0.03685 0.17103 
8 -9.06E-07 -0.04849 0.171234 
 
Autocorrelation Check for White Noise 
 
   To        Chi-                       Pr > 
  Lag      Square         DF     ChiSq    --------------------Autocorrelations-------------------- 
 
    6        3.06               6      0.8008    -0.177    -0.121    -0.117     0.058     0.071    -0.049 
 
 
TABLE 43. TIME SERIES PROPERTIES OF PERCENTAGE CHANGE OF SMALL BANK X-
EFFICIENCY 
 
Autocorrelations 
Lag Covariance Correlation Std Error 
    
0 1.5E-05 1 0 
1 -3.02E-06 -0.20124 0.160128 
2 -1.89E-06 -0.12593 0.166486 
3 1.98E-06 0.13154 0.168911 
4 7.40E-07 0.04931 0.171517 
5 -1.23E-07 -0.00821 0.171881 
6 -5.99E-08 -0.00399 0.171891 
7 3.94E-08 0.00263 0.171893 
8 -8.71E-07 -0.05801 0.171894 
 
 
Autocorrelation Check for White Noise 
 
   To        Chi-                   Pr > 
  Lag      Square     DF     ChiSq    --------------------Autocorrelations-------------------- 
 
    6        3.27            6    0.7739    -0.201    -0.126     0.132     0.049    -0.008    -0.004 
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TABLE 44.  LEAD AND LAG RELATIONSHIPS IN SMALL AND LARGE BANKS’ EFFICIENCY 
The following are the results of the model shown in equation (2), as shown below.  
 
 
Centered R**2       0.846063       
R Bar **2       0.783089 
Uncentered R**2     0.848949       
T x R**2      27.166 
Mean of Dependent Variable       -0.000567214 
Std Error of Dependent Variable   0.004169672 
Standard Error of Estimate         0.001941970 
Sum of Squared Residuals          0.0000829675 
Regression F(9,22)                     13.4351 
Significance Level of F             0.00000049 
Durbin-Watson Statistic               1.774582 
Q(8-0)                                1.838463 
Significance Level of Q             0.98556986 
 
Variable  Coefficient Std Error T-Stat 
Constant -0.000670925 0.000372671 -1.80031* 
DXEFFSt-1 -0.223822956 0.209539215 -1.06817 
DXEFFSt-2 0.010877243 0.096500168 0.11272 
DXEFFSt-3 0.075756928 0.095434712 0.79381 
DXEFFSt-4 -0.041279614 0.107031749 -0.38568 
DXEFFSt-5 -0.071924607 0.12520395 -0.57446 
DXEFFSt-6 0.096457309 0.126254933 0.76399 
DXEFFLt+1 0.03494987 0.081420897 0.42925 
DXEFFLt 0.83011372 0.084579393 9.81461*** 
DXEFFLt-1 0.140526845 0.186507327 0.75347 
***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels respectively. 
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FIGURE 11. X-EFFICIENCY VERSUS BUSINESS CYCLES  
This figure shows the movement of average X-efficiency of the banking industry accompanied 
with the business cycles.  The faded area represent the period of recession during the sample 
period. Series 1 indicates the mean of X-efficiency of U.S. commercial banks in each sample 
quarter.  
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FIGURE 12. X-EFFICIENCY OF BANKS BASED ON DIFFERENT SIZE CATEGORIES  
This figure shows the quarterly average X-efficiency of banks based on different size categories.  
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CHAPTER 5 
AN ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATION OF X-EFFICIENCY IN BANKS 
 
5.1 Abstract 
Cross sectional regression analysis is the traditional estimation technique for X-
efficiency.  Time series properties of the data are not considered in the estimation of X-
efficiency.  Thus, autocorrelation may create bias for the estimation.  In this essay, an 
alternative estimation, considering both cross section and time series properties of the 
data, is conducted.  The estimation of the alternative approaches is applied to the 
empirical analyses done in the first two essays. 
 
 
5.2 Introduction  
Previous studies generally use the translog function equation to estimate X-
efficiency in banks.  Cross sectional regression methodology is used to calculate the 
residual and form the X-efficient frontier.  The technique of seeming unrelated regression 
(SUR) is generally employed in those studies.  However, total costs, outputs, and inputs 
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of banks are time-varying might have autocorrelation during the testing periods.  
Moreover, the residuals of the translog function are also correlated with previous time 
periods.  If the cost efficient frontier is formed in this approach, the frontier might be 
biased.  
In this study, the problem of autocorrelation in the residuals is considered.  Thus, 
cross-sectional and time series properties are considered jointly for the estimation of the 
translog function.  A comparison of two different approaches will be conducted.  We 
expect the alternative approach, which considers both cross section and time series 
variation, will form a better efficient frontier for the X-efficiency.  An empirical ana lysis 
will be conducted to show the differences of the results between the new and old 
approaches.  We re-examine the results found in the first two essays by utilizing the time-
series, cross-sectional estimates of X-efficiency. 
 
 
5.3 Literature Review 
According to previous studies, there is lack of agreement among researches 
regarding a better frontier estimation approach.  Berger and Humphrey (1997) 
documented a number of different possible approaches.  The parametric approaches 
commit the mistake of imposing a particular functional form and associated behavioral 
assumptions that presuppose the shape of the frontier.  The nonparametric studies impose 
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less structure on the frontier but commit the mistake of not allowing for random error 
owing to luck, data problems, or other measurement error.  If random error exists, 
measured efficiency may be confounded with these random deviations from the true 
efficient frontier.  The conflict between the nonparametric and parametric approaches is 
important because the two types of methods tend to have different degrees of dispersion 
and rank the same financial institutions somewhat differently.  Thus, Berger and 
Humphrey (1997) suggested that it would be more appropriate to add more flexibility 
into the parametric approaches and to introduce a degree of random error into the 
nonparametric approaches.  
Bentson, Hanweck, and Humphrey (1982) first investigated scale economies in 
banking by using the translog function.  Murray and White (1983) also applied the 
translog function examining scale and scope economies of British Columbia credit 
unions.  They mentioned that the translog function is essentially a second-order Taylor 
series expansion in output quantities and input prices.  The cost function should be 
linearly homogeneous in all input prices, concave in input prices, and increasing in the 
product of output and input price.  Humphrey (1985) distinguished the difference 
between the production approach and the intermediation approach to bank behavior.  
Demand deposits, time and saving deposits, the variety of loans, and employment of 
capital, labor, and materials are regarded as the production of banks.  The production 
approach treats those outputs and inputs as banks’ production.  The intermediation 
approach views banks as collectors of funds which are transformed into other products, 
like loans and other assets.  Humphrey emphasized that the production approach provides 
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better measurement of cost efficiency because operating costs of banks are the only 
concern of this approach.  The overall costs of banking are the concern of the 
intermediation approach, which is appropriate for describing the problems related to the 
economic viability of banks.  Berger, Hanweck, and Humphrey (1987) examined the 
competitive viability in the banking industry by using the intermediation approach.  
Ferrier and Lovell (1990) concluded that it is appropriate to employ production approach 
for the study of cost efficiency because cost efficiency only concern the operating costs 
of banking.  
This essay employs the production approach by using the translog function to 
estimate bank efficiency.  The conventional translog cost function plus input share 
equation, modified by Christensen and Greene (1976), are generally used in the studies of 
banks’ X-efficiency.45  However, McAllister and McManus (1993) and Mitchell and 
Onvural (1996) showed that the translog function might under-represent some of the 
results of scale economies because of the ill- fit of the translog function across a wide 
range of bank size.  Berger and Mester (1997) argued that a more flexible functional form 
could reduce the problems of the translog function.  They suggested the Fourier- flexible 
                                                                                                                                                 
45 Christensen and Greene (1970) estimated economies of scale for U.S. firms, which produced electronic 
power from 1955 to 1970 by using the stochastic parametric cost frontier, which incorporated technical, 
allocative, and cost efficiency.  
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function form which augments the translog function by including Fourier trigonometric 
terms.46  
The fourier-flexible function is more flexible than the translog function.  Gallant 
(1981) suggested that when including a second-order polynomial in the explanatory 
variables, a Fourier series representation of an unknown function could achieve a given 
level of approximation error with fewer trigonometric terms.  McAllister and McManus 
(1993), Berger and DeYoung (1997), and Mitchell and Onvural (1996) also showed that 
Fourier- flexible function is a global approximation to virtually any cost or profit function 
and fits the data for U.S. financial institutions better than the translog function.  
Furthermore, Berger and DeYoung (1997) provided the empirical evidence showing that 
measured inefficiencies were about doubled when the translog function was specified in 
place of the Fourier-flexible function.   
Mitchell and Onvural (1996) asserted that permitting sample size to guide 
numbers of terms in cost functions might be unique on initial encounter, but it lies at the 
heart of the difference between parametric an semi-nonparametric methods.  When using 
a parametric method, as one does with the translog function, one holds the maintained 
hypothesis that the bank industry’s true cost function has the translog form.  If this 
                                                                                                                                                 
46 See Gallant (1981 and 1982), Chalfant and Gallant (1985), Eastwood and Gallant (1991), and Gallant 
and Souza (1991) for detail of the Fourier-flexible function form. 
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maintained hypothesis actually is false, misspecification error can cause tests of 
hypotheses such as the hypothesis of constant returns to scale, to be rejected when they 
are actually true.  Although a Taylor series expansion may approximate a function around 
the expansion point in a mathematical sense, White (1980) demonstrated that ordinary 
least squares estimates of a second-order polynomial have a true Taylor series 
interpretation only under highly restrictive conditions.  
Flexible functional forms are used in econometrics because these forms allow to 
modeling of second-order effects, for example, elasticity of substitution, which is the 
second derivative of the production, cost, or utility function.  The translog function is the 
most widely used functional forms.  Berndt and Christensen (1973) showed that the 
translog model is often interpreted as a second-order approximation to an unknown 
functional form.  Previous studies, like Aigner and Chu (1968), Bentson, Hanweck, and 
Humphrey (1982), Berger (1993), Berger, Hunter, and Timme (1993), Berger and Mester 
(1997), Berger and DeYoung (1997), Berger and Hannan (1997), Berger and Humphey 
(1997), DeYoung (1997), and Evanoff (1998), employed the translog function by using 
cross-sectional regression.  In order to permit zero outputs, Clark and Speaker (1994) 
utilized a generalized translog cost function to evaluate scale and scope economies.  
Kwan and Eisenbeis (1996) asserted that there is little information on how X-efficiencies 
in the banking industry might evolve over time in response to market forces and on how 
the rankings of X-efficiencies of individual banking firms might change over time.  Both 
Kwan and Eisenbeis (1996) and Peristiani (1997) assumed the cost function to be 
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stationary over time.  Pooled time-series cross-sectional observations were used to 
estimate the stochastic cost frontier.   
 
 
5.4 Data and Methodology 
The Reports of Condition and Income Report Guide (Call Report) is the source of 
the banks’ output and input data.  The study period is from the first quarter of 1988 to the 
fourth quarter of 1997.  We use the translog flexible function form to estimate the cost 
structure of banks and to derive the measure of the bank efficiency. 47  The translog 
function has been widely used to analyze the cost characteristics of depository 
institutions.48  The standard tranlog function is given by the following: 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
47 The translog function is also used as the cost equation in Mester (1987) and Englis h et al. (1993) 
48 See the survey of Berger, Hunter, and Timme (1993) for the detail information. 
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where xt i represents the X-efficiency factor and ut i is the random error.  The current 
specification assumes six standard bank outputs and four input prices.  The specifications 
are the following: 
TCt i = total costs of bank i at time t = (total operating expenses + interest 
expenses) 
yk = bank outputs; (k=1) real estate loans, (k=2) agricultural loans, (k=3) 
commercial and industrial loans, (k=4) loans to individual for household, family, and 
other personal expenditures, (k=5)deposit liability – transaction accounts, and (k=6) 
deposit liability – nontransaction accounts.  
pl = price inputs; (l=1) total interest expenses, (l=2) price of capital (occupancy 
expenses, furniture, equipment and other non- interest expenses), and (l=3) salaries and 
employees benefits. 
Cost-share equations are derived from Shephard’s Lemma as follow: 
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A share equation is omitted in order to prevent singularity.  We estimate the equation 
formed by equation (24) and (25) subject to homogeneity and symmetry restrictions by 
the method of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR).  
However, seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) consider only the cross 
sectional relationship between the total costs (TC) and those banks’ inputs and outputs 
simultaneously through 40 quarters, which is from the first quarter of 1988 to the fourth 
quarter of 1997.  Thus, our new model considers the cross sectional and autocorrelation 
relationship of each variables.  The rationale of the regression is as following: 
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where TCin*1 means the n*1 matrix in total cost of commercial banks for each bank i. 
Ykin*1 is the matrix of the commercial bank’s outputs and k is the number from 1 to 6 that 
k=1 is real estate loans, k=2 is  agricultural loans, k=3 is commercial and industrial loans, 
k=4 is loans to individual for household, family, and other personal expenditures, k=5 is 
deposit liability – transaction accounts, and k=6 is deposit liability – nontransaction 
accounts.  Plin*1 is the matrix of the commercial bank’s price inputs and l is the number 
from 1 to 3 that l=1 is total interest expenses, l=2 is price of capital (occupancy expenses, 
furniture, equipment and other non-interest expenses), and l=3 salaries and employees 
benefits.  YYmin*1 and PPqin*1 are the matrix of the interaction within bank’s outputs and 
price inputs respectively where m has 15 combinations and n has 3 combinations.  Ypjin*1 
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is the matrix of the interaction between the bank’s output and input variables where j has 
18 combinations.  All variables are in logarithm terms in the matrix.   
If a firm systematically incurs relatively higher costs than the other firms in a 
competitive environment, it is considered X-inefficient.  In the survey of Berger, Hunter, 
and Timme (1993), there are several econometric and linear programming techniques 
have been proposed for estimating X-efficiency.  They are Econometric Frontier 
Approach (EFA), Thick Frontier Approach (TFA), Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), 
and Distribution-Free Approach (DFA).  In this study, we assume the efficiency 
differences are stable over time, and the random error averages out over time.  Thus, we 
employ the distribution-free approach proposed by Berger (1993) to estimate the 
efficiency of the banks.49  From equation (24) and (26), we can define et i = ln(xt i) + uti 
and  e’t i = x’t i + u’ti  respectively.  We can observe the problem of the disturbance term of 
the equation (27).  We assume that the inputs are autocorrelated and follow the AR(1) 
process.  The derivation is as follow: 
                                                                                                                                                 
49 See also the discussion in DeYoung (1997) for a diagnostic test for the distribution –free efficiency 
estimator. 
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From equation (27), the variance of the error term (eti) of the traditional translog 
function is shown on equation (28).  Thus, the variance of the error term (eti), which 
purely considers the cross section of the traditional translog function, can be expected to 
be greater than the variance of e’t i, which considers the cross section and time series 
jointly (see equation (29) and (30)).  
Peristiani (1997) indicates that residual can be transformed so that the minimum is 
zero.  Thus:  
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By taking the exponential of equation (31) and (32), we can obtain the efficiency 
as equation (34) and (35).  However, because of the difference of the variance on 
equation (30), we can expect that the expected residual of the traditional translog function 
is greater than the expected residual of the alternative translog function, equation (33).  
Thus, X-efficiency (Xeff) derived from the traditional translog function (equation (34)) 
should have more variation than the X-efficiency (Xeff’) derived from the alternative 
translog function (equation (35)).  
 
XEFFti is normalized to fall between zero and one.  However, XEFFt i is not robust 
to outliers.  Berger modifies the observations that fall below the p-th percentile are set to 
the p-th percentile value ( )(ˆ ptie ), and observations that exceed the (1-p)-th percentile are 
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valued at ( )1(ˆ pti
-e ).  Thus, the modified X-efficiencies derived from traditional and 
alternative translog functions can be defined as: 
 
 
 
 
5.5 Empirical Study 
In order to show the differences between the traditional and alternative translog 
functions, several empirical analyses are conducted.  All commercial banks during the 
periods between 1988 and 1997 are used to form the cost frontier.  The criteria that we 
use as a filter is that the charter type in the call report should be 200, 210, 250, or 340 and 
the primary issuer code and total assets are both greater than zero.  By using different 
methodologies, shown in equation (27) and equation (28), two different residuals are 
formed.  After getting two different residual from equation (31) and equation (32), we 
form two different X-efficient frontiers of all commercial banks. 
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Since two sets of X-efficiency data for commercial banks in the United States are 
available by using different approaches, the differences of banks X-efficiencies are 
observed.  Commercial banks’ X-efficiencies derived from the alternative translog 
function are expected to be lower than those derived from the traditional translog 
function because of the time-series problems in the traditional translog function.  
Furthermore, the newly developed X-efficiencies of commercial banks are also applied to 
the examinations done in the essay I and essay II, which are the economies of scale in the 
banking industry and the relationship between X-efficiency and monetary policy and 
macroeconomic factors.  Moreover, the lead and lag relationship between large and small 
banks are also compared by traditional and alternative X–efficiency estimations. 
 
 
5.6 Results  
In this essay, some empirical tests in chapter 3 and 4 are applied to test the 
alternative estimate of X-efficiency that we develop.  Simple statistics of traditional and 
alternative X-efficiency estimation are shown in Table 45 and Table 46.  The results 
show that the mean of traditional estimation is higher than that of alternative estimation.  
The volatility within the industry in every year is also higher for the alternative efficiency 
estimation.  Economies of scale in the banking industry are also examined.  Economies of 
scale do exist in the banking industry by traditional X-efficiency estimation shown in 
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Figure 13.  However, Figure 14 shows that it is not the case for the alternative X-
efficiency estimation.  If the observations are categorized based on bank specialization in 
agriculture, there is a range of optimal size in agricultural banks by the traditional 
approach (Figure 15).50  Economies of scale exist for non-agricultural banks (Figure 17).  
However, Figure 16 and Figure 18 show that the alternative estimation does not exhibit 
the economies scale for the specialty and non-specialty banks.  Pairwise comparisons are 
conducted to examine the optimal size of the bank.  For the traditional estimation, Table 
47 shows that specialty banks with total assets between 20 and 250 million dollars 
outperform non-specialty banks.  With the alternative approach, Table 48 shows the 
optimal size for the banks with agricultural specialization is between 90 and 100 million 
dollars in total assets.  Yet, non-agricultural banks outperform agricultural banks in 400 
to 500 million dollars of bank size.  Other than those two ranges of bank size, there is no 
difference between the efficiency of agricultural and non-agricultural banks.  Economies 
of scale disappear when the alternative estimation is applied.  The efficiency of large 
banks declines in the new approach.  The major difference between the traditional and 
new approaches is the autocorrelation in the error term.  Large banks might gain an 
advantage for the better past performance.  Thus, when the bank size increases, it cost 
efficiency improves by the traditional estimation which ignores the autocorrelation issue 
in the efficiency estimation.  The alternative estimation can examine bank efficiency 
                                                                                                                                                 
50 Agricultural banks are defined as banks with more than 25 percent agricultural loans of total loans.  
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independently without the influence of the past performance.  Therefore, large banks 
might not have an advantage in cost efficiency by employing the alternative X-efficiency 
estimation.   
The basic bank information model in chapter 3 is also examined in this essay.  
Table 49 and Table 50 show the results between bank efficiency and bank fundamental 
information by the traditional and newly developed approaches respectively.  In Table 49, 
the results from three different regressions based on different criteria are consistent with 
traditional estimation.  The adjusted R squares are all less than 1 percent.  In Table 50, 
the results using the alternative estimation are different from those by traditional 
estimation shown in Table 49.  For the alternative estimation, the average agricultural 
loan ratio is not statistical significant.  The multiplier effect of agricultural loan and bank 
size with the tradition estimation (Table 49) does not exist in the alternative estimation.  
However, the competitiveness of the local financial markets (bkcapita) does have a 
significant positive impact on bank efficiency.  The volatility of agricultural loan ratio 
does not play an important role in the alternative estimation.  Seasonal effects do affect 
bank efficiency significantly.  However, the first and second quarters have a significant 
negative influence on bank efficiency when estimated with the alternative approach.  
The relationship between bank efficiency and macro economic conditions is 
tested and the results are shown in Table 51.  The change of bank size, market returns, the 
dummy of the Federal Reserve discount-rate changes, and the second quarter have 
significant negative impact on bank efficiency by traditional estimation and positive 
significant impact on bank efficiency using the alternative estimation.  Default premium, 
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federal funds premium, bank competitiveness, and Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act have significant positive effects on bank efficiency using 
traditional estimation and negative effects using the alternative estimation.  However, the 
percentage change of total loans and gross domestic production influence bank efficiency 
positively by traditional estimation but not by alternative estimation.  
Finally, the lead and lag relationships between large and small banks are 
examined.51  Simple statistics of large and small banks’ X-efficiencies by traditional and 
alternative estimation are shown in Table 52, Table 53, Table 54, and Table 55.  Since the 
time series properties of X-efficiency of both large and small banks are not stationary, 
first differencing of X-efficiency is taken in order to make the data stationary.  In Table 
56, Table 57, Table 58, and Table 59, the results show that only the percentage changes 
of large and small banks’ X-efficiency estimated by traditional approach are stationary.  
Lead and lag relationship are examined and the results shown in Table 60 indicate that 
the improvement of large bank efficiency enhances the change of small bank efficiency 
simultaneously.  Although the results shown in Table 61 by alternative estimation support 
those in Table 60 by traditional estimation, the non-stationary properties of the 
percentage change efficiency estimated by the alternative approach shown in Table 61, 
indicate the results may be biased   
                                                                                                                                                 
51 3 million dollars in total assets is the cutoff between large and small banks.  
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5.7 Conclusion 
After considering the autocorrelation issue of the X-efficiency estimation, we find 
that X-efficiency estimated by the alternative approach is lower than that by traditional 
estimation.  Large banks might lose the advantage of gaining cost efficiency after the 
consideration of autocorrelation in X-efficiency estimation.  Thus, economies of scale do 
not exist when using the alternative estimation.   
Autocorrelation might be an important issue in the process of X-efficiency 
estimation.  However, in order to test the lead and lag relationship between large and 
small bank efficiency, the alternative estimation, which takes autocorrelation into 
account, might lead to significant problems for the tests of the lead and lag relationship.  
Thus, the results are still ambiguous as to whether the estimation of X-efficiency should 
consider autocorrelation in the estimation process.   
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TABLE 45. STATISTICS OF TRADITIONAL ESTIMATED BANKS ’ X-EFFICIENCY  
Number (N), mean (Mean), standard deviation (STD), minimum (Minimum), and maximum 
(Maximum) of all available commercial banks’ X-efficiency in each period 
 
Quarter/Year N Mean STD Minimum Maximum 
01/88 13493 0.9615389 0.0164629 0.9342307 1 
02/88 13362 0.962879 0.0154328 0.9386537 1 
03/88 13188 0.9653512 0.0142411 0.9441017 1 
04/88 13071 0.9650262 0.0140527 0.9448373 1 
01/89 12951 0.9702176 0.0120363 0.9534684 1 
02/89 12901 0.969858 0.0119853 0.9538302 1 
03/89 12778 0.9698037 0.0119138 0.9539253 1 
04/89 12658 0.9664573 0.0128582 0.9496647 1 
01/90 12547 0.9716948 0.011123 0.9565151 1 
02/90 12456 0.971914 0.0109893 0.9572652 1 
03/90 12362 0.9712227 0.0111101 0.9565828 1 
04/90 12298 0.9705493 0.011386 0.955826 1 
01/91 12205 0.9704031 0.0114006 0.9555581 1 
02/91 12108 0.9672958 0.0125561 0.950956 1 
03/91 12025 0.9684136 0.0121872 0.9528333 1 
04/91 11872 0.9689972 0.0121807 0.9539456 1 
01/92 11759 0.9623393 0.0144966 0.9449686 1 
02/92 11638 0.9620402 0.0146812 0.9450204 1 
03/92 11545 0.9610776 0.0150112 0.9439562 1 
04/92 11424 0.9556204 0.0173887 0.9351169 1 
01/93 11290 0.9531283 0.0177285 0.9337138 1 
02/93 11161 0.948415 0.0194748 0.9275312 1 
03/93 11047 0.9517172 0.0186091 0.93076 1 
04/93 10933 0.9530229 0.0174107 0.9350429 1 
01/94 10816 0.9563527 0.0157603 0.9403875 1 
02/94 10694 0.9561427 0.0157536 0.9401388 1 
03/94 10566 0.9559631 0.0159887 0.9390213 1 
04/94 10424 0.9564464 0.0156869 0.9402391 1 
01/95 10212 0.958814 0.0145525 0.943151 1 
02/95 10142 0.9595763 0.0145391 0.9436393 1 
03/95 10025 0.9602 0.0143501 0.9447016 1 
04/95 9914 0.9586622 0.01486 0.9423382 1 
01/96 9807 0.9615499 0.0138218 0.9451512 1 
02/96 9660 0.9598226 0.0144524 0.9420214 1 
03/96 9556 0.9468016 0.0203983 0.9169477 1 
04/96 9498 0.9574082 0.0155628 0.9380668 1 
01/97 9417 0.9587427 0.0150062 0.9401945 1 
02/97 9266 0.9559556 0.015883 0.9371955 1 
03/97 9177 0.9540928 0.0161803 0.9353275 1 
04/97 9101 0.9526131 0.016795 0.9331643 1 
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TABLE 46. STATISTICS OF ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATED BANKS’ X-EFFICIENCY 
Number (N), mean (Mean), standard deviation (STD), minimum (Minimum), and maximum 
(Maximum) of all available commercial banks’ X-efficiency in each period 
 
 
Quarter/Year N Mean STD Minimum Maximum 
01/88 12905 0.931358 0.036014 0.866035 1 
02/88 12968 0.947903 0.025407 0.895805 1 
03/88 13014 0.955892 0.021156 0.913664 1 
04/88 12899 0.949327 0.023829 0.90267 1 
01/89 13260 0.884779 0.052183 0.792426 1 
02/89 13204 0.945523 0.026216 0.894561 1 
03/89 13086 0.956171 0.021359 0.913998 1 
04/89 12969 0.947632 0.025131 0.897133 1 
01/90 12859 0.895449 0.04824 0.80791 1 
02/90 12770 0.946089 0.025383 0.897598 1 
03/90 12677 0.952642 0.022178 0.908915 1 
04/90 12608 0.950603 0.02335 0.904402 1 
01/91 12515 0.890413 0.049818 0.79987 1 
02/91 12418 0.94646 0.025318 0.8962 1 
03/91 12335 0.952408 0.021997 0.908871 1 
04/91 12188 0.952782 0.02386 0.903519 1 
01/92 12079 0.884814 0.053587 0.789203 1 
02/92 11975 0.945919 0.026137 0.894308 1 
03/92 11892 0.956189 0.0207 0.916842 1 
04/92 11793 0.949809 0.026147 0.895553 1 
01/93 11699 0.88883 0.051419 0.800049 1 
02/93 11601 0.946544 0.025072 0.899353 1 
03/93 11499 0.955197 0.020213 0.918359 1 
04/93 11395 0.954115 0.022903 0.907146 1 
01/94 11299 0.903498 0.044722 0.824224 1 
02/94 11173 0.947463 0.024217 0.902434 1 
03/94 11046 0.953367 0.020701 0.916231 1 
04/94 10913 0.955157 0.022496 0.909562 1 
01/95 10705 0.877508 0.055841 0.785043 1 
02/95 10634 0.945136 0.02605 0.896141 1 
03/95 10514 0.953869 0.021664 0.912015 1 
04/95 10399 0.950678 0.024263 0.900003 1 
01/96 10300 0.887609 0.052825 0.786947 1 
02/96 10144 0.929475 0.03071 0.871579 1 
03/96 10049 0.946156 0.023637 0.900129 1 
04/96 10001 0.953355 0.025338 0.895392 1 
01/97 9932 0.885487 0.049399 0.801199 1 
02/97 9797 0.940106 0.026589 0.890297 1 
03/97 9642 0.952808 0.022679 0.90636 1 
04/97 9501 0.948612 0.026409 0.891044 1 
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TABLE 47. COMPARISON OF TRADITIONAL ESTIMATED X-EFFICIENCY BASED ON LOAN 
SPECIALIZATION IN DETAILED SIZE CATEGORIES  
This table contains the comparison of bank efficiency based on loan specialization by using the 
detailed size categories.  Cochran statistics are used to test the difference between efficiencies of 
banks without agricultural loan specialization (NA) and banks with agricultural loan 
specialization (A).  Because of the lack of observations of banks with agricultural loan 
specialization, the results of the banks with $600 million or higher in total assets are not available.  
 
Size (total assets, million dollars) t Value (NA-A) Results 
0-10 24.18*** NA>A 
10-20 13.12*** NA>A 
20-30 -19.62*** A>NA 
30-40 -18.99*** A>NA 
40-50 -24.59*** A>NA 
50-60 -16.45*** A>NA 
60-70 -16.63*** A>NA 
70-80 -12.92*** A>NA 
80-90 -8.27*** A>NA 
90-100 -10.18*** A>NA 
100-150 -9.7*** A>NA 
150-200 -2.51** A>NA 
200-250 -3.11*** A>NA 
250-300 1.29 NA=A 
300-400 3.8*** NA>A 
400-500 4.33*** NA>A 
500-600 . . 
600-700 . . 
700-800 . . 
800-900 . . 
900-1000 . . 
1000-1500 . . 
1500-2000 . . 
2000-3000 . . 
3000-5000 . . 
5000-10000 . . 
>10000 . . 
***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively. Values are for the 
statistics using the Cochran and Cox approximation. 
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TABLE 48. COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATED X-EFFICIENCY BASED ON LOAN 
SPECIALIZATION IN DETAILED SIZE CATEGORIES  
This table contains the comparison of bank efficiency based on loan specialization by using the 
detailed size categories.  Cochran statistics are used to test the difference between efficiencies of 
banks without agricultural loan specialization (NA) and banks with agricultural loan 
specialization (A).  Because of the lack of observations of banks with agricultural loan 
specialization, the results of the banks with $600 million or higher in total assets are not available.  
 
Size (total assets, million dollars) t Value (NA-A) Results 
0-10 -0.99 NA=A 
10-20 -1.30 NA=A 
20-30 0.46 NA=A 
30-40 -0.15 NA=A 
40-50 0.76 NA=A 
50-60 0.95 NA=A 
60-70 -1.58 NA=A 
70-80 -1.09 NA=A 
80-90 -1.95* A>NA 
90-100 -0.51 NA=A 
100-150 -0.56 NA=A 
150-200 -0.92 NA=A 
200-250 -0.60 NA=A 
250-300 0.35 NA=A 
300-400 -0.88 NA=A 
400-500 2.59 NA>A 
500-600 . . 
600-700 . . 
700-800 . . 
800-900 . . 
900-1000 . . 
1000-1500 . . 
1500-2000 . . 
2000-3000 . . 
3000-5000 . . 
5000-10000 . . 
>10000 . . 
***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively. Values are for the 
statistics using the Cochran and Cox approximation. 
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TABLE 49. THE FUNDAMENTAL INFORMATION MODEL BY TRADITIONAL X-EFFICIENCY 
ESTIMATION 
This table contains results of the estimation of the fundamental information model for explaining 
banks’ X-efficiencies.  Size is the size of the bank, measured by total assets in logarithm term.  
Size2 represents the size of the bank in squared.  Size3 shows the size of the bank in cubed.  AAR 
is the average agricultural loan ratio, calculated from the average agricultural loans divided by the 
total assets.  Inter is an interaction term, testing the relationship between agricultural loans and 
bank’s size.  Bkcapita represents banks per capita in the county level, which is the proxy of the 
competitiveness of the local financial market.  Bkcapita is the ratio of number of commercial 
banks chartered in the county to the population of the county.  Agpr ice shows the volatility of 
agricultural loans based on the quarterly data of average agricultural loans over the 10-year 
examination period.  qj = dummy variables measuring seasonal effect.  q1 represents first quarter, 
q2 represents second quarter, and q3 represents third quarter.  XEFFi is the average efficiency of 
each commercial bank over 1988-1997 periods. 
 
 
Observations All Banks Agricultural Banks Non-Agricultural Banks 
    
Variable     
intercept 1.07545*** 2.62388*** 1.07718*** 
size -0.02762*** -0.49307*** -0.02642*** 
size2 0.00203*** 0.04795*** 0.00182*** 
size3 -0.00004369*** -0.00153*** -0.00003590*** 
AAR -0.10998*** -0.06214*** -0.23956*** 
Inter 0.01082*** 0.00732*** 0.02158*** 
Bkcapita 4.14366*** 3.79562*** 7.35801*** 
Agprice -2.87701E-8*** -5.56486E-7*** -3.28334E-8*** 
q1 0.00194*** 0.00207*** 0.00194*** 
q2 0.00092125*** 0.00092995*** 0.00094170*** 
q3 0.00023268*** 0.00028747* 0.00023137*** 
    
Adjusted R2: 0.0341 0.086 0.0341 
***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 50. THE FUNDAMENTAL INFORMATION MODEL BY ALTERNATIVE X-EFFICIENCY 
ESTIMATION 
This table contains results of the estimation of the fundamental information model for explaining 
banks’ X-efficiencies.  Size is the size of the bank, measured by total assets in logarithm term.  
Size2 represents the size of the bank in squared.  Size3 shows the size of the bank in cubed.  AAR 
is the average agricultural loan ratio, calculated from the average agricultural loans divided by the 
total assets.  Inter is an interaction term, testing the relationship between agricultural loans and 
bank’s size.  Bkcapita represents banks per capita in the county level, which is the proxy of the 
competitiveness of the local financial market.  Bkcapita is the ratio of number of commercial 
banks chartered in the county to the population of the county.  Agprice shows the volatility of 
agricultural loans based on the quarterly data of average agricultural loans over the 10-year 
examination period.  qj = dummy variables measuring seasonal effect.  q1 represents first quarter, 
q2 represents second quarter, and q3 represents third quarter.  XEFFi is the average efficiency of 
each commercial bank over 1988-1997 periods. 
 
 
 
 
Observations  All Banks Agricultural Banks Non-Agricultural Banks 
     
Variable      
Intercept  0.88447*** 1.14131*** 0.87688*** 
Size  0.01758*** -0.05951** 0.01967*** 
size2  -0.00149*** 0.00617** -0.00167*** 
size3  0.00004046*** -0.00021179** 0.0000459*** 
AAR  0.00491 0.00113 0.00119 
Inter  -0.00077884* -0.00017423 -0.00055115 
bkcapita  0.83372** 0.80871* 1.20364** 
agprice  0.000000000000721788* 0.00000000000326377 0.000000000000717221* 
q1  -0.05761*** -0.05752*** -0.05762*** 
q2  -0.00715*** -0.00698*** -0.00719*** 
q3  0.0023*** 0.00193*** 0.00238*** 
     
Adjusted R2  0.3575 0.3583 0.3574 
***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 51. THE RELATIONSHIP BETW EEN BANK EFFICIENCY AND MACRO ECONOMIC 
CONDITIONS BY DIFFERENT X-EFFICIENCY ESTIMATIONS 
This table contains the results of the estimation of the regression model for bank efficiency 
changes by size categories.  The variables used in the model are the percentage change of bank 
size, percentage change of total loans, market return based on CRSP equal weighted index, 
bull/bear market dummy variable, dividend yield, default premium, dummy variable for federal 
discount-rate change, federal funds premium, banks per capita at the county level, quarter dummy 
variables (q1 q2 q3), percentage change of gross domestic production, percentage change of 
unemployment rate, percentage change of leading indicator, and dummy variables of important 
deregulation acts, respectively. 
 
ititititit
ititititit
itititititititit
RNIBBEAFDICIAFIRREALEAD
UNEMPGDPSEASONBPCFFP
DIRDEFDPBBMRTLSizeXEFF
ebbbb
bbbbb
bbbbbbba
++++D+
D+D++D++
+++++D+D+=D
16151413
12111098
7654321
 
 
 
Variables Parameter Estimate 
 Traditional Estimation Alternative Estimation 
Adjusted R2 0.0774 0.4654 
Intercept -0.01501*** 0.04734*** 
DSize -0.00055894*** 0.00242*** 
DTL 0.00000332*** 0.0000058 
MR -0.00564*** 0.0263*** 
BB 0.00408*** 0.00078276** 
DP 1.26744*** -5.25234*** 
DEF -0.00938 -1.21403*** 
DIR -0.00014495*** 0.0033*** 
FFP 0.08767*** -0.59277*** 
BPC 0.31135*** -0.34457 
q1 0.00204*** -0.0686*** 
q2 -0.00054744*** 0.05871*** 
q3 0.0019*** 0.00835*** 
DGDP 0.49055*** -0.02396 
DUNEMP 0.03982*** 0.18341*** 
Dlead -0.29672*** -0.49657*** 
FIRREA -0.00003819 0.00983*** 
FDICIA 0.00206*** -0.00247*** 
RNIBBEA -0.00041174*** -0.00805*** 
***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 52. TIME SERIES PROPERTIES OF LARGE BANK EFFICIENCY BY TRADITIONAL X-
EFFICIENCY ESTIMATION 
 
Autocorrelations 
Lag Covariance Correlation Std Error 
    
0 2.46E-05 1 0 
1 1.52E-05 0.6162 0.158114 
2 9.08E-06 0.36877 0.209727 
3 6.03E-06 0.24462 0.225355 
4 4.83E-06 0.19593 0.231898 
5 2.91E-06 0.11831 0.236 
6 -1.27E-06 -0.05158 0.237478 
7 -2.38E-06 -0.09667 0.237758 
8 -5.11E-06 -0.20766 0.238739 
Autocorrelation Check for White Noise 
   To        Chi-                  Pr > 
  Lag      Square     DF     ChiSq    --------------------Autocorrelations-------------------- 
 
    6       27.68         6          0.0001     0.616     0.369     0.245     0.196     0.118    -0.052 
 
 
TABLE 53. TIME SERIES PROPERTIES OF LARGE BANK EFFICIENCY BY ALTERNATIV E X-
EFFICIENCY ESTIMATION 
 
Autocorrelations 
Lag Covariance Correlation Std Error 
    
0 0.000846 1 0 
1 -9E-05 -0.10662 0.158114 
2 -0.00028 -0.32991 0.159901 
3 -0.00021 -0.24791 0.176097 
4 0.000522 0.61689 0.184616 
5 -7.5E-05 -0.08811 0.230458 
6 -0.00022 -0.25833 0.231298 
7 -0.00015 -0.17747 0.238402 
8 0.00031 0.36644 0.241683 
Autocorrelation Check for White Noise 
 
   To        Chi-                   Pr > 
  Lag      Square     DF     ChiSq    --------------------Autocorrelations-------------------- 
 
    6       29.52          6      <.0001    -0.107    -0.330    -0.248     0.617    -0.088    -0.258 
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TABLE 54. TIME SERIES PROPERTIES OF SMALL BANK EFFICIENCY BY TRADITIONAL X-
EFFICIENCY ESTIMATION 
 
Autocorrelations 
Lag Covariance Correlation Std Error 
    
0 4.74E-05 1 0 
1 3.99E-05 0.84026 0.158114 
2 3.51E-05 0.7408 0.245564 
3 3.24E-05 0.68226 0.296212 
4 2.83E-05 0.59719 0.33319 
5 2.32E-05 0.48889 0.358953 
6 1.57E-05 0.332 0.375231 
7 1.11E-05 0.23331 0.382504 
8 6.76E-06 0.14261 0.386045 
Autocorrelation Check for White Noise 
   To        Chi-                    Pr > 
  Lag      Square     DF     ChiSq    --------------------Autocorrelations-------------------- 
 
    6      109.37         6        <.0001     0.840     0.741     0.682     0.597     0.489     0.332 
 
 
 
TABLE 55. TIME SERIES PROPERTIES OF SMALL BANK EFFICIENCY BY ALTERNATIVE X-
EFFICIENCY ESTIMATION 
 
Autocorrelations 
Lag Covariance Correlation Std Error 
    
0 0.000677 1 0 
1 -0.00014 -0.21193 0.158114 
2 -0.00032 -0.46655 0.165062 
3 -0.00016 -0.24153 0.195267 
4 0.00058 0.85685 0.202598 
5 -0.00012 -0.17164 0.278847 
6 -0.00028 -0.41318 0.281476 
7 -0.00017 -0.25199 0.296251 
8 0.000519 0.76752 0.301562 
Autocorrelation Check for White Noise 
 
   To        Chi-                   Pr > 
  Lag      Square     DF     ChiSq    --------------------Autocorrela tions-------------------- 
 
    6       58.32          6      <.0001    -0.212    -0.467    -0.242     0.857    -0.172    -0.413 
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TABLE 56. TIME SERIES PROPERTIES OF PERCENTAGE CHANGE OF LARGE BANK 
EFFICIENCY BY TRADITIONAL X-EFFICIENCY ESTIMATION 
 
Autocorrelations 
Lag Covariance Correlation Std Error 
    
0 1.87E-05 1 0 
1 -3.30E-06 -0.17654 0.160128 
2 -2.27E-06 -0.12145 0.165044 
3 -2.18E-06 -0.11675 0.167319 
4 1.08E-06 0.05789 0.169395 
5 1.33E-06 0.0711 0.169902 
6 -9.25E-07 -0.04946 0.170663 
7 6.89E-07 0.03685 0.17103 
8 -9.06E-07 -0.04849 0.171234 
Autocorrelation Check for White Noise 
 
   To        Chi-                       Pr > 
  Lag      Square         DF     ChiSq    --------------------Autocorrelations-------------------- 
 
    6        3.06               6      0.8008    -0.177    -0.121    -0.117     0.058     0.071    -0.049 
 
 
 
TABLE 57. TIME SERIES PROPERTIES OF PERCENTAGE CHANGE OF LARGE BANK 
EFFICIENCY BY ALTERNATIVE X-EFFICIENCY ESTIMATION 
 
Autocorrelations 
Lag Covariance Correlation Std Error 
    
0 0.0022908 1 0 
1 -0.0009213 -0.40217 0.160128 
2 -0.0002672 -0.11666 0.184216 
3 -0.0008495 -0.37083 0.1861 
4 0.0016023 0.69943 0.204169 
5 -0.0005413 -0.23629 0.258404 
6 -0.0002267 -0.09895 0.263886 
7 -0.0005343 -0.23324 0.264836 
8 0.00099515 0.43441 0.270051 
Autocorrelation Check for White Noise 
 
   To        Chi-                    Pr > 
  Lag      Square     DF     ChiSq    --------------------Autocorrelations-------------------- 
 
    6       38.95         6       <.0001    -0.402    -0.117    -0.371     0.699    -0.236    -0.099 
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TABLE 58. TIME SERIES PROPERTIES OF PERCENTAGE CHANGE OF SMALL BANK 
EFFICIENCY BY TRADITIONAL X-EFFICIENCY ESTIMATION 
 
Autocorrelations 
Lag Covariance Correlation Std Error 
    
0 1.5E-05 1 0 
1 -3.02E-06 -0.20124 0.160128 
2 -1.89E-06 -0.12593 0.166486 
3 1.98E-06 0.13154 0.168911 
4 7.40E-07 0.04931 0.171517 
5 -1.23E-07 -0.00821 0.171881 
6 -5.99E-08 -0.00399 0.171891 
7 3.94E-08 0.00263 0.171893 
8 -8.71E-07 -0.05801 0.171894 
Autocorrelation Check for White Noise 
 
   To        Chi-                   Pr > 
  Lag      Square     DF     ChiSq    --------------------Autocorrelations-------------------- 
 
    6        3.27            6    0.7739    -0.201    -0.126     0.132     0.049    -0.008    -0.004 
 
TABLE 59. TIME SERIES PROPERTIES OF PERCENTAGE CHANGE OF SMALL BANK 
EFFICIENCY BY ALTERNATIVE X-EFFICIENCY ESTIMATION 
 
Autocorrelations 
Lag Covariance Correlation Std Error 
    
0 0.0020504 1 0 
1 -0.0008238 -0.40179 0.160128 
2 -0.0003811 -0.18587 0.184173 
3 -0.0007233 -0.35276 0.188922 
4 0.0017628 0.85974 0.205117 
5 -0.000668 -0.32578 0.282805 
6 -0.0003156 -0.15391 0.292269 
7 -0.0007125 -0.34751 0.29434 
8 0.0016025 0.78155 0.304679 
Autocorrelation Check for White Noise 
 
   To        Chi-                    Pr > 
  Lag      Square     DF     ChiSq    --------------------Autocorrelations-------------------- 
 
    6       53.72          6      <.0001    -0.402    -0.186    -0.353     0.860    -0.326    -0.154 
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TABLE 60.  LEAD AND LAG RELATIONSHIPS IN SMALL AND LARGE BANKS ’ EFFICIENCY 
BY TRADITIONAL X-EFFICIENCY ESTIMATION 
The following are the results of the model as shown below using traditional X-efficiency 
estimation.  
 
 
Centered R**2       0.846063       
R Bar **2       0.783089 
Uncentered R**2     0.848949       
T x R**2      27.166 
Mean of Dependent Variable       -0.000567214 
Std Error of Dependent Variable   0.004169672 
Standard Error of Estimate         0.001941970 
Sum of Squared Residuals          0.0000829675 
Regression F(9,22)                     13.4351 
Significance Level of F             0.00000049 
Durbin-Watson Statistic               1.774582 
Q(8-0)                                1.838463 
Significance Level of Q             0.98556986 
 
Variable  Coefficient Std Error T-Stat 
Constant -0.000670925 0.000372671 -1.80031* 
DXEFFSt-1 -0.223822956 0.209539215 -1.06817 
DXEFFSt-2 0.010877243 0.096500168 0.11272 
DXEFFSt-3 0.075756928 0.095434712 0.79381 
DXEFFSt-4 -0.041279614 0.107031749 -0.38568 
DXEFFSt-5 -0.071924607 0.12520395 -0.57446 
DXEFFSt-6 0.096457309 0.126254933 0.76399 
DXEFFLt+1 0.03494987 0.081420897 0.42925 
DXEFFLt 0.83011372 0.084579393 9.81461*** 
DXEFFLt-1 0.140526845 0.186507327 0.75347 
***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 61. LEAD AND LAG RELATIONSHIPS IN SMALL AND LARGE BANKS ’ EFFICIENCY 
BY ALTERNATIVE X-EFFICIENCY ESTIMATION 
The following are the results of the model as shown below using alternative X-efficiency 
estimation.   
 
 
 
Centered R**2        0.974654       
R Bar **2       0.964285 
Uncentered R**2      0.974712       
T x R**2          31.191 
Mean of Dependent Variable       0.0022436300 
Std Error of Dependent Variable  0.0473918523 
Standard Error of Estimate        0.0089563184 
Sum of Squared Residuals          0.0017647441 
Regression F(9,22)                     93.9978 
Significance Level of F             0.00000000 
Durbin-Watson Statistic               1.824902 
Q(8-0)                                7.755928 
Significance Level of Q             0.45766775 
 
Variable  Coeff Std Error T-Stat 
Constant 0.008096 0.003339 2.42505** 
DXEFFSt-1 -1.01705 0.209099 -4.86399*** 
DXEFFSt-2 -0.95072 0.305284 -3.11421*** 
DXEFFSt-3 -0.83157 0.337692 -2.46252** 
DXEFFSt-4 0.035958 0.329558 0.10911 
DXEFFSt-5 0.074639 0.249202 0.29951 
DXEFFSt-6 0.092452 0.136549 0.67706 
DXEFFLt+1 -0.01943 0.060805 -0.31961 
DXEFFLt 0.117812 0.067376 1.74858* 
DXEFFLt-1 0.084784 0.063131 1.34297 
***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significant level respectively. 
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FIGURE 13. TRADITIONAL ESTIMATED X-EFFICIENCY OF ALL COMMERCIAL BANKS  
This figure shows the quarterly average X-efficiency of banks based on different size categories 
using traditional X-efficiency estimation. 
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FIGURE 14. ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATED X-EFFICIENCY OF ALL COMMERCIAL BANKS  
This figure shows the quarterly average X-efficiency of banks based on different size categories 
using alternative X-efficiency estimation. 
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FIGURE 15. TRADITIONAL ESTIMATED X-EFFICIENCY OF COMMERCIAL BANKS WITH 
SPECIALIZATION IN AGRICULTURAL LOANS 
This figure shows the quarterly average X-efficiency of banks with specialization in agricultural 
loans based on different size categories using traditional X-efficiency estimation. 
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FIGURE 16. ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATED X-EFFICIENCY OF COMMER CIAL BANKS WITH 
SPECIALIZATION IN AGRICULTURAL LOANS  
This figure shows the quarterly average X-efficiency of banks with specialization in agricultural 
loans based on different size categories using alternative X-efficiency estimation. 
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FIGURE 17. TRADITIONAL ESTIMATED X-EFFICIENCY OF COMMERCIAL BANKS WITH 
SPECIALIZATION IN NON-AGRICULTURAL LOANS 
This figure shows the quarterly average X-efficiency of banks with no specialization in 
agricultural loans based on different size categories using traditional X-efficiency estimation. 
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FIGURE 18. ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATED X-EFFICIENCY OF COMMER CIAL BANKS WITH 
SPECIALIZATION IN NON-AGRICULTURAL LOANS 
This figure shows the quarterly average X-efficiency of banks with no specialization in 
agricultural loans based on different size categories using alternative X-efficiency estimation. 
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